

Biographical Summary

Harlan Cleveland, son of Stanley Matthews Cleveland and Marian Phelps Van Buren Cleveland, was born on January 19, 1918 in New York City. His father, an Episcopal chaplain at Princeton University and the University of Wisconsin, died in 1926. Following his father's death, he and three siblings were raised by their mother in the United States and Europe.

A graduate of Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, Cleveland at age sixteen was admitted to Princeton University where he received his bachelor's degree in 1938. He was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University until the escalation of World War II in Europe suspended his scholarship.

With his studies interrupted, he returned to the United States where he worked as an economic warfare specialist in Washington, D.C.

In the early postwar years he served as a United Nations relief and rehabilitation administrator in Italy and China.

In 1948 Cleveland joined the Economic Cooperation Administration, where he served as director of the China Aid Program, then developed and managed U.S. aid to East Asia. Later, in 1952, he became the Washington-based supervisor of the Marshall Plan for European recovery.

In early 1953 he left Washington to become executive editor and later publisher of *The Reporter* magazine. In 1956 he was appointed dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and professor of political science in the Maxwell School.

During the 1960s Harlan Cleveland served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Appointed U.S. Ambassador to NATO by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965, he continued in that post under President Richard M. Nixon until May 1969.

From 1969 to 1974 he served as the eighth president of the University of Hawai'i.

At the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies from 1974 to 1980 he developed and directed an international affairs program. In 1979 he was the Distinguished Visiting Tom Slick Professor of World Peace at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin.

During the 1980s Harlan Cleveland served as the founding dean of the University of Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, a graduate school, research institute, and one of the nation's early centers for leadership education. He retired in 1988 as professor emeritus at the University of Minnesota.

He has authored hundreds of magazine and journal articles and eleven books, mostly on executive leadership and world affairs.

He has been a fellow of the World Academy of Art and Science since 1977 and in 1991 became its president, a position he held at the time of the interviews.

He and his wife Lois raised three children. The Clevelands reside in Virginia.

Tape Nos. 25-1-1-96 and 25-2-1-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

January 18, 1996

Punalu'u, Hawai'i

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: This is interview number one with Professor Harlan Cleveland for the University of Hawai'i presidents oral history project on January 18, 1996, and we're at his winter home in Punalu'u, Hawai'i on the Big Island. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay, why don't we begin with our first interview. Before we get into your years as the University of Hawai'i president, what I'd like to do is to sort of cover some of your early life, starting with your family background, getting into your childhood, moving into your education, and your professional life beginning with your career in Washington, D.C. and working with the United Nations prior to getting into your years at the University of Hawai'i.

HC: Mm hmm.

WN: Could you tell me, first of all, when and where you were born?

HC: I was born in New York City, January 19, 1918. But, I must not have liked it very much because we moved out after about three months.

WN: Three months.

HC: My father [Stanley Matthews Cleveland] was an Episcopal minister and sort of a student chaplain by trade. He was in the First World War as an army chaplain. He was gassed pretty badly and he eventually died—of the effects of that on his heart, apparently—when I was eight. So I never really got to know him very well. But I guess he was abroad and my mother was living on Fifty-seventh Street in Manhattan.

WN: What was your father doing in New York?

HC: Well, I don't think he ever had a professional base in New York. She was just there while he was abroad. And then shortly after I was born, he came back from the war—I think while it was still going on, actually—and became the Episcopal student chaplain at Princeton University. So we lived in Princeton for several years, which I don't remember at all.

WN: So from New York City you moved to Princeton, New Jersey.

HC: Yeah. Probably going to Cape Cod every summer because that was sort of the thing to do in our family. My grandmother on my mother's side had bought an old fishing shack on the bluff in Harwich Port before Harwich Port was really developed at all, with quite a lot of land around it. And at the time I knew it, she had a big house there and two of my uncles had houses. And then a house was built for my mother when we were young. And every summer we went to Cape Cod. No matter where else we were, we'd wind up in Cape Cod during the summer. So it was not a very *mouvementé* childhood, but the anchor was summers on Cape Cod.

WN: Tell me something about your mother [Marian Phelps Van Buren Cleveland]. What is her background? I know she had very interesting lineage.

HC: Well, her maiden name was Van Buren. And there was sort of a vague relationship with Martin Van Buren, we were told. But, you know, the third cousin twice removed kind of thing. And her mother was a very strong person and had been married to a man named Harold Van Buren who was for years the consul general in Nice in France. And so being the wife of the consul general, she—at least, judging from her stories—cut quite a (figure) in the social life of Nice, which, being a port, was a place where American ships would happen by and stay for a few days. So that would always create a party. And consul general there was sort of like a little embassy. They'd have a Fourth of July party and generally try to take care of any problems Americans had. Well, most of the Americans in Nice and who visited Nice were probably pretty well off, society people. So they got so used to doing things in an elegant way. And my grandmother, Grummy, she was . . .

WN: What was her name again?

HC: Grummy.

WN: Grummy?

HC: Grummy was the name, nickname. She always did things in a rather elegant way, even in her Cape Cod house. She had a cook. And when we went over to dinner there, the best silver was out and that sort of thing.

WN: So your grandmother was the one who owned the Cape Cod house?

HC: Yeah. It was a big house which had been expanded rather randomly. Kind of a nice, comfortable, old place, with quite a lot of bedrooms. I can't remember when the house across the street, which became my mother's house, was built, but. . . . And it was next to a garage; the garage was converted into sort of a guest house (known as the "Barnacle"). And then my mother's house, which was named Llandevec, two l's, which is an anagram on Cleveland. And (chuckles) that house is still there, looking very much the way it did. We've been in it and used it some in more recent years 'cause my daughter, Anne (and her husband), bought it from the estate when my mother died.

WN: When did your mother die?

HC: Nineteen seventy. I had just gone to Hawai'i. I had to go back that first year a couple of times, and the second time, she died while I was back there. She'd been in bad shape for

about fifteen years. She had a stroke and had aphasia. She couldn't speak. She had only one word, which was "No," that she used for everything. She could take in anything that was said. At one point we had her come to France when we were there when I was with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. She had been fluent in French. She could obviously understand everything that was being said around her and was obviously frustrated by not being able to do what she could do well, which was to speak French.

WN: Your mother's name was Marian.

HC: Marian Phelps Van Buren, and then became Marian Van Buren Cleveland.

WN: So Phelps was her middle name?

HC: Was the middle name.

WN: Okay. And then she was also a college dean, wasn't she?

HC: Much later, yeah, but she actually had no degrees at all. She was educated up until the time she was about thirteen or fourteen in Europe. And then when she came back, she went through Farmington, which is a finishing school. And as she put it, "You don't graduate from a finishing school, you just drift out."

(Laughter)

HC: And this created sort of a problem later when she got into (higher education). She was assistant headmistress of a school in Cincinnati and—oh, she worked before that. When we came back from spending three years in Europe as children, she decided—we decided, she made it seem a very consensual process (in which we would) sit on the floor (of her Geneva apartment) and look at maps and brochures about schools—to move to Andover, Massachusetts.

WN: When was this?

HC: In 1931. But maybe I should explain how we happened to go over there. My father died in '26, it must have been. He was only about thirty-five, but looked like an old, stooped white-haired man of sixty or seventy, you know, because of the effect of being sick a lot of the time. He'd gone from Princeton to become Episcopal student chaplain at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, which is the first place I remember.

WN: How old were you when you moved to Madison?

HC: I must have been about five, I think. Four or five. And after we'd been there [Madison] a couple of years, he was appointed to be head of a collection of Episcopal institutions—a boys' school, and a sisterhood, Sisters of the Transfiguration, I think they were called, and a little church—in Glendale, Ohio, which is a suburb of Cincinnati. So I remember the Madison days. We were there for [another] year to finish out school. We were there for a good part of a year after he'd been transferred down [to Ohio], staying with an aunt who was in Madison. I can remember sliding down snowy hills to see how far out on an icy lagoon we could go without actually pushing. Our house, which was, I guess, a house that went with the job, was right

next door to a small church or a chapel. Our house was just across the street from the University [of Wisconsin]. It was on University Avenue. If you go to Madison now, University Avenue runs right through the middle of the campus. But at that time the campus was just on one side and they put other things on the other side. I can remember watching with resentment as a large Lutheran church was built right next door to us. It was much bigger than our church, [Madison] being more Lutheran territory than Episcopalian, I guess. But it seemed *lèse-majesté* to do that to our chapel, you see. My brother and I served in the chapel as acolytes and we started singing some. We always did a lot of singing in our family. So we learned something about choral singing quite young. And then (my father) left and we stayed on for school through one winter.

WN: In Madison?

HC: In Madison.

WN: Where did he [father] move to?

HC: He left for Glendale, Ohio.

WN: I see. He didn't take the family along?

HC: No, I guess he had to get into that job and Mother probably didn't want to take us out of school in the middle of the year.

WN: What kind of school did you go to?

HC: Well, I don't know. It was just sort of a normal, public school, I guess, out there in Madison. Once we got to Glendale, we were put in the boys' school (that) was part of the establishment that he was in charge of. That was a school run by Episcopal nuns. And well, then he died [in 1926] while we were there.

WN: I see.

HC: Glendale was a place---my guess is that he was assigned there because there was a lot of family there on the Cleveland side, in Glendale and nearby. The family had been an Ohio family for some generations. My [paternal] grandfather after whom I was named, had been mayor of Cincinnati and he became lieutenant governor of Ohio. Everybody said he was going to be the next governor of Ohio except he died before that happened.

WN: What was his name?

HC: James Harlan Cleveland. Which is what I thought I was named for some years in my childhood. But then when I first got a passport in my own name, I, of course, had to get a birth certificate. So I got a birth certificate from—I can't remember from where, I suppose from New York. And it had on it that my name was Harlan Cleveland, without the James. So I took it to Mother and said, "What goes on here. What happened to the James?"

"Oh," she said, "I remember now. I really didn't much like the name James." One of her brothers-in-law was named James and was called Jimmy and had a tendency toward drinking

too much. He was a successful lawyer in that southern Ohio area. And so, "I just didn't want you being called Jimmy. So when the time came for the birth certificate I just sort of left it out."

WN: So legally you're Harlan Cleveland.

HC: Legally I'm just the two names. But lot of documents survived, J. Harlan Cleveland, because that was my name, actually through most of college. And I still occasionally get letters from early associations like Phillips Academy, Andover, where we went to school when we came back from Europe. And even from Princeton. Some people are just taking my name off a list saying, "Dear James," or "Dear Jim," or something like that (chuckles). So any letter that's addressed like that, I know what to do with it, throw it away, you see.

(Laughter)

WN: Where are the Cleveland ancestors from originally?

HC: Well, the family sort of derives from the two brothers who gave their name to Cleveland, Ohio, you see. That is, the two brothers about eight generations back, Moses and Aaron. Mother told me that there was considerable lobbying for me to be called Aaron Bénézet Cleveland because there wasn't an Aaron yet in (my generation of the) Cleveland family. But she creatively objected on the ground that I'd be called Benny and she didn't want me to be called Benny.

(Laughter)

HC: So I wasn't called Aaron Bénézet Cleveland. But those two brothers, Moses and Aaron, came from Connecticut by boat through the canal system and the Great Lakes. They wound up at a landing—a landfall, which is now a landing—in what is now Cleveland, Ohio. I don't know what the process was by which their arrival became the name of the town, but they were probably the first people to have arrived, so (chuckles) that was the way it happened. And there's still a statue of Moses Cleveland down in the main public square in Cleveland, Ohio.

I must tell you a little story about that name. Much later when I was in the State Department, I had to go to Cleveland to speak at the World Affairs Council—which happens to be the oldest world affairs council in the country. It's a big organization, has a lot of members. And the State Department was going through one of its spasms of trying to relate itself to the country. So the public affairs people said, "We've got this important announcement to make." Instead of making it as usual at a Washington press conference, "Why don't you," I was assistant secretary of state, "Why don't you make the announcement in Cleveland, Ohio?" And so it was all arranged and I arrived at the airport and they had decided to have the press conference at the airport. And as we were sitting around waiting for the press to assemble, one of the reporters from the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, which is the main newspaper, said, "Any connection between your name and the city?"

I said, "Well yes, as a matter of fact you've got my great, great, great, great, great uncle eight generations back down in the public square."

"Oh," he said, "Moses Cleaveland. But that's not spelled (your) way. It's spelled C-L-E-A-V."

And I just sort of said off-handedly, "Well, but that was before the family learned to spell." So then we go ahead and have the important press conference. The next day, in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, there was nothing whatever about the important announcement that we had made. (WN laughs.) I don't know whether any of the wire services picked it up; the Cleveland papers didn't. But on the front page of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* there was a big headline: "Cleveland Kin Says Family Couldn't Spell."

(Laughter)

HC: That was an important early lesson in public relations.

(Laughter)

WN: Ah ha. So from that point on you watched what you said. (Laughs)

HC: Only moderately carefully, yes.

WN: Oh, shucks.

HC: Later when I was ambassador to NATO, I—in the course of conversation with a reporter—I said that I think that I have the best job in the whole foreign service setup. 'Cause I'm 10,000 miles from Vietnam and 3,000 miles from the White House. That remark got back to President [Lyndon B.] Johnson, LBJ, and I was told that he was not amused.

(Laughter)

HC: But anyway, to come back to the thread of the story, if it has one, my father died when I was eight, I think it was in 1926 or '27. My mother was not in very good shape. She had been nursing him for a long time and she was physically (weak). And her doctors said, "I think you ought to move to the South for your health. So you're not taking these long, wet winters." But she didn't want to move South because (schools were) still segregated at that time and she knew enough about the country so that she knew that as northerners we'd be discriminated against in some way by the local southerners.

WN: Where in the South are we talking . . .

HC: Well, it never got to the point of picking a place in the South. She later, of course, lived in Florida, but that was much later. And she said to the doctor, "How would the south of France be?"

And he said, "Well, I suppose that would be all right." So (that's where we went). The one thing that she was sure about was she didn't want to stay in Glendale. The place was sort of papered with Cleveland kin and nobody that she was related to except by marriage. And I think she just found it an oppressive idea to stay there.

WN: Where were her kin living?

HC: Well, her mother was in Virginia, I guess, at that point. But she was already a widow. For a little while she lived even in the District of Columbia in Washington. Her home base was that

place on Cape Cod, you see. So, and of course, Mother had this tremendous, long, youthful experience in southern France; she was fluent in French. A very good French accent. My grandmother was fluent, too, but with a very American accent. And when the two of them needed to discuss something at the dinner table that they didn't want us to hear they'd just talk about it in French. Later, after we'd been in France, it didn't work. (Chuckles) But in our early life it did work. So we moved to a place called Pau, P-A-U, in the Basses-Pyrénées which is (almost in the) foothills of the Pyrénées mountains. A lot of Basque people around. We even went to a Passion Play, about a six-hour performance, you know, all in Basque, of course, so we couldn't understand a word of it—but it was sort of interesting to see the setup—the big open-door, outdoor amphitheater. (In Pau), we were put in a school called Park Lodge, which was a school actually run by some British expatriates there.

WN: The instruction was in English?

HC: The instruction was in English in part, but also partly in French. And there was a lot of emphasis on learning French, with punishments to fit the crime if you were observed talking English, even.

WN: So you and your classmates were all from America?

HC: No, British and some other non-French.

WN: Non-French though?

HC: Mostly non-French.

WN: I see.

HC: And some Americans. But in those days the Americans weren't as numerous in Europe, of course, as they are now. And it was probably more British than anything else.

WN: What were your reactions or your first impressions of the school, going from an American school system to a British school system in a foreign country?

HC: Well, it seemed harder for us because we were (partly) learning in a new language. But then, you know, at that age, I suppose I was nine by that time, you pick it up very fast. It rained continuously all winter in Pau that winter. And Mother finally said, "This is ridiculous." And took us all to Switzerland, which she knew well. (In her youth), she had spent every vacation there. She spoke German and also German-Swiss. So she got an apartment in Geneva and scattered us out into schools more or less (within) commuting distance, not daily commuting distance but boarding school thing. I had a much younger brother, Stanley, five-and-a-half years younger and he was put in a very small children's school in Geneva, but my older brother and sister were just eighteen months older than I was.

WN: Your twin older brother and sister?

HC: Yeah, they were twins. And we were almost like triplets. We were always together. And my brother and I were put in a school that still exists, La Châtaigneraie, which means "a grove of horse chestnut trees." A very nice, very good school academically. Not quite as good

athletically as some of our rivals. So we weren't generally the champion of our (division). There were a number of sort of expatriate schools in the French part of Switzerland, in Lausanne and Lyon and Geneva and then all along that coast of Lake Geneva. This school was on the rise of a hill overlooking the lake with vineyards in between. And with a couple of small towns nearby, but they're kind of out in the country. And it was very well run, apparently. Headmaster was at the time driver of the leading four-man bobsled team in the world. It was a Swiss team. So he would occasionally go off and participate in some pre-Olympic thing or something. Everybody was very proud of the fact that he was the headmaster.

WN: What language was this school taught in?

HC: In French. And they were very fierce about French. It was illegal to speak anything else.

WN: By then was your French getting a lot better?

HC: It was pretty good by then. But, of course, there were some Americans and British and Poles and other Europeans there. I remember the Poles, particularly because one of the larger Polish boys pushed me and I landed on my elbow and I still can't get it straight.

WN: What types of families did the Poles and the British come from? What were their parents doing in Switzerland?

HC: Oh, I suppose they were mostly working. . . . Geneva's a very international city, you know. League of Nations was there. Some of them probably worked in the League. And there was also a certain amount of business there, though the biggest part of the business community in Switzerland was in the German part of Switzerland, in Basel and in Zurich. And this was a boarding school so for somebody living in Zurich, it would be quite convenient.

WN: What language did you speak at home?

HC: Oh, English. Always. But increasingly interlaced with French. You know, because we'd think of a concept or a word that couldn't get to the English right away so we'd just do it in French. And since Mother could understand that just as easily, I never thought of that as a problem. The school had serious punishments for being caught talking anything but French. *Trois pages* was one of the (punishments)—"three pages," meaning that you had to write out three pages usually copied out of something. You had to write it out in handwriting in French. And quite a business was done for a while by some of the brighter students in producing three pages in different handwritings so their friends could use them when they were punished. And there were more serious punishments like chopping wood for the fireplaces and so on. They had a big, sort of Olympic-sized swimming pool there. And my main sport was really swimming. 'Course I'd gotten used to doing that in Harwich Port, Cape Cod.

WN: So you swam competitively?

HC: I swam competitively using the Australian crawl, where you only breathe once every four strokes. I never got very good at the backstroke or the breaststroke. They didn't really have in those days what you now see in the Olympics, the butterfly, very splashy kind of swimming. And I played soccer there. I was on the defense. We had a school soccer team. We actually

did quite well because our center forward, the leader of the team, a young man about fifteen, I guess, when he wasn't at school, he was off playing as a regular member of the Dutch national team. So we were constantly surprising some of the other schools.

WN: What schools did you compete against? Were they all schools like your school or were they Swiss . . .

HC: No, they were mostly these expatriate schools. The one I remember best was Le Rosay, which was in Lausanne. That was known to be a school for rich kids. And they were generally pretty good at athletics. And when we could beat them at anything it was, you know, the masses against the bosses.

WN: And your school didn't have that reputation?

HC: No.

WN: Of rich kids?

HC: No, it was just sort of a middle-class school.

WN: Middle-class, expatriate school.

HC: Yeah. I suppose you might say upper middle-class because if you're very far down the income level, you wouldn't be there at all. But Mother managed to exist over there and get us all in these schools.

WN: Did your mother have to work at all?

HC: No, she wasn't working there at all. My father's pension was apparently pretty good, but not munificent, but she had it figured, you know, we went over there in the middle of the depression . . .

WN: Yeah, I was going to ask you . . .

HC: . . . and she had it figured that she could live more cheaply there than in the United States. And her mother, (my grandmother), had some resources and she kept helping some. She'd come over to visit about every year.

WN: Just a second. I'd like to turn the tape over . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

HC: . . . more about my childhood than you really need to know.

WN: No, no, no, this is fine. This is fine. I'd like to back up just a little bit. You know, you spent

your early childhood years in Madison, Wisconsin, then you moved over to Glendale, Ohio, then all of a sudden you move over . . .

HC: To Pau . . .

WN: . . . to Europe.

HC: . . . in France, yeah.

WN: And I'm just wondering, you know, from the perspective of hindsight, I guess, how would you compare your childhood in America and in France and in Switzerland?

HC: Well, I don't remember that it was any great shock, perhaps because we had already moved two or three times by then. In fact, I don't think we ever lived more than two or three years in one place. Until I got married. And that was in Washington—that was a transient place, too. But, I don't recall it as having been a traumatic adjustment at all. When you're that young, you sort of adjust to anything, I guess. And we were real interested to be in Europe and to be learning this other language and be able to communicate with people that were very different from us.

WN: When you moved to Europe, did you miss anything?

HC: No, not really. I don't remember---we weren't into things like the Super Bowl. . . . And the things that we were into, like Christmas, were just as much a thing there as it would be at home.

WN: How special was Christmas in your household?

HC: Oh it was very special. It was a major deal. We always had a tree and presents under the tree and the whole procedure. We generally went to a Christmas Eve service wherever we were. 'Course it used to be a family affair when my father was doing it. And then on Christmas morning we'd all wake up early and go prowling around and things would get started pretty soon but as a rule you couldn't open any presents until after breakfast, except what was in the stockings. But the stockings kept us occupied till breakfast was over, then we'd spend all morning opening presents from various relatives and friends. And so it was always a very upbeat day, upbeat season in general. We did some traveling also on vacations. We traveled to Italy a couple of times.

WN: From Madison? Or from . . .

HC: No, from . . .

WN: . . . France and Switzerland?

HC: From Switzerland mostly. We went up to skiing places in Switzerland (on winter vacations. In summer) we went to Italy—I don't remember which year—but we sort of did Venice and Florence. Never really learned Italian at that time. Picked up a little. At one point, on a train we learned those legends that were always on the train windows. One of them in every language. "*E pericoloso sporgersi*," which meant, "It's dangerous to lean out." Or "*Non*

gettare oggetti solidi dalla finestra," meaning, "Don't throw solid objects out of the window." We had learned that in French, so of course, we immediately recognized it. We learned that in Italian, but it was also in German on the Swiss and the Italian trains. "*Keine fester Gegenstände aus den Wagen werfen*." So we had great fun saying those things.

At one point my older brother tripped over my mother's feet, getting out of a railway carriage. And he was quite good at languages and it was clear to him that the way you learn Italian is just to put a vowel at the end of every word. So instead of saying, "*Pardon, Maman*," he said, "*Pardone, Mamone*." And that name stuck. And she was known for the rest of her life by us and by our friends and cousins and so on as "Mamone," which later got sort of shortened to "Mone."

WN: How would you spell that?

HC: M-A-M-O-N-E. Mamone. Would actually mean "a big mother." The O-N would be a suffix for "large." I guess compared to us, she was large at the time.

WN: How long would you spend in Italy?

HC: Well, probably three or four weeks. The (Swiss) have rather long vacations. And two of them, one in Christmastime and one at Eastertime. Traveling in Italy, I think, was mostly at Easter. Or in the summer. We went to the German part of Switzerland some, where Mother could get around very easily because she could speak the local patois as well as German. But we never really visited Germany very much. Was probably a hangover, I suppose, of having been at war with those people. But we saw a lot of the French part of Switzerland. And a good deal of France and Italy, too.

WN: What kinds of things did you do to have a good time, or fun, as a child growing up in Europe?

HC: Well, sports was a lot of it. We all played tennis, we swam. The boys played football, that is, soccer. And we'd go on these trips to interesting places, where Mother was sufficiently acquainted so that she was able to interpret what was going on and we could relate to the place much more easily than if we'd just been with a tourist guide.

WN: And at home, did you have cooks, maids?

HC: No, I don't recall she ever had a live-in servant. She probably had somebody coming in to clean. And you know, we didn't do very much formal entertainment anyway. It wasn't part of the job. We all kind of turned to when we were there. We played quite a lot of tennis. We both played on the school tennis team for our age groups against these other schools. And I got pretty good at that. I got very good at serving, but not so good at the rest of the game. (WN chuckles.) My model was, my hero was Jean Barotra who was a French tennis champion back in those days. He was left-handed and he had the most extraordinary backhand. It was sort of a huge arc and just slamming the ball. You don't really see anybody---nowadays you see the people hit the ball that hard, backhand, by using both hands. But he'd do it with one hand. He was sort of a big, strong rangy kind of man. Big serve, big backhand, good forehand. And we had a chance to watch him play, I think, a time or two. But he was, you know, always in the papers and so on. So I tried to model my right-handed backhand after his. And it

never worked as well (chuckles). But until I stopped playing tennis, my backhand was always better than my forehand.

WN: That's unusual.

HC: It just seemed sort of looser and easier, somehow, to do that than do this.

WN: Backing up again, when your family moved from New York over to Madison, were you still going to Cape Cod?

HC: That was early, very early. That's when I was a baby. Yeah. The first place I really remember is Cape Cod. And then Madison. But Cape Cod was just kind of built into our bones. I think we swam off that beach, which was just below the bluff on which my grandmother's house was. The steps going down the. . . I'm sure we swam off that beach long before I can remember. I learned to swim before I can remember it, really. And I always thought of myself as being able to swim.

WN: Anybody teach you how?

HC: Well, I suppose they did hold me up, when I was tiny. But I was a pretty strong swimmer and so was Van. And we got into sailing quite early, too, as children. And eventually my sister and brother and I owned a boat, a racing sailboat in the class that was—the main class in those parts, those days called Stonehorse Juniors. We were able to afford that because my grandmother offered us all two bribes: that if we didn't smoke until we were twenty-one, we'd get \$500, and if we didn't drink until we were twenty-one we'd get \$500. And \$500 in those days was a lot of money.

WN: It sure was.

HC: And when you put the \$3,000 for the three of us together, we could afford to buy a really good boat. So when they both qualified at twenty-one—and I'd been following the same abstemious regime—(WN laughs) they just assumed I would too, and put my money in the pot, too. So we bought this boat, which inevitably was an absolutely magnificent boat. I mean, mahogany topsides and so on. It was a special boat. And we cleaned up the racing season for two or three times after that, with my brother and me arguing about racing tactics and whether we should tack or how we should trim the sails and my sister handling the helm very (skillfully). I don't think it would have worked for either of us to handle the helm. He tended to let it go off the wind too much, I tended to pinch it too much toward the wind. Maybe just an expression of personalities, I don't know.

WN: What kind of personality did you have? In comparison to your brother and sister?

HC: Well, I was somewhat---compared to Van, he's the one who always got into trouble. I was sort of ambitious and I was more—I had more equanimity, you might say. I was more collected, focused. We were both bright, we both did very well in school. He was a summa cum laude at Harvard later. And at Princeton I had high honors which was equivalent to a magna cum laude. We both competed for Rhodes scholarships. I got one. I went from Ohio because Mother was living back in Cincinnati helping run a school by that time.

WN: Okay let's back up little bit, then. Okay, you were in Switzerland going to school, and where did you go from there?

HC: Then we went over to Andover, Massachusetts.

WN: Andover, Massachusetts. And how old were you then?

HC: I was. . . . We got there in about '31. I would have been (thirteen) . . .

WN: Twelve, thirteen?

HC: . . . probably thirteen by then.

WN: Okay.

HC: That time I started school.

WN: Why did your mother move to Andover?

HC: Well, it had a very good boys' school and a very good girls' school. That was her main criterion for the place we would move to. We didn't know anybody there. We had no connections there at all, but . . .

WN: She didn't see you continuing school in Switzerland?

HC: No. In fact, it was important by that time—we were sort of in the prep school stage—to get the kind of education that would help us get into college and so on. Abbot Academy there is a girls' school. It's now merged with Phillips Academy, actually.

WN: I see.

HC: But at that time it was separate. (My sister Anne went to Abbot. Van and I) both went to Andover, as it was called. Phillips Academy, Andover. And my younger brother also went there, 'cause they had a lot of grades from quite young. And after a time my mother got a job there. We were "townies"—I mean, we weren't boarders at the school, which would have been much more expensive. But she got a job at the school being sort of the hostess at the Beanery, which was the eating place, the refectory or whatever you call it, known as the Beanery. And I remember a little drama at the very beginning of her service there. She was hired partly, I think, to give tone to the place. She was quite tall, she was about five feet nine [inches] or maybe ten. And quite slim. A very striking woman. And so her first night, one of the problems in the dining hall was that the boys were always throwing buns at each other. You'd see a friend two tables over and you'd bomb him with a bun. (Mother) swept in her first night, first evening, and a bun came hurtling through the air, more or less in her direction, although I'm sure it wasn't thrown at her, but thrown to some friend. But she'd had pretty good training in softball with us. So she caught it. And a sudden hush went over the whole assembly. And she then threw it very hard back to the boy. Well, that demonstration of masculine prowess just established her immediately. And she was very popular in that job, apparently.

(Laughter)

WN: Was it unusual for her, you know, a woman of that stature, to work? At that type of a job?

HC: Well yeah, yeah. She had never really had a job before. You know, being a pastor's wife is a job, but not a paying job. And so she had never had a job where she was paid before. If it bothered her, we never cottoned to it. We were kind of pleased that she was working at the school, because we were going there anyway. It was just a few blocks from where we lived. So it was a good arrangement.

WN: Was is unusual for people to not board there?

HC: I suppose probably two-thirds or more of the boys there were boarders. And same at Abbot for the girls. But there were also some people who lived within commuting distances in that part of the rather dense part of Massachusetts, north of Boston. And so there were a number of other townies, so-called. But it was a bit of a put-down to be a townie.

WN: Why is that?

HC: Well, I mean, the thing to be was a boarder. That was the majority. We were the minority. Coming from the other side of the tracks, as it were. And I think that bothered us all some. But it's probably a good experience to live as a minority. Of course, a minority at one of the best prep schools in the country was not exactly being disadvantaged, you know, but. . . . And we all did well enough in school so that we were never marginal academically.

WN: Students come from all over the country? Or were they mostly from Massachusetts?

HC: No, they were from all over. 'Cause it was then and still is, in fact, one of the outstanding schools in the country. Prep schools. We got to go because she decided to live there. We wouldn't have otherwise been able to afford to board there, I don't think. I don't have any idea how much it costs, but it would have been too rich for our blood I'm sure. And it got to be so that she really had to work in order to make ends meet. Then my brother Van went to Annapolis for a year, for less than a year, 'cause he'd always thought he'd want to be a naval officer. Liked boats and so on. But he played football against the varsity during sort of the preseason before the first year and broke his leg and had several months in a hospital thinking about what he really wanted to do. And he decided he really didn't want to go to the [United States] Naval Academy anyway. And so he wound up going to Harvard and he was in the same year at Harvard that I was at Princeton because he'd lost a year having his leg broken.

WN: What year was this when you went to Princeton?

HC: [Nineteen] thirty-four.

WN: So you were only sixteen years old.

HC: I was only sixteen years old, yeah.

WN: So how did---did you skip some grades? Or . . .

HC: Yeah, they skipped us a grade when we went in to Andover. Because we always had---we had the language requirements cold before we even got there, you see. There were problems about

the transition. They apparently had particular difficulty with my transcript before I'd turned up personally, of course, sent transcripts to get admitted. I learned later that in algebra I had gotten a ninety-eight. But I flunked arithmetic, which comes before algebra.

WN: (Laughs) Yeah.

HC: And but there was a very creative young instructor there who found this so extraordinary that he went and actually looked at the examination and what I had done and why it worked out that way. And he figured it out right. The problems in the latter stages of arithmetic are full of complicated and long explanations. You know, "A man is on the side of the river and he sees a shadow coming from a pole on the other side," you know, and it gets to be an exercise in geometry, or something. Or it would have things about tonnage and so on. What he found was that every arithmetic problem that I had done I had just assumed that it was in a decimal system. So a ton was obviously a thousand pounds. The idea that it could be 2,000 or 2,200 or something was ridiculous to me. And (he found) that if you dropped that error out of the business, that I easily passed the arithmetic. But I had made enough of just that kind of mistake to put it, I don't know, down to sixty or something like that. Below passing level. So anyway, they admitted me. (Chuckles)

WN: So what were some of your favorite courses at Andover?

HC: Well, I kind of gravitated to history and to—I gravitated to social sciences very much. I really enjoyed learning about the government and learning about politics and learning about history, and philosophy, and anthropology, that sort of thing. I didn't gravitate to science. That was possibly because I had one disastrous experience in chemistry. It was partly a laboratory course. And in one experiment you had to take ten cubic centimeters of NH_4OH , which is ammonium hydroxide. And, you know, transfer it to something else. You did this with a pipette. You probably used those to sucking up . . .

WN: Oh no!

HC: And well, I sucked up ammonium hydroxide all the way into my mouth.

WN: Oh no!

HC: And it just burned like hell. Fortunately, the instructor knew that if you mixed it with enough water, it would dilute it. So he just took me over to the basin and just sloshed water in my mouth. But that sort of browned me off on science somehow. (Chuckles)

WN: But were you good at it? I mean, did you have that scientific mind then?

HC: Not particularly, no.

WN: Uh huh.

HC: The thing, I guess, I was always good at, always interested in, was the connections between subjects. What I later learned to call "interdisciplinary," (or "integrative." This talent) was still quite hard to develop in a normal academic process because everything is built around the disciplines. But you can't solve any problem with the methodology of just one discipline. You

always have to mix them. I was always struck with the contrast between a situation in a school or college or university—where all the organization and all the power structure, too, is built on the disciplines—and the communities surrounding it, where (everything) is organized by problems. And you couldn't solve any of the problems (outside) without mixing the disciplines inside. And I always found that a fascinating puzzle. That's really one of the things that drew me into academic administration, I think. And it's meant that my main retirement activity now is being president of the World Academy of Art and Science, where what we do is mostly, kind of a mix of a lot of different subjects to try and make sense out of some larger subject.

WN: Hopefully that's a trend, you know, in universities as well. Interdisciplinary approach . . .

HC: Hopefully but it's a hard sell relative to the strong departments.

WN: Right.

HC: As one of my mentors once told me, "You don't get ahead here by being seen having lunch with people from other departments."

(Laughter)

HC: And I think that was probably right.

WN: So you were drawn to the social sciences, history, politics, government. By the time you were ready to enter Princeton, did you have some idea of what you were going to be doing careerwise?

HC: Not really, except that I was very much interested in what would now be called public affairs. Public and international affairs. And, you know, the New Deal was on, it had just started the year before in '33. It was the big noise going on. It [the New Deal] wasn't actually solving the problem. It really didn't solve the unemployment problem until the war came along. But there was an enormous amount of noise about the New Deal. It was very exciting. And I can remember campaigning for Franklin D. Roosevelt in '36. It was right in the middle of my college at the time. I'd always been interested in debating, even in Andover, and in discussion. I always enjoyed that sort of thing. So I was on the Princeton debating team.

WN: In what way did you campaign for FDR in '36?

HC: Well, I was just going around stuffing leaflets in peoples' mailboxes and leaving them on cars and the sort of thing you do on a campaign, at the grunt level of the campaign. But it provided an opportunity to get around New Jersey some. And begin to understand about Boss Hague and Jersey City and about what a cesspool Newark was, and the tremendous contrast between Trenton and Princeton, which are right next door to each other. And I was very active at Princeton in what they called Whig Clio which is the American Whig Clisophic Societies, which is a big political and debating society. Where they had a lot of public meetings and a lot went on in that. One of my best friends there was a fellow from Basra, Iraq, an American whose father was a missionary in Basra. He was tall, taller than I was, and with a shock of blonde hair. And in our sophomore year we ran, which was sort of a socially graceless thing to do, we ran for president and vice president of the "Halls," Whig Clio, and won by one vote or two votes, something like that. We organized all the freshmen who were more numerous and

easier to organize. So we had a kind of a machine. Political machine sort of. We were in office for two years, (during which) we practically lived at (Whig Clio). They had a wonderful downstairs area. They had billiard tables and pool tables, and several offices. And as the officers of the society, we sort of had control of that territory. It was from (there that) we organized our participation in the FDR campaign. From there we organized a lot of things, well, some protests. We invited Norman Thomas (the Socialist candidate for president). The administration of Princeton wasn't very fond of the idea of a Socialist coming on the campus. But Norman Thomas had graduated from Princeton in 1903. And so we put out huge posters around the campus saying, "Norman Thomas, '03," showing that he was an alumnus. Of course, everybody knew him. He'd run for president [of the United States] as a Socialist and so on. He drew a huge crowd. And I introduced him and . . .

WN: What was he doing at that time?

HC: Oh, he was being the leader of the U.S. Socialist party. He ran for president in 1936. And I guess again in 1940. He was a very, very good bombastic speaker and a terrific personality. Extremely nice person as well.

WN: Can I just change tapes for just a second?

HC: Yeah, while we're interrupting shall I get you a Coke or anything?

WN: Do you want to take a short break?

HC: Yeah.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 25-2-1-96; SIDE ONE

WN: Tape two, session one, with Harlan Cleveland, January 18, 1996.

Okay?

HC: One thing that was very important to me at Princeton and indeed later at Oxford [University], too, was the traveling that I did during vacations, especially during summer vacation. Between freshman and sophomore year in '35, my brother and I both went on a wonderful trip with the Experiment in International Living. You know that organization?

WN: No.

HC: It's become a very big program now. But it was basically---the new gimmick was that you went abroad but instead of just going around seeing museums and so on, you stayed with families. And of course, in language areas other than English that was an even more important experience because that actually got---people could get on top of Italian, you know, in a summer. But we went to England and Scotland. And we had a wonderful walking trip with a group of English and Scottish counterparts, (more or less our) ages. We walked from

Edinburgh to Glasgow, across Scotland. And it was a great experience both with the place but also the camaraderie. We just sang all the time. Sang our songs, each others' songs, and so on. And . . .

WN: Well, what are some of the songs you sing?

HC: . . . it was great. It was great fun. Goodness I can't, I don't think I can remember now. Everything from hymns to, you know, patriotic songs of the day, and songs left over from the First World War. But it was a wonderful experience. And then we stayed for a while with families in suburbs near London and so we got a chance to see something of London, in a better way than just staying in a hotel because the family would take us out on their outings, whatever they were.

WN: Sponsored by Princeton?

HC: No, it was invented by a guy who lived in Vermont and was headquartered in Putney, Vermont. It's now become a huge organization 'cause they've developed a very big language school. Also they're near Brattleboro. I was on their board for quite a while. I think I'm still on an advisory committee of some sort. Ours (in 1935) was the third year (of the program). So it was still a very experimental and exotic thing to do at the time. Then between junior and senior year, when I was nineteen, I had gotten interested in the Far East—because I'd never been there. My favorite professor was Robert Reischauer, the older brother of Ed[win O.] Reischauer.

WN: What did he do?

HC: He was organizing what he called an Orient study tour. And he needed what would now be called a gopher. Somebody to rustle the bags, and help make arrangements because basically the members of the group were faculty members from other colleges around the country. And he was the leader. He was a historian of both Japan and China and made it wonderfully interesting and clear. We went over, of course, by boat. Took fourteen days. But every day we'd spend an hour, he'd be lecturing and having a class, in effect, about Japan and China.

WN: This is in '37?

HC: [Nineteen] thirty-seven, yeah.

WN: That's a pretty volatile time to go to China.

HC: It was exactly a volatile time. We got all involved in the volatility, too. We were in Japan for a month. And he [Reischauer] was good at explaining things in a very down-to-earth way. I remember his description of sukiyaki. He said, "Actually, it got started as the western idea of a Japanese meal and it wound up as the Japanese idea of a western meal, and it isn't either one."

(Laughter)

HC: I always thought that was the best description of sukiyaki I'd ever heard. Anyway we were in Tokyo for a couple of weeks. Went around, you know, seeing a lot of things and learning. I went down to Kyoto where Ed Reischauer was a graduate student. And he kind of took us and

organized the several days we were in Kyoto. And we went to Nara and, you know, did all the temple bits but we also learned a lot about the country. It was, of course, essentially under military control at the time. We were sponsored by an organization called the Kokusai Bunka Shinko Kai, which was a society for culture. And I learned enough Japanese to get around at the time by myself.

WN: You mean while on this trip or before?

HC: No, while on the trip.

WN: Oh yeah?

HC: And, you know, just to get something to eat and to know what to say when I got on the streetcar and that sort of thing. Got scared to death going in taxis because most of the roads were kind of cobblestone at the time. But taxis found that if they could get on the streetcar tracks that their wheels were about the same width as the streetcar tracks, and they would barrel at fifty and sixty miles an hour through this very slow-moving traffic. (WN chuckles.) It was a hairy experience. I'd already decided to write my senior thesis (on Japanese militarism). At Princeton, they have a thing about doing one big paper. It isn't really at a dissertation level, of course, but it's a substantial piece of intellectual work. And I'd done well enough in the first three years so that I was already designated to go on a so-called "no-course plan" for the senior year. You literally didn't take any courses for credit. But you had to write a thesis. And if you were on that plan it was assumed your thesis would be a weightier document than otherwise.

WN: Did you have your choice of topics?

HC: Yeah. And the topic I had chosen was essentially Japanese militarism. But primarily the internal politics of it. What was propping it up. Why did the aristocrats and the bureaucrats and the various other groups, the big corporations and so on, why were they all playing the same tune the military leaders wanted played? One of my classmates at Princeton was Fumitaka Konoe who was the son of Fumimaro Konoe who was the prime minister [1940-41] and was elbowed aside [in 1941] when [General Hideki] Tōjō wanted to be formally in charge of the government. I kept in touch with Fumitaka, "Fumi" as he was known. He was in the army, of course, as an officer but was killed in that very brief war when the Soviets came in to Manchuria at the very end of the war so they'd have a piece of the peace. (On the 1937 summer trip, I) learned a good deal about the old Japan but also I learned a good deal about what was going on currently. I had a chance to talk to some of the people in government agencies and so on. (Bob and Ed) Reischauer were quite well known there; their father had been a very well-known and very well-liked missionary for his whole life in Japan. Both the boys, of course, grew up fluent in Japanese. So the (Japanese) regarded Bob Reischauer as one of the people who was helping foreigners understand Japan.

Then we were supposed to go to Manchuria and then to Peking, Beiping as it was then called, and then go down from there to the Yangtze Valley and Nanking and Shanghai. But during the time we were in Japan, we heard that there had been a big row in the Peking area, the so-called Marco Polo Bridge Incident which was the beginning of the war in that part of the country. The Japanese, of course, already had Manchuria. Manchukuo as it was called. From Dairen we went up to Mukden on the Manchurian Railway. Most elegant railway I'd ever

seen. The first place I'd ever seen where the attendant would hand you a damp towel for your hands and your face, the way they do on airplanes all the time now. But we couldn't safely go through Peking at all because it was just too difficult and too dangerous. So instead we went from—we took a Japanese coastal liner—and went from Dairen to Tsingtao. And we got to Tientsin but we (couldn't go) inland (from there). We just (skirted) the coast, then put in at Shanghai. We spent the rest of the time in the Yangtze Valley. We went up to Nanking and we saw the great monument to Sun Yat-sen there. Went to Hangchow, that wonderful, very classic lake. And generally got the feel of the place but also a sense of the worrying resentment and so on that the Chinese had about the Japanese at the time. I had interviewed a number of people in Tokyo, I still needed to do a little more interviewing before we actually took off across the Pacific again.

WN: Who were you interviewing? This is for your thesis?

HC: Yeah, I was basically interviewing lower-level types in ministries and trying to get a feel for what they thought and why they thought it and so on. We got back to Shanghai after some travel up and down the Yangtze River. There was one graduate student from Stanford on the tour, and he was doing a dissertation. (The two of us) decided to go back a couple of days ahead of the (tour group) to Tokyo and then rejoin them when the (liner) that we were all supposed to go (home) on put in at Yokohama. So we got on this small Japanese liner, the *Shanghai Maru* and it goes out down the Whangpoo, the river that goes right into the city, and out into the Yangtze to its mouth. But (in the ocean) outside there was a hurricane. They couldn't face that, so they turned around and came back. And by the time they came back, the dock from which we had departed was burning because the Japanese Navy was shelling Shanghai. It was the beginning of the war in the Yangtze Valley. It was also called the Shanghai Incident. And I had a ringside seat for the "incident" because (the *Shanghai Maru*) just anchored in the river, and the Japanese Navy started using us as a (buoy). They'd come around us, then go down about a mile and fire a volley at Shanghai, especially the Chapei region, which was industrial and relatively lower income also.

WN: So all this time you were there on the boat?

HC: We were there on the boat just watching this . . .

WN: Watching it!

HC: . . . watching this beginning of the war in the Yangtze Valley.

WN: Were there any, was there any kind of assurance that everybody knew who you were and there wasn't a danger . . .

HC: No, there was no problem of that sort at all. I mean, we weren't the enemy at that point (and we were on a Japanese vessel). But on land in China, the rest of the group, these faculty members and Bob Reischauer himself, were immured in a big suite, on the upper floor of the old Cathay Hotel, I guess it was, which was right on the corner of Shanghai Road and the Bund, the big square there (on the waterfront). Ten years later I lived in that hotel, actually (chuckles), when I was with UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] there. And there were airplane dogfights going on (right over Shanghai). At one point three Chinese airplanes, trying to escape from some (Japanese) Zeros that were

chasing them, came over and one of the bombs dropped on the street right outside the hotel. Just before that, the group had been kind of bored and nobody had any playing cards, so Reischauer volunteered to go down and get some playing cards at the (hotel) desk. So he's standing at the desk negotiating about getting some playing cards when the bomb falls and just blows the whole front of the hotel into the lobby. Slices off both his legs. And he died of bleeding a few hours later. I've often thought, if I had been there, I was the gopher who would have gone down to get cards.

WN: And where were you at that time?

HC: Oh, I was out on the *Shanghai Maru* watching . . .

WN: Oh, okay, that's right, okay.

HC: . . . watching this military exercise. I didn't know, of course, that this was going on at the time.

WN: When did you find out about . . .

HC: Well, as soon as we got to Japan, there were huge headlines that one of the Reischauer boys had been killed. That was big news in Japan. The name was well known and so on. And while we were just being piloted into Yokohama harbor, an emissary came out on the pilot boat, I guess, and sought us out, Johnny Masland and myself, and invited us to lunch the next day at a fancy restaurant with Viscount Motono who was about the number three man in the Foreign Office. They had obviously realized that Reischauer had been killed, this would be a big story at home. The people who were accompanying him would obviously be blabbing about what a nasty thing it was for the Japanese to be invading Shanghai just when we were there. And they wanted to explain to us why it was so necessary for them to invade China. I wished I had had a tape recorder because he spent—this foreign service officer, excellent English—spent about three hours telling us in detail why this wasn't really an invasion, it was a sort of a defense thing that the Japanese were doing. You know, putting the best face on it he possibly could. And as I said, I wish I had the record of that conversation because I'd love to publish it. But I don't have it, of course.

WN: What were your feelings toward what he was saying?

HC: Well, I thought he was a very competent foreign service officer putting a best face on a bad situation. And it was bad not because they were invading but it was bad because a well-known good friend of Japan had been killed on the very first day.

WN: Quite embarrassing, actually.

HC: The irony was that it wasn't even a Japanese bomb. It was a bomb jettisoned from one of the Chinese planes. And they never did find out whether they were just jettisoning the bomb so they could go faster or whether they were trying to hit the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank which was right next door, or less than a block away, where the Japanese had apparently smuggled in anti-aircraft guns in parts and assembled them on the roof and were up there shooting at the Chinese planes. Of course, I heard this whole story from the group when we got together with them.

WN: In Japan?

HC: Yeah, when we got together on the boat. Because the boat put in to Yokohama.

WN: I see.

HC: And then we went down to Yokohama and joined it. It was still a sizable story by the time we got home after a couple of weeks. People were coming aboard interviewing members of the group because we'd been there at this dramatic moment.

WN: What were your feelings when you found out about Reischauer?

HC: Well, I was very devastated because he was my favorite professor and the only reason I was on the trip was that he was running it. In fact, he put an anonymous notice on the bulletin board in the politics department saying anybody interested in going on this trip, expenses would be paid. It didn't even occur to me—I saw the notice—and it didn't even occur to me to apply for it because I always had the feeling that whatever you apply for doesn't happen, you know. Something else happens instead. But then I ran into Professor Reischauer in the hall one day and he said, "You seen that notice and are you applying?"

And I said, "Well, no, I didn't know if it had anything to do with me."

He said, "I think you ought to apply." The whole thing was just a charade because he wanted me to come with him on that trip. I was apparently sort of his favorite student, too. So I was really quite devastated by the fact that he was no longer there. I still did the thesis and . . .

WN: Did you put in any of your observations on the trip in your thesis?

HC: Oh yeah. And some of the interview material and so on. I gave it a very sophomoric title. "Mars in the Land of the Rising Sun."

WN: Mars?

HC: Mars. You know, god of war . . .

WN: Oh. (Chuckles)

HC: . . . in the Land of the Rising Sun. But I think the thesis itself was better written than the title. (WN chuckles.) And it got a prize, the thesis did. So I guess it was pretty good. And I got a Phi Beta Kappa at the end of the year. Actually I took more courses that no-course year than any other year, 'cause I was able to shop around. I'd always wanted to sort of try anthropology but I couldn't fit it into my program. So I went and took an anthropology course, that sort of thing. I took a history of science course, too.

WN: Well, it's interesting with your background, living in France and Switzerland and so forth, coming to Princeton and then selecting as your thesis topic, Asia.

HC: Well, I think it was mostly because I enjoyed that particular professor. You know people always say, "Don't take the course, take the professor." And I think that's good advice for a

student. I just liked him very much and found him very stimulating. And if he was teaching about the Far East, that's what I was going to be interested in. You know, that's the kind of decision a student makes. Also, I guess I sort of had the feeling that since I had already had some experience in Europe I ought to branch out and do something else. I always had that feeling during the war or just after the war. I spent 2½ years in Italy. By the end of that time I was fluent in Italian, I had had a very responsible job. I was really in charge of all the economic aid both during the military government period and then later with UNRRA, the UN relief program. And so as people began to focus on postwar Italy as a market and so on, I began to get offers to stay in Italy during this time. I could have been the Pepsi-Cola representative in Italy. You know, I'd be a millionaire by now (chuckles).

(Laughter)

HC: But my one preoccupation at the time was that I was getting typed as an Italian expert. And I didn't want to spend my life as an expert on Italy. I wanted Italy to be a part of a life, but. . . . So while my boss was in Washington at the UNRRA headquarters, he had to have a new chief of mission for China to go there for a year, the last year of the program. It wasn't a prestige job anymore. They called up and said, "We got to know right now whether you'll go to China for a year." And I just had no difficulty deciding yes.

WN: This was in '47?

HC: In '47 . . .

WN: [Nineteen] forty-seven. Okay, we'll get into that next . . .

HC: May of '47.

WN: Next time we'll get into your experiences with the UNRRA. I just have a few more questions. You were talking earlier about your student activism at Princeton and the fact that Norman Thomas was someone that you brought over . . .

HC: I was president of something called the Princeton Anti-War Society. I was a pacifist in effect, in addition to my job with Whig Clio. This was an advocacy organization. I got quite involved in the politics of activism.

WN: Where does that stem from? Does it stem from your parents? Or . . .

HC: Not really from. . . . 'Cause they weren't politically active at all. And my mother's family which was the family that I really had gotten to know, were Republicans. The Cleveland branch, I guess, were mostly Democrats. But I didn't really have very much contact with them after we left there. But I was always interested in public affairs and much more interested in that than in business, even though most of my classmates were thinking about being stockbrokers and so on. But . . .

WN: Why did you end up choosing the liberal orientation and not the conservative?

HC: Well, probably it was the excitement of the climate at the time. The New Deal was in the papers every day. It was a big deal. And I sort of yearned to be part of that, you know. And

eventually I did go to Washington and worked in a New Deal agency.

WN: Was the New Deal philosophy pretty much prevalent at Princeton? Was it the norm?

HC: No, it was not the norm at Princeton. It was the ab-norm at Princeton. They did a survey on Roosevelt versus [Alfred] Landon in 1936. The faculty was split about halfway between. But the student body was three to one for Landon. But I'd always been motivated somehow to do something that was different from what most people were doing. One of the reasons I went to Princeton was—it doesn't sound like a huge protest to anybody else but—was the fact that most of my classmates at Andover were going to either Harvard or Yale. And I said, "I want to go to Princeton." Maybe there was some *arrière pensée* that my father had been at Princeton once and so on. But it was mostly that it wasn't Harvard or Yale. But now, to make a comparable gesture of revolt, you'd have to go to Occidental College in California or something, you know. (Chuckles) But in the circle that I was floating in, Princeton was an exception but was just as good a location to go to college as Harvard or Yale.

WN: And you were with the Princeton Anti-War Society . . .

HC: Well, that was . . .

WN: . . . just trying to put myself in 1933–34. In essence what war were you protesting?

HC: Well, now this was '37–'38.

WN: Okay, thirty—, okay. So things were brewing.

HC: So things were brewing and there was worry that the U.S. might get into it and so on. And they were beginning to talk about a draft, and it was like the Vietnam business. We were a pretty small minority but we made quite a lot of noise. And I think that the Progressives were also somewhat isolationist, you know. And so getting the Socialist presidential candidate there for—in '37 or early '38 probably—for a big mass meeting did draw. . . . You got a thousand people together on the Princeton campus, it was a big deal. Because it wasn't like Berkeley, you know, or someplace where you constantly get crowds like that.

WN: Were there any negative repercussions from the conservative side of the student body? Or faculty?

HC: Yeah, we had problems with the university administration—the dean of students—because they didn't like us stirring up the campus. But I guess it never occurred to us to stop doing so because they didn't like it, you know. So when much later I got out to Hawai'i and found a lot of protest on the campus, it seemed a somewhat more normal state of affairs to me than it probably did to a lot of others.

WN: I'm just wondering too was Woodrow Wilson and his shadow, the League of Nations and isolationism and so forth, was it influential to you at all?

HC: Well, I think it was, some. But in a way it was more influential that he had been professionally interested in public administration and had written on public administration and politics before he became governor, before he became president. And there was a cloud, of

course, over (his foreign policy) because he'd blown it. He'd gotten us into the League [of Nations] and then he couldn't get the Senate to agree.

WN: Right. So would you say that Woodrow Wilson—although you probably never met him— . . .

HC: No.

WN: . . . in his writings influenced you?

HC: More afterwards really than when I was at Princeton. 'Cause afterwards when I got into the public administration field first as a practitioner and then later on when I was appointed dean of the Maxwell School [of Public Administration] at Syracuse [University], some of Woodrow Wilson's writings and the slogan that Princeton was using even then, "Princeton in the Nation's Service," started meaning more and more to me. And I'd always carried around a couple of books of his and I'd use them for quotes and so on, but I never became an expert on that literature particularly. But when I was at the Maxwell School for five years, you know, I was ex officio a wheel in the public administration field, even though I didn't have a doctorate or even a master's degree. But I was a dean and I was a full professor and I was teaching public administration from experience and from writings that I was catching up with at the time. And I did become president of the American Society for Public Administration. Twice, in fact. I was elected at one point, and then told them I really couldn't do it because I was just on my way to NATO, and it really couldn't be done from Paris. And then as soon as I came back and came here [University of Hawai'i], as soon as that transition was known, then I was importuned again to become president of the [American] Society [for Public Administration]. I never was part of the norm in that society, which was really people who were making a life as bureaucrats in executive, state, local, as well as national government. I was always more interested in policy and less interested in personnel or budget intricacies than some of my colleagues. But I did some writing about executives. And became pretty well known, I guess, in that field.

WN: Okay, we'll get into that next time we meet. What I'd like to do is just end it here and continue next time with your years in Oxford and getting into your beginnings of public administration.

HC: Okay, good.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape Nos. 25-3-2-96 and 25-4-2-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

January 24, 1996

Punalu'u, Hawai'i

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: This is an interview with Professor Harlan Cleveland on January 24, 1996 and we're at his winter home in Punalu'u, Hawai'i. This is for the UH presidents oral history project. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay Harlan, now, we finished our last interview talking about Princeton, and we touched on this a little bit but I wanted to get back to it for a bit, about some of the political causes that you were involved in at Princeton as an undergraduate. Could you tell me something about those?

HC: Well, I was very active in the American Whig Cliosophic Society, known as Whig Clio.

WN: Whig would be the Whig orientation, political orientation. Clio, are you talking about history?

HC: Well, they analogize it, I guess, with really ancient history. Actually, there were two buildings. Whig Hall and Clio Hall. And we were a political and debating society. We organized the debate team, also, for Princeton. And we conducted meetings that were usually very well attended, right on campus. And sometimes got into interesting, bitter arguments on current issues. And that was fun because we—my friend John Van Ess and I—took over the leadership of the halls when we were sophomores. So we had them for two full years. It had been somewhat in the doldrums and we made it one of the liveliest extracurricular activities on the campus. And we brought in speakers, some of them controversial . . .

WN: So besides Norman Thomas, who else did you invite?

HC: Well, when the Democratic boss of Jersey City responded to one demonstration against him by telling the demonstrators who were talking about law, he said, "I am the law." So we brought some civil libertarians and others in to a big conference which we styled "Is He the Law?" (Chuckles) And that had been such a well-known headline and everybody knew what the title meant.

And we had had speakers on war and peace. And I remember we had somebody from England at one point. War was sort of just over the horizon at that point. This was '37, '38. We organized one thing around the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

WN: Did you consider yourself a pacifist at that time?

HC: Yeah.

WN: When did you start feeling that way?

HC: I don't know, probably quite early. And, of course, that was the popular position, really, at the time. Then it got mixed up with the America First and kind of isolationist feelings. I guess what really shifted my own thinking was going to Oxford [University] in '38. I left for Oxford within a few days after the Munich Agreement.

(Someone knocks at the door. Taping stops, then resumes.)

WN: Okay, we're at Oxford and you were talking about the Munich Agreement.

HC: Well, we were delayed in going over by the uncertainty about whether war was going to break out in 1938, you see. I was selected in the winter of 1938, the very beginning of the year, to go over in the fall of '38 for two years, at least. We were delayed in leaving by the announcement of some kind of conflict. And that was tamped down for the moment by the Munich Agreement, which was a famous appeasement agreement, you know. And then in summer of '39, after around one year, Hitler marched into Poland, and so they said, "Everybody better go home. We've got a war to fight." They suspended the scholarships.

WN: Did everyone go home?

HC: Not quite everyone. I think there were one or two Americans who stayed for a year. I was actually in Geneva when I got the word.

WN: What were you doing there?

HC: Well, I was rattling around, being interested in international happenings and organizations and so on. I almost took a job in the International Labor Organization which was in Geneva, when I knew that I wouldn't be continuing in school. Some friends had offered to take me through the League of Nations building, which is a magnificent building, but it was closed at the time. The League of Nations was pretty well kaput at that point. And so we went all through this vacant building, beautiful marble, and beautiful rooms and furniture, and so on. On the way out, we came past the press room. There were three or four reporters in there, glumly sitting around a radio listening to it. We put our heads in and said, "What's happened?"

They looked up and said, "Oh, Hitler's just marched into Poland." Everybody knew that that was the beginning of a big change of events for everybody, in Europe and eventually for us as well. So . . .

WN: So you're still enrolled at Oxford at this time . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . when you found out.

HC: And they said, "Go on home," and I didn't have anything that I needed to go back to Oxford for. They sent me some packages, some of the papers that I had been working on for my thesis. I was working on a D.Phil. thesis on a subject where my sources were all suddenly closing on me. It was about "compulsory military service in democratic states." I was still really interested in that subject but it came from (my earlier) pacifism. But while I was at Oxford that year, I got very much involved in the Oxford University Labour Club, which is really a piece of the [British] Labour party, and became their director of propaganda, they called it. (Chuckles) Which meant that I organized demonstrations and that sort of thing. I never really cottoned much to participating in demonstrations myself. I liked to be pulling the strings from some back room. We organized one famous demonstration that probably made the front page of every newspaper in the world. We had a group of about fifty students walking down the main street—High Street, it's called in Oxford—all wearing Hitler masks. It was a mass of Hitler images coming down. We were arguing that [Neville] Chamberlain was wrong and he ought to get out of there and were supporting the [Winston] Churchill position in effect. This was before the war started, of course. And Chamberlain and his folks were still in the government. So we were against the government.

The Labour party was against the government because they were the opposition anyway. But we were really against the government because of Munich and the appeasement. Obviously I had, by that time, determined that there were worse things than fighting. And being under the iron heel of a dictator like Hitler was one of them.

Actually, Oxford had a reputation at that time of being very pacifist. There was a famous resolution that had been passed by the Oxford Union which was a big (campus organization, sort of) like Whig Clio (at Princeton). It was the big student debating society, which most of the members of the [English] cabinet would have been in (when they were) students, probably. And they had passed, I think the year before, a famous resolution that—I forgot how it was phrased, exactly—but that "we won't take up arms for our country." For England. That was a big story at the time. Because the Oxford students made a lot of news. I mean it was sort of like something happening at Harvard. And I didn't think that was a good idea at all. I thought that was a silly resolution and was part of the group that was really pushing to stop Hitler before he got the whole continent, you know. That was an interesting and fun part of my experience at Oxford, participating in that.

WN: How did you feel when you found out about Hitler invading Poland and knowing that you had to leave school?

HC: Well, I was disappointed not to be able to finish a degree. But I couldn't see going home and just going back to school somewhere.

WN: Why not?

HC: Well, at that point, the degree wasn't important in my horoscope. Because I didn't see myself as an academic.

WN: You didn't see yourself as an academic?

HC: No.

WN: You didn't?

HC: No. And the American secretary of the Rhodes Trust, who was running the American Rhodes scholar selection and process and so on, was a fellow named [Frank] Aydelotte who was the president of Swarthmore College. And he made quite an extraordinary promise to all the people who had come home in the middle of their Rhodes scholarship. He had his finger in every scholarship pie in the country, I think, one way or another. Said he would find the money to finance a year doing anything in the United States as long as it had some educational value. And I said, "Well, what I'd really like to do is try working for the government." The New Deal was still going on and I was still kind of caught up in that philosophy.

WN: With the intention of eventually doing what? Did you have any idea at that time?

HC: Not really. Never have had really.

WN: You just knew you didn't want to be an academic.

HC: Well, I didn't have that as a philosophy either. I thought of myself with a phrase that I used later—I didn't think of that phrase at the time—I thought of myself as a "reflective practitioner." That is, a person who be would doing, but thinking harder about it than most of the doers. That was my self-image. And so I said, well, what I'd really like to do is try working for the government. And Aydelotte had already made a deal with the National Institute of Public Affairs [NIPA], run by a former congressman from New York state, which had a big and very successful intern program. Selection, of course, had happened the previous winter, so it was long past their selection process. But he'd gotten them to agree that they would take any returning Rhodes scholar, sight unseen. When they told me that I said, well, that's what I'd like to do.

WN: Did you know anything about the organization?

HC: Not really, no. And I hadn't really worked in Washington before. But it turned out to be very good. I ran into a former intern, who kind of took me under his wing, a fellow named Phil Hammer from Georgia, who had been an intern with Senator [Robert] La Follette, [Jr.], "Young Bob" La Follette of Wisconsin. And he said that that had been real interesting and educational, and why didn't I do that? The (NIPA) intern program was oriented more to putting people into budget jobs and personnel jobs and, you know, public administration in the narrower sense of the term. And I never really wanted to do that kind of thing. I was more interested in policy. So Phil Hammer took me up to meet Senator [La Follette] and his staff and it was finally worked out. It didn't cost them anything and they got a free body.

WN: Was this the first time you met Senator La Follette?

HC: Yeah. I had a modicum of qualification in that I had spent 2½, 3 years, I guess, in Madison in my youth, you see. So I sort of had a little bit of Wisconsin in me, they figured. (Chuckles)

WN: Was that a factor?

HC: I think it probably was, yeah. But mostly I think it was they got an unemployed Rhodes scholar and somebody else would pay for it. That was an additional staff member. And Aydelotte had arranged for a (Carnegie) grant for, I think it was \$700, which I lived on for eight months, if you can imagine that.

(Laughter)

HC: 'Course the dollar was worth a lot more then. And I didn't join it until November, you see.

WN: November of '39.

HC: [Nineteen] thirty-nine. And one of the people already selected for that intern program, already serving as an intern in the juvenile delinquency section of the Bureau of Prisons, was Lois. That's where we met and by the end of that intern year, we were engaged. But we didn't get married because both of our families were objecting.

WN: Why was that?

HC: Oh, (pause) I know Mother's objection was East Coast oriented and her-kind-of-people oriented and the idea of marrying a dentist's daughter from Oregon was sort of off her screen.

(Laughter)

HC: And also, Lois was a year and a half older than I was. So she made much of marrying an "older woman" and so forth. She hadn't been looking at the demographic statistics which made it a sensible thing to do, actually. (WN chuckles.) And Lois' parents had her all programmed to come back after the intern year to Salem, Oregon, where she'd already been immured for the first twenty-three years of her life. She'd hardly left the state. But she was supposed to go to law school, to the Willamette University Law School, which was a good law school. For a while the dean there was Wayne Morse, who was a famous [United States] senator later. We got to know him quite well, and he was very helpful to us in getting Lois a job in the Library of Congress after our intern year.

WN: So she had gone from Salem . . .

HC: To . . .

WN: . . . straight to D.C., Washington, D.C. . . .

HC: To D.C., yeah.

WN: . . . for her internship. I see.

HC: And so in effect she had decided not to go back [to Oregon]. And her parents had it all figured out that she was going to go to law school and then she'd be able to support her brother who was much younger, and make sure he got through college, and so on. But Lois wasn't buying that scenario after she had met me. So it was kind of difficult. We arranged to be married in Washington. Her mother came about two weeks before the (wedding, but wouldn't stay for the wedding itself). And my then boss, (Jack Fischer), who knew all about

the situation, arranged to have me transferred (for three months) to the regional office of the Farm Security Administration in Portland, Oregon—(fifty miles from Lois's family in Salem).

WN: Oh.

HC: So that summer I was able to reconcile with Lois' family, you see. And that worked just fine. I mean, once it was a *fait accompli*, it was all right. But . . .

WN: But how did your mother take the news of your moving to Portland?

HC: Well, it was just for the summer. It was just a summer assignment. She thought it was fine to get Lois' family on board. Because by that time, she had gotten over her qualms and was outraged at the fact that Lois' family was objecting, you see.

(Laughter)

HC: That probably helped bring her around, in fact. "What, she's not good enough for Harlan?" you know, that sort of thing.

(Laughter)

HC: Maybe we should backtrack a little on the year at Oxford because there were some other things that were important in that year. One is that all the systematic economics that I ever learned was in that year. It was the heyday of Keynesian economics. My tutor was a young don in his first year of teaching, Harold Wilson, who later became president of the board of trade and various (other political) jobs and wound up as the prime minister. A very bright, very quick-minded economist. The master of University College at the time was Lord [William Henry] Beveridge, who was one of the great economists of his generation. And so some of us were selected to participate in what was called the Master's Discussion Group, a very exciting intellectual experience. 'Cause you had Beveridge and G.D.H. Cole and Harold Wilson and one or two other faculty, all those people, and then some of the brightest students in the college. This is University College, Oxford, which was sort of a nest for economists at that time. And I didn't ever think of myself as an economist and didn't aim at a Ph.D. in economics and only taken one course in economics in my life at Princeton which was the dumbest course I had at Princeton, I think, because it was taught by a very dull man. But (at Oxford) I got excited by the concepts and the sense that by analyzing situations, governments could actually change the prospects for people. And my government, I mean the Roosevelt administration, had in effect used concepts from [John Maynard] Keynes: when there's inflation you tamp down the economy but when there's recession you feed it with public works and that sort of thing. Trouble is people who use those concepts since then have remembered only the part where you feed it and not the part where you tamp it down. Hence our \$4 trillion deficit and all that.

WN: So in other words, then, what you're saying is that the New Deal was really based on Keynesian economics.

HC: Yeah, it was, quite consciously. We had a lot of talk about Keynes and everybody read Keynes. And I found the *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, which was his famous book, remarkably lucid and interesting compared with most economics writings which

struck me as terribly turgid, mathematical, and so forth.

WN: Right, right.

HC: But, it wasn't true of Keynes.

WN: Well, he was looking at economics as a social science. Rather than as mathematics.

HC: As a sort of human, even humorous thing I used in my . . . (HC pulls microphone) oops, sorry.

WN: That's okay.

HC: Just let me get a copy of his book.

WN: Okay.

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)

HC: He was not only very bright, but he had a very good sense of humor. So for me that was a very important intellectual development that I think stood me in good stead because later on I had—during the war and after the war—I had several jobs that were really economic warfare and economic development. And I was able to understand what people were saying in those fields much better, I think, as a result of this exposure at Oxford. So even though I didn't get (an economics) degree I got a lot of education from that.

WN: How did you prepare for your internship? Did you at all?

HC: No. I just went down there and went to work. They had a very good support system because the interns met a couple of times a week and we all got to know each other very well—a very close group. Everybody talked about what they were doing and you got a pretty good view of the whole government through the eyes of these twenty or so people. And some wives and husbands who were already married and whose spouses were also working. And we had a very good time together. I first got together with Lois because I was a tenor. I don't sound as if my voice would have been very good, but that was a result of a heart attack and what happened to me in the hospital room. I have one paralyzed vocal chord. But I was a pretty good tenor. I even thought about trying to be an operatic tenor at one point.

WN: Did you engage in any of that at Oxford?

HC: No, I did some singing but it was mostly, you know, songs that we made up. (WN laughs.) My best friend there—I had two best friends in Oxford, both Americans. One was Steve Bailey who played the piano, a political scientist and was later at Wesleyan College in Connecticut. And wound up head of the National Institute for Education, which was sort of a semi-government thing. Extremely bright, very amusing, very good pianist, and liked making up patter songs. And so I learned from him to play jazz piano and I made up a few songs myself.

WN: Well, I noticed you used the word, "made up." I mean, you don't want to call it "composed?"

HC: Well, yeah, composed. But you know, you'd start with the words and then weave some music around them. We didn't think of the two functions as so different that they had to be done by two different people like Rogers and Hammerstein. (WN laughs.) Or Lerner and Loewe. But there was this genius young man (an English fellow-student at Oxford), who also played the piano well and who was wonderful at developing lyrics. He would toss off lyrics like, "And when I get to work you'll easily see that I'm a Hercules." That's a pretty intricate piece of lyrical composition, you know. (WN chuckles.) I never could manage anything that good.

(Laughter)

HC: That was an important part (of my experience) at Oxford. (Music) was an important part with the (group in Washington), too, because a number of us liked to sing and some played instruments and so we'd get together at least once a week, usually in the apartment that Lois shared with a couple of other girls, where they had a piano.

WN: And did Lois have a musical background?

HC: Yeah. She had started to major in piano, actually, at college. But she was derailed from that by the fact that her teacher, who was on the faculty, got into a fight with other members of the music department, which is quite normal in music departments apparently, and finally left. Lois wanted to stay with her but she couldn't be majoring in piano and studying with this defecting professor of piano. So she sort of looked around. She liked very much the man who was in charge of the public administration [department]. The old principle: take the professor, don't take the course. She chose public administration and became his star student. So he promoted her for one of these internships. They went through the whole rigmarole of the selection process and so on, and she was one of the successful candidates. It was a very tough competition and as a result, the group that assembled in Washington each year for these internships were a very bright lot.

WN: How many were there?

HC: About twenty or so.

WN: Oh, is that all? Twenty from across the United States?

HC: Yeah, from around the United States. And they had a pretty good mix of men and women. And most of them were in the executive branch of government.

WN: Did they get a choice as to which department they were going to work in?

HC: Well, the organization had sort of worked out a lot of the possibilities, you see. And they tried to match the vacancies to the people.

WN: Was it unusual for a woman to get an internship?

HC: No, out of the twenty or so, there must have been six or seven, anyway. Lois would remember better. And in a way that's always been true of government work and public administration, that women have been—there hasn't been as strong a glass ceiling in that as there always was in corporate business or military or other kinds of things.

The other thing is, reverting once more to Oxford, the other thing that was absolutely wonderful about Oxford was the length of their vacations. They had six weeks at Christmas and six weeks at Easter where you were off. I was there just for one Christmas and one Easter, but I made the most of them. During the winter vacation, I met my brother [Van] who had graduated from Harvard the same year I graduated from Princeton. He hadn't gotten a Rhodes scholarship but he had gotten a wonderful fellowship, a traveling fellowship, from Harvard, on the basis of which he got married and took his wife on the traveling fellowship all over Europe. He visited Poland and had a chance to talk to some of the people who were just sure they could make mincemeat of the Nazis and so on. He was basically an economist. He'd majored in economics. He later got a law degree but he always remained basically an economist. Wound up as a vice president of Citibank for thinking about the international monetary situation. And so we arranged our schedules so that we could get together for this four or five weeks during my six-week vacation and go to Val d'Isère, which was a great place, one of the great places for skiing in those days.

WN: Now, where is this?

HC: It's in the French Alps.

WN: Hold it now, let me just change . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

HC: We didn't really know it until we got there, but Val d'Isère was where the French ski team was practicing. The French ski team was winning everything because they'd invented a new way of skiing. Have you ever gone skiing?

WN: Well, I have, but not enough to know these terms.

HC: The old system was you sort of brake yourself while your ski is going this way and then you turn.

WN: Like snowplow a little.

HC: Snowplow, yeah. That had been the Austrian system and the Austrians had won everything for many years. And the French found that if you put your skis together and lean far enough forward to get the backs of your skis off the ground, you could actually increase your speed around the turn. And with this ski *Français* technique, they started winning all the downhill and slalom events. And the two people who were number one and number two in the world were on the French ski team. Emile Allais, A-L-L-A-I-S, and Maurice La Faffourg, L-A F-A-F-F-O-U-R-G, I guess. Van's wife was an artist and remarkably good at capturing likeness with a sketch. So we made a deal. She would produce a sketch of every member of the French ski team, and in return they would teach us the French ski technique.

(Laughter)

HC: So we got pretty good. Betty had been a crack skier anyway. At Wellesley she'd won a couple of Dartmouth winter events, and so on. Van and I were never that good but we were ambitious. (Chuckles) So.

WN: You mean you actually wanted to go faster?

HC: Yeah. And we were heavier so (WN laughs) if you got going straight you went faster. And so we got pretty good at skiing. And that was the year that I was just turning twenty-one, completing my obligation not to drink or smoke until I was twenty-one. And so I was young and I was always a little too heavy and never really that good an athlete but that was okay for football because you're supposed to be a large block in the way . . .

WN: Right, you told me off tape . . .

HC: . . . in the line.

WN: . . . that you played football at Princeton.

HC: Yes. Freshman football.

WN: I was just wondering too, my understanding of Oxford, to get a Rhodes scholarship, you had to have been participating in a sport?

HC: Yeah, you were supposed to be an all-around person.

WN: So what was your sport actually?

HC: Well, lacrosse and the fact that I had played football. But probably the most important thing was that I had, with Van (and Anne), done a lot of sailboat racing, which was also a very athletic endeavor. And so that was enough to get by, at least, I mean, without being an All-American or anything. Then at Oxford I played lacrosse for the university. Half the team was Americans. And half the Cambridge team was Canadians for some reason. So it was kind of a North American championship when Oxford and Cambridge met.

WN: Was there any kind of resistance or animosity toward Americans there?

HC: I didn't feel anything at all. They were sometimes curious or regarded us as gauche and so on but I never really had any feeling of that sort from the time that I was in England. The fellow that persuaded me to try for a Rhodes scholarship, who'd been a Rhodes scholar many years before and had been a teacher of mine at Andover, and was by that time down at Rollins College where Mother was the dean of women. Bael Trowbridge was his name.

WN: Trowbridge?

HC: Trowbridge. He told us that when he first went to England, which would have been probably in the late [19]20s, or mid-[19]20s maybe, that they had been very carefully briefed to keep their heads down and not talk aloud or make yourself obvious as foreigners and so on. And the first night—the foreign students were supposed to get there a few days ahead—the first night there was one large table full of new students. None of them knew each other, of course,

so they were all talking, very whispery way. And so one of the other students said something that couldn't have been said by a British student. I mean it was a---he was a South African or an Australian or something. And I can't remember what it was, but it was an attitude that was just inconceivable from a British student. And so everybody kind of looked up from their plates and they found that they were all non-British. They were all from the various ex-colonies. (Chuckles) And had a fine time together after that.

(Laughter)

HC: In fact, the Rhodes scholar status at Oxford was a good status. It was a good medal to have on, as it were. And in fact it's been a lifelong medal. I mean it's what people always point to in your biography. And in a way, for a while, it was a substitute for the advanced degrees that I didn't get. 'Cause it was always sort of an assumption that, well, if things had been different he could have, you know, it wasn't that he wasn't bright enough, it was just that. . . . (Chuckles) So. But it is a kind of a status like the medal of honor, things like that.

And the alumni organization of the Rhodes scholars, the American Rhodes scholars, is quite active and puts out an annual updated list of everybody's addresses and so on. And puts out a quarterly magazine, which has some serious stuff in it and some funny stuff in it.

And so, even though the timing was wrong in terms of the war, it turned out to be a very good thing for me to have done.

WN: Did you ever think of going back after the war?

HC: Well, they offered all of us who had been chopped off in the middle the opportunity to go back for a scholarship, which at that time was worth about \$2,000. But I had a \$10,000 salary, a wife and three children by that time, and had been in quite senior jobs during the war and right after. So it didn't seem like junking all that and going back to school made any sense. And so I didn't.

One other thing about the Oxford experience was the Easter vacation. My friend John Van Ess—I had been his collaborator all through the politics of the campus in Princeton—his father, as I mentioned, I think, before, was a missionary educator in Iraq, in Basra, which is down near the head of the Persian Gulf. And he had gone back to Basra himself and was brushing up his Arabic, which he handled very well. We were very good friends so he said, "Why don't you come to Basra?" You know, in a normal vacation you wouldn't be able to do that, but six weeks (made it possible). There weren't any airplanes. But I went by train and boat across the [English] Channel and train down to Marseilles and on a boat through the Mediterranean. And put into Alexandria and then wound up in Beirut. Took a bus from Beirut across the desert, to Baghdad, and another bus down from Baghdad to Basra. That was (nearly) two weeks of travel. (WN laughs.) But it was a fascinating trip. I'd never been in that part of the world, outside of France. I'd never been to Egypt before, I'd never been in Lebanon before. I'd heard about monuments and ranges of mountains that I was having a chance to see. And then the desert isn't at all like the Sahara. It was dry but often very flat as that one is. And Baghdad was exotic, full of interesting-looking mosques and so on. And Basra was fascinating because I lived with the Van Esses. And he was the leading authority on the spoken Arabic of Iraq. He'd written a book about the spoken Arabic of Iraq. He knew everything about Iraq, you know, who was who and what the clashes and counter clashes

were. And John and I, whenever there was a demonstration or anything, anything exciting going on in town, we'd just go and join in and see what was going on, which I don't think I'd do nowadays. And we were very conspicuous. He was about six feet five with this shock of blonde hair, so no problem about picking him out in an Arabic crowd, you know. (Chuckles) But he could also speak Arabic fluently. Idiomatically and . . .

WN: What was he doing there? I mean he had finished, graduated from Princeton?

HC: He had graduated from Princeton. He had kind of an intern arrangement with an oil company there where, of course, he'd be a major asset because he could speak Arabic so well and yet he was a well-educated American. And he arranged for us to go down to Kuwait, which we did by boat out to Shatt al Arab, along the coast and down to Kuwait, so later when Kuwait got into the news it wasn't just a sort of an idea of a place called Kuwait. It was a place I'd been to, I'd seen. 'Course it's much bigger now and more developed but, still, I had a feel for the ambiance of the whole Persian Gulf. And then whenever the Persian Gulf came up in the news, I felt that I was a little better off than most newspaper readers because I had been there, you know, a long time ago.

I have a very good record of that trip. 'Cause I wrote long, typed letters back to my mother. And she preserved them and I have them now. So if I ever do a full-blown biography, that part would be very well covered. But that was an enormously important experience for me. I came to feel that I had some feel for the Middle East and the Arab world. And so later when I was in the State Department and things would come up in the UN [United Nations] about Palestinians and so on, it wasn't—I had visited there later as an adult but the really important visit was when I was a very impressionistic and very lively, curious student.

WN: Were there beginnings of war around? I mean was there any feeling about war?

HC: Well, for them at that time, the war was very far away. It was basically a European thing. But of course, in Lebanon the French and the British had sort of a "condominium," they called it, and in Persia and Iraq American and British oil companies were the main cheese—and our war effort later was very dependent on that oil, as we still are today. But neither the Germans nor the Japanese were much engaged in the Persian Gulf at that time. The Germans were much engaged, of course, in Egypt and Libya and North Africa, but they never really got troops (to the Middle East). I learned a good deal about what the British were trying to do with Palestine, and Balfour Declaration and all that got into my memory track. But that was an important experience for me.

WN: And so you took another two weeks to get back?

HC: Oh yeah.

WN: So actually, you only spent about two weeks there? Actually there?

HC: Yeah, I think I was probably there about 2½ weeks. About there. (Pause) I came back partly on the famous Orient Express which came, you know, all the way through Hungary and Greece and all that. Down to that part of the world. So just to have a different experience. I didn't want to just get on another boat and go back up the Mediterranean. Wanted to try something else.

- WN: So that by the time you got to Washington, D.C. as an intern, you were pretty well-traveled by then.
- HC: I had been to Japan, China, and so on. And I had been in Europe and in the Middle East. Where I hadn't been and haven't ever been hardly, except for a couple of meetings in Rio, was in South America and Latin America. I had never really had any connection with Latin America and I had never learned Spanish, which I wish I had because I did a lot of work with Latin Americans in the UN and elsewhere. But that wasn't something that rubbed off early. And I had so many sort of natural interests, in the Far East for one and in Europe for another, that most of my "foreign affairs" and "international affairs" activity, and most of my (personal) interest, has been those two regions.
- WN: So when you were an intern with the National Institute for Public Affairs, what was your job actually?
- HC: For the first couple of months I was assigned to the Senate Civil Liberties Committee of which Senator La Follette was chairman.
- WN: That was the actual name of the committee?
- HC: Yeah, Civil Liberties Committee. That was . . .
- WN: What took its place?
- HC: It wasn't a standing committee. It was sort of like the Watergate committee.
- WN: I see.
- HC: Or something. And it was making about as much noise as the Watergate committee did at the time.
- WN: So what were the issues at that time regarding civil liberties?
- HC: Well, it had to do with two things primarily. One was the rise of the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] had threatened steel and other industries. And those industries had reacted with gangster attacks on the unions. You know, they had goons and all those sort of things you associate with gangster movies. And the first job that I did when I arrived, since I was sort of sold to the senator's office as somebody that could write, they put me to work editing a huge report—a big, fat report on a series of hearings and investigations that they had done over a two-year period on the Little Steel Strike of 1937. The steel workers had struck some of the smaller steel companies in Youngstown, [Ohio] and several other places. And the employers' side of the fight were really Neanderthal in the violence of their tactics. This was the beginning of the sit-in strikes which had never been used before. There was a real danger for the union members who were sitting in that somebody would just blow up the building or light the whole building on fire to get rid of these radicals, you see. There was quite a lot of violence.
- WN: You mean on the part of the company?

HC: On the part of the companies and responded to by the unions, of course. So the committee was still trying to sort that out. The committee was more or less on the side of the unions. And it was a liberal Democrat wing in the union that all supported Roosevelt and so on. And the administration was trying to bring some order into it by having a National Labor Relations Board and beginning to develop some rules and regulations and that sort of thing.

WN: So these are pretty much wildcat strikes at this time.

HC: No, they weren't wildcat. They were mostly done by the unions. By the leadership of the unions. And of course the unions were working together much better in those days. If the steel workers went out, then a lot of other people would go out in sympathy. Postal workers and teamsters, and so on. So it was a very dramatic period. And we hadn't fully recovered from the depression so it was still a lot of unemployment. So it was a very, very tough period. It was a wonderful ringside seat that I had, because I had to read all this material, you see, in order to make sense of it and get it into plain English that would go well in a report. And then there were currently . . .

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)

HC: There was currently, as I remember, an investigation of the so-called Associated Farmers. Which was, again, sort of a pro-employer group that was trying, with some violent tactics, to discourage the farmers' union and the migratory workers' groups from raising hell because they were being badly paid and put upon in all sorts of ways.

WN: Is this where the Wagner Act came into play?

HC: Wagner Act was passed, I think, in '35. And it began to work on the big situations. But most of the farm groups were smaller and the farm owners developed an organization called the Associated Farmers which became a kind of the point organization to undermine the workers and make it more difficult for them to strike, and brought in other workers for their jobs if they did strike. All that sort of thing. They, again, were very vulnerable to charges of really Neanderthal tactics. And so that was going on in the committee and I got involved doing some of the staff work in that. So I was there about 2, 2½ months. (During) that time [U.S.] (Congressmen and) [U.S.] Senators were not really much around (Washington) after the middle of the year. (Congress) wasn't a year-round thing the way it is now. Some of the committees operated year-round like the Civil Liberties Committee was doing and making a lot of headlines in the process. But Senator La Follette was not there most of the time. He came, and chaired hearings, but he wasn't using his office very much. And no legislation was going on. But after the first of the year I then was transferred to be a legislative assistant to him (personally).

WN: This is with the Farm Security Administration?

HC: No, that was what I went into in my next job.

WN: Oh, okay.

HC: But the reason I got that job was partly because of what I worked on with him. He was the ranking minority member of the Senate Finance Committee. He'd been there . . .

WN: La Follette was?

HC: La Follette. He'd been there a long time already. And he was a minority even though he was a minority of one Progressive but still, he had seniority.

WN: Oh, he was in the Progressive party?

HC: Yeah.

WN: The name of his party, he wasn't a Democrat?

HC: No, he was a Progressive.

WN: Oh, oh, okay.

HC: Later, after the war in '46, he decided to be a Republican and thought he would get the [U.S. Senate] nomination as a Republican in Wisconsin. And ran into Joe [Joseph R.] McCarthy. And was beaten by Joe McCarthy in the primary.

WN: In '46?

HC: [Nineteen] forty-six, I think it was.

WN: Was it a big margin?

HC: I don't remember the margin. But I think it was pretty decisive. Because (McCarthy) went on, then, to win the [general] election. And before long, I guess after a couple of years, he started stirring around the way he did.

WN: We know what happened after that. (Chuckles)

HC: And some years later, in the early [19]50s, I don't remember exactly what year, Bob La Follette, the guy that I worked for, Robert, Jr., committed suicide.

WN: Robert, Jr.?

HC: Robert M. La Follette, Jr.

WN: Really? You mean this is the son of . . .

HC: This was the son of the guy that was a senator [Robert M. La Follette, Sr., 1855–1925] for a long time [1906–25]. And when he finally died, Bob, Jr. [Robert M. La Follette, Jr., 1895–1953] ran for the seat and won it. So it was quite a long tenure for the two of them in the [U.S.] Senate. But (Bob, Jr.) really only had two (political) jobs in his life. One was to be an assistant to a senator and the other was to be a senator [1925–46]. He stayed in Washington, [D.C.], and, could never, I think, get used to just sort of being a lobbyist and I think the fact that he had lost to McCarthy [in the 1946 Republican primary for U.S. Senator] was preying on his mind, too. Anyway, he committed suicide. I don't think I was in Washington at the time. I think I was probably abroad at that time.

WN: So this Senator La Follette that was the department head of the Senate Civil Liberties Committee, you're talking about is the . . .

HC: Bob, Bob, Jr.

WN: Bob, Jr., I see.

HC: And his brother [Phillip F. La Follette, 1897–1965] was, I think, governor of Wisconsin [1931–33 and 1935–39]. And so the Progressives really had a lock on Wisconsin for quite a long time.

WN: Okay.

HC: And I learned quite a lot about Wisconsin politics, of course, in the process.

WN: Interesting, though.

HC: See, my job was basically as legislative assistant, I was working mostly on farm credit issues because in the [Senate] Finance Committee, that was one of the big things. And the Farm Security Administration was a big player in that. But they put me on a huge desk, the biggest desk I had ever had.

WN: (Laughs) You mean with the Farm Security Administration?

HC: No, no. In the senator's office.

WN: Oh, okay.

HC: In a sort of an outer office that just had me and this huge desk. And everybody had to come in through that door. That was the only door that was open to the outside. And of course as the ranking minority member of the Senate Finance Committee, a lot of the people who came in had some magnificent scheme for fixing up the economy. And part of my job was to make sure that the senator didn't have to waste too much time with these greenback nuts that came in. But I was fascinated with them. You could always tell that there was a greenbacker type because they would come in with a big roll of paper under their arm. And if you gave them a chance and a big enough desk or table, they would lay out this wonderful chart showing, this is where (the money) goes, you see—(and you could see just how and where the) inflation came in, and so on.

WN: What is a greenbacker?

HC: Well, people who want to inflate the money to make everybody prosperous. There have been strains of that all through our economic history. But some of them are more bright than others. Or even back in Andrew Jackson's days there was a big fight about the setting up of the federal bank and getting them. . . . My brother Van, the last job he did with Citibank before he retired was he presided over the production of a magnificent book, which was the history of Citibank and its predecessors going all the way back into the 1830s. It was really a history of the whole banking system. Not racy reading but lucid. It was kind of educational to be related to Van and thus to understand a little about banking. 'Cause his story started before the federal

reserve even came into the picture.

WN: So you got sort of a prelude to your job at the Farm Security Administration with this, working with the . . .

HC: Well, it turned out that it was very relevant and I knew a lot about farm credit issues. Because I'd worked on speech material and I'd worked on legislation and negotiated with other senators' offices and so on. But the reason that I was hired by Farm Security [Administration] was again as a writer or potential writer anyway . . .

WN: Can I just take a minute . . .

HC: Yeah.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 25-4-2-96; SIDE ONE

WN: Okay, you were talking about the Farm Credit Committee as sort of a prelude to when you became part of the Farm Security Administration.

HC: Oh yeah, well, the reason I got the job was pure old-boy network. (WN chuckles.) Jack Fischer, who became editor-in-chief of *Harper's* (magazine) after the war, was working in this New Deal agency as (chuckles) what at Oxford would have been called "director of propaganda"—that is, he was in charge of the information division of the Farm Security Administration. And I was hired by him. He had been a 1933 Rhodes scholar. And so he had a list, from the ever active American secretary of the Rhodes Trust, of Rhodes scholars who would be looking for jobs, which apparently was circulated to. . . . They don't do that anymore, at least I hadn't seen it for some years. And I had been working for a congenial senator, congenial to the Democratic administration, and working on farm credit issues and so on. So he picked me off the list and asked me to come talk to him. I did, and I was hired.

WN: So this was a regular job, not as an intern?

HC: This was a paid job, yeah. At, what was it (pause), I think may have gotten, oh, as much as twenty-three hundred dollars [\$2,300] a year, or something like that at that time. And that was a very exciting job partly because he was such an interesting person. And the agency itself was a huge experiment. You know, you've always heard about county agents for the [U.S.] Department of Agriculture all over the place. But the county agents were helping mostly the richer farmers. And they weren't doing anything for the people who couldn't ask for loans because they didn't have any credit rating or anything. And the New Deal had sort of the idea that we should be promoting small-farm ownership and so on.

WN: By small, you mean how many acres?

HC: Well, the old phrase was "forty acres and a mule," you know. But sometimes they were smaller than forty acres. And sometimes they were a good deal bigger, depending on the crop.

And sometimes they were really just subsistence farmers. They were just trying to produce enough for themselves and their family and maybe get a little cash income. But it was mostly income in kind to themselves. And there were huge numbers of these farmers. They were all over the country in all kinds of different situations depending on the kind of land and kind of people. So the Farm Security Administration was set up with a very ambitious agenda to make loans to poor farmers—that is, make loans to people who, in the general scheme of things, were not eligible for loans by banks or by mortgage companies or by the Farm Credit Administration, which was helping larger farmers. So (the FSA) had a farm securities supervisor in just about every county in the country—and there are a lot of counties in this country.

I did some general writing about that for a little while, but it turned out that the future of this agency was going to depend on showing that it was related to the defense buildup. That was where the prestige was, and that was where the money was in 1940. And Roosevelt, I think, was sure we were going to go to war sooner or later. Everything was increasingly oriented to being relevant to defense. And Farm Security [Administration] was well-equipped to do some things that nobody else knew how to do. When the [U.S.] Army decided that they wanted to have a big artillery range in Georgia near Hinesville, they obviously took the cheapest land. Cheapest land belonged to the poor farmers.

So, Farm Security [Administration], your job is to move the farmers out and find some other place for them and get them out of there. Sometimes we had to move the cemeteries out, too, because people didn't want a practice shell landing on Aunt Tilley's grave, you know. (Chuckles) So there was a lot of emotional stuff like that. And a lot of legal and real estate economics also involved in it. And the person in charge of handling this locally there in Georgia—and several other places around the country after a while but Georgia was the most dramatic one—was the local county supervisor who never dreamed of being part of a national drama like this. So I was the latest person hired in the information division, the public relations division. So I was assigned to be the defense expert, the expert on the defense angle of the agency. And that meant that I needed to go and visit these places. Places like Hinesville, Georgia.

WN: What was the name of that place again?

HC: Hinesville. H-I-N-E-S ville.

WN: And what were they going to put there?

HC: A big artillery range. So they needed a lot of space, you see. So that the bombs didn't rain on people.

WN: What kind of farming was being done?

HC: Well, it was mostly very poor land, subsistence farming. Scratching a livelihood. Not very much cotton or cash crops like that. Vegetables.

WN: So even subsistence farmers were getting federal aid.

HC: Oh yes (especially subsistence farmers).

WN: Federal loans.

HC: Yeah. They were people toward the bottom of the barrel and that's what the New Deal was sort of aiming at. People at the bottom of the barrel.

WN: Was there a lot of objection to moving?

HC: Tremendous objection to moving. You know, some people had lived there all their lives. Their grandfathers were there, great-grandfathers were in the grave, and all that sort of thing. Their churches were there. We moved some churches.

WN: So you're actually moving towns.

HC: Yeah, well, we didn't move many houses but we moved some churches and quite a lot of graveyards.

WN: Well, if there's a graveyard that had to be moved and if there was a home near it, wouldn't the home need to be moved also if there's going to be artillery shelling?

HC: Well, the people would just get paid for what they owned and often they didn't own it, they were a tenant of somebody else, you see.

WN: I see. So they vacated the home.

HC: So they just had to get out.

WN: I see.

HC: And our problem was to find some other place for them—hopefully, nearby in Georgia, someplace where they could start a new life. And these issues were locally very dramatic politics, you can imagine. And so my job turned out to be—to my surprise and somewhat to Jack Fischer's surprise—to go in and set up as the public relations advisor to the county supervisor. And handle the relationships with the [U.S.] Justice Department and the [U.S.] Army and that sort of thing. I also handled the press and wrote reports on it back to Jack.

WN: Now, you were just assigned to this one area?

HC: No, I was assigned all over the country.

WN: All over the country.

HC: I was just using that as an example.

WN: I see. That's a heck of a job. (Laughs)

HC: It was a wonderful job. I visited every state in the continental United States except Maine, I think, in that job in an eighteen-month period. And it was a tremendous learning experience for me when I was. . . . This was 1940. . . .

WN: Twenty, twenty-two.

HC: I was twenty-two, twenty-three. And I was still very much on a learning mode, anyway, you know. I had just come out of school.

WN: And you weren't married yet?

HC: I wasn't married yet.

WN: Not yet.

HC: (Lois and) I married in '41.

WN: [Nineteen] forty-one.

HC: But I was engaged. And Lois was working in the Library of Congress as a cataloguer.

WN: So your job was to work with each county supervisor . . .

HC: Farm Security [Administration] county supervisor. To help him handle this very unusual kind of thing that he didn't think he was hired to do at all. 'Cause he was usually (an agricultural) expert.

WN: And so in every state that you went to, there were areas that they were going to utilize for military purposes.

HC: Yeah. Artillery ranges was one case. Another case was what they called defense housing. That is, you'd start a new factory somewhere where you were going to make tanks or something.

WN: I see.

HC: (Suddenly) you'd move 5,000 workers in there, and where were they going to live? Well, the only people in the government that knew anything about rapid temporary housing was the Farm Security Administration because one of our programs was the migratory labor camps.

WN: I see.

HC: And so we used all the expertise from migratory labor camps and we created, with extraordinary suddenness, whole towns.

WN: Sort of a pre-fabricated . . .

HC: Yeah, not exactly the estate you'd want to live on, but . . .

(Laughter)

HC: . . . but pretty good. You'd make good wages as a defense worker and you were willing to take some inconvenience in terms of housing because you had to be housed. And you wanted to live with your family and there had to be schools and so on. So we used the migratory

worker (housing) techniques that had been developed, (and the housing projects developed) in the old Resettlement Administration which was merged with the Farm Security Administration. The Resettlement Administration had been run by Rex Tugwell. And they had developed some model towns, one of which was Greenbelt, (Maryland), outside of Washington. Anyway, most of them didn't work too well because it was the example of everything being planned, you know. And didn't work for us, I think, any better than it did for the Communists, to try to plan everything. (Chuckles) But there were people who were really dedicated to planning everything. And some of us were inclined to be more, not exactly free marketeers, but (wanting), you know, a lot more looseness in the system, to let people improvise and so on. Give them support for what they felt they needed rather than what you thought they needed. So these emergencies were popping up all over the country and we were supposed to sweep up after them, you see. And the [U.S.] Army didn't want to have to get into the business of relocating farmers or building defense housing or stuff like that. I mean, they had a war to prepare for. But the fact is that we were very activist about it, and Jack Fischer arranged for a lot of good noises to come out about what FSA as it was called—Farm Security Administration—was doing. It meant that we survived very well at appropriation time on Capitol Hill because we weren't just fiddling around with "unimportant" things like poor farmers, we were helping the (national) defense (program). It was a little like attitudes about foreign aid and the Cold War, you know. If you were helping some country where you liked the military, well, that was easier to get the money for than for some social experiment. So that was a very intensive, roughly, eighteen months, I guess. Because I got into that job in the middle of nineteen. . . .

WN: [Nineteen] forty?

HC: [Nineteen] forty. And that lasted until just after Pearl Harbor.

WN: So in essence what you did was, you were like the organ for the government to explain these happenings to the general public?

HC: It was more than that. When I went to a local situation where because I had been in Washington I knew much more about the context than any of the local people. I became sort of part of the operation. And I would advise them what to do so it would look good (chuckles) you know, that sort of thing. Jack Fischer always said that there are two ways of being a public relations officer. You can wait around, see what the agency does and then try to explain it, or you can tell the agency what they ought to do so that you can explain it better. And he believed in being the activist, second kind. And he was on very good relations with Beanie Baldwin, the administrator, who had been a businessman before; Jack Fischer was, I think, a very important policy advisor to the administrator. Much more so than would be normally true of the public relations guy in an agency.

WN: Were there any incidents aimed at you or the administration, regarding what you were doing?

HC: No, on the whole it was---what we were doing was sort of popular with all the elements in the equation. The [U.S.] Army? We got the (messy) problems off their hands; the Justice Department got the chance to do its thing but didn't have to worry about the consequences of the buying of the land. The farmers looked to us as their only savior around, if they had to move. Or the workers looked to us as the only people who knew how to build houses, so let's get some houses built. Looking back on it, I think we were really filling a vacuum that would

have been a serious scandal if it hadn't been vigorously filled at the time. Being hired as a writer in the information division with the Farm Security [Administration] sounds pretty tame. But it wasn't tame at all.

WN: Well, you did more than writing. You were . . .

HC: Right. I had to do quite a lot of writing but I was also doing a lot of advising and sort of policy-making in local situations.

WN: Did you have to do any arbitration at all?

HC: No.

WN: Mediation?

HC: No. But what was very useful was that after I had been to several of these relocation situations, I knew more about the relocation business than almost anybody. I'd say, "Well, what they did in Hinesville was so and so," you see.

And they'd say, "Well, let's try that."

So it was that kind of policy advice. And then also I could write it up in a way that could be consistent with the Washington policy and consistent with our wish to be seen as being helpful to the defense effort.

WN: I guess in those days, helping, well, being part of the defense effort really sort of helped justify what you were doing to the local population.

HC: And to Congress.

WN: And to Congress.

HC: Because the bloom was off the rose as far as the New Deal itself was concerned. This was a huge, expensive piece of the [U.S.] Department of Agriculture, which some of the other parts of the [U.S.] Department of Agriculture thought it was too damned big and too abrasive (chuckles), because we'd get into fights with the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior's Land Reclamation people, over some of the land issues. And of course, we were always turning up as the advocates for the little guy, you see. And that was kind of hard to beat down. But on the other hand, it would have been more comfortable if we hadn't been there. So on the whole, that was an exciting, and for me, a very positive experience. And a tremendous education in what the country was like and what people were like in Oklahoma and the state of Washington, and Montana, and places that I had never been to before at all for any purpose.

WN: So you were doing this until through Pearl Harbor or . . .

HC: Well . . .

WN: . . . after Pearl Harbor?

HC: . . . and suddenly Pearl Harbor comes along. Bang. And suddenly we were in a war. And everything changed. Everything was oriented toward getting the war effort off the ground. And one of the things that they wanted to get off the ground was a Board of Economic Warfare, to handle some of the buying of rare metals and so on for our industry. Or buying them preclusively. That is, buying them so the Germans wouldn't be able to get them from places like Brazil (or Turkey or) elsewhere. And other essentially economic activities (directly) related to the war effort. So they set up an agency called the Board of Economic Warfare. And the vice president [of the United States] was appointed as its chairman. The vice president was Henry [A.] Wallace [1941-44] who had been secretary of agriculture for eight years. The other members of the board were other members of the cabinet. And Henry Wallace didn't really know very many staff people outside of the Department of Agriculture. And all his life had been in agriculture out in Iowa, where he'd published an important farmers' magazine for a long time before he got into politics. So he knew about people in the Department of Agriculture but he didn't have a very good feel for people elsewhere in the government.

So it was natural that he should select as the executive director, the guy who was really going to run the Board of Economic Warfare, the very effective businessman and very effective government leader (who had been brought into the USDA) as head of the food stamp plan when it was first invented sometime in the late [19]30s. He developed this whole food stamp plan from scratch and it was very successful, very popular, and very well-known. So (Wallace) selected that man (Milo Perkins), as executive director of the Board of Economic Warfare. And that man didn't know anybody in Washington except people in the Department of Agriculture. So he literally just went around saying, "I want you and you and you and you and bring your staff," you know. (Chuckles) And one of the people he wanted was Jack Fischer. And so Jack Fischer just swept me in the undertow and about a hundred of us, in a week or two, went over and started the Board of Economic Warfare.

WN: Is this like a step up? Or. . . .

HC: Well it was. It was a step up in responsibility. I was a special assistant to Jack. But then as things went along I got thrown into—if something wasn't going very well they'd fire the head of that division and put me in to run that division for the time being, that sort of thing. I was still only, you know, twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five. And I had the enormous advantage that I had one eye that didn't work. So they kept not drafting me when my number would come up.

WN: Because of your eye?

HC: Yeah.

WN: Oh, okay.

HC: I'd go through the whole business. Naked all day long in a big armory or a gym. The eye people for some reason were always last. (WN laughs.) And then I'd go and they'd say, "Anything wrong with your eyes?"

And I'd say, "Oh yeah, I have a scar on the retina of my right eye."

"You mean the cornea?"

"No, I don't mean the cornea. I mean the retina."

"Let me take a look. . . . Hey Joe, Harry, come over and look. This is really interesting."

(Laughter)

HC: I was the highlight of their day, you see . . .

(Laughter)

HC: . . . for these experts.

WN: How did it happen?

HC: Well, when I was in Madison, at the age of about seven, playing cops and robbers and so on, we were throwing clinkers—you know, the hard jagged pieces of ash that come out of the bottom of a coal furnace. They're hard and they're jagged. We were throwing these at each other. And one of them bounced on my foot and then came up and hit my eye. If it had hit my eye the whole eye would have been (damaged). The shock effect busted the retina, the mirror in the back; but it didn't bust the cornea. So I was in the hospital for a while. And in effect they said, "There's nothing we can do about this." These days they might be able to put another mirror in, another retina in, you know. They do retina replacement, I think, now. So I got used to the fact that only my left eye worked. And fortunately it didn't show, in the sense that when I look at people I look as if I'm looking at them with both eyes. And I do have some vision in the eye, peripheral vision. If I look at you, I can see my desk with this eye. But I don't see you. It was as if somebody put their fist into the mirror in the middle. So I have no direct vision. So I can't read or anything with it but I can drive and I have all the peripheral vision you need for driving. But it's my right eye and I'm right-handed, so I couldn't possibly manage a rifle or anything, you know. And so the only thing would have been to go into the U.S. Army as a so-called "limited service." Which means you sort shoes or do something useful like that. And I kept hoping that they wouldn't draft me to do that because I was having much too good a time in increasingly important jobs in the government. So I was one of the few people in his middle twenties in Washington. Young, male, White, and not in uniform.

WN: Was that a stigma?

HC: No, it was a tremendous advantage, it turned out. Because the reason for not being in was not my fault. And I hadn't refused to go in. In fact I wanted very much to get abroad and somehow be part of it. Later the selective service finally decided they had too many 1-Bs, limited services people, and they didn't need any more. That happened at a moment in my draft board career when I had been down to the draft board on Friday and they had showed me a card file which was arranged by priority of taking. My card was in the very front of that card file. So they said, "Well, the next time we reach, we're going to get your card." So I came back and told Lois that we'd better get ready for me to get in the [U.S.] Army. Sunday morning, Lois goes out to get the newspaper. And comes back in—she's generally rather low-key but came sort of screeching in, saying, "Hey! Look at this." There was a big headline saying, "Army doesn't want any more 1-Bs." Which was an important piece of news for a Washington newspaper. And so then I arranged to go to Italy as a civilian. That's

getting ahead of the story.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape No. 25-5-3-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

January 24, 1996

Punalu'u, Hawai'i

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: This is interview number three with Professor Harlan Cleveland for the UH presidents oral history project. Today is January 24, 1996, and we're at his winter home in Punalu'u, Hawai'i. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay, let's see, we left off by when you were talking about your 1-B deferment and how you—Lois had looked in the newspaper and found that they're not drafting people with 1-Bs. And this is when you were working for the Board of Economic Warfare?

HC: Yes, it was just being converted at that time. I'd been assigned the year before to the (chuckles) what was called the Enemy Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare to run the Italian Division. Because I guess the guy who was running it wasn't doing it right, and so I was taken out of my staff position. I'd already been asked to do that with the Economic Intelligence Division, and then I was asked to do that with the Italian Division.

My staff there consisted entirely of enemy aliens. That is, of Italians, mostly Jews, who had escaped from Italy just ahead of the sheriff when Mussolini, in a society where anti-Semitism hadn't been a big deal, decided to make it more anti-Semitic so as to get along better with Hitler. It turned out to be a fabulous group of people. One guy had run an aluminum company and was a first-rate engineer. Another's father owned a seat on the New York Stock Exchange; he was himself a publisher of financial and other (journals. There was a) professor of law from the University of Rome. And so on. I mean, it was just a wonderful group of people. I turned out to be the only person in the staff other than some secretaries that even had American citizenship. Or could speak English with an American accent. So I was Mr. Outside. I testified (before Congress) and did all that sort of thing, but they really did the work. And our job at first was to figure out how to ruin the Italian economy.

WN: Oh, I see, economic warfare. (Chuckles)

HC: Yeah. To tell the [U.S.] Air Force what they should bomb, exactly. And that developed into a companion assignment to tell the [U.S.] Air Force what they shouldn't bomb—where the cathedrals were and don't touch those frescoes—that sort of thing. So the bombing of Italy was very selective and for its time was a great example of precision work. And, when it was all over, not very much of Italy's extraordinary artistic heritage had been destroyed.

So then the so-called Salò government [i.e., the Salò Republic, 1944–45], S-A-L-O government, went north into the area that was still occupied by the Germans. A new Italian government now competing with the German-sponsored puppets started to be formed. The king's son came back, Umberto. And Italy was declared to be a co-belligerent of (the Allies). Theoretically, they were still enemy aliens, their people. But Italy as an entity was regarded as something we wanted to help. At that point they formed (in the BEW) what they called the Reoccupation Division. This was before the invasion of Sicily. And I became, to my surprise and the surprise of all my staff, head of the Italian Division of the Reoccupation Division.

WN: This is still the Board of Economic Warfare?

HC: It was still the Board of Economic Warfare. That later became what was called the Foreign Economic Administration, which was the first foreign aid agency, really, but it still consisted mostly of the same people who had been the Board of Economic Warfare.

So suddenly we had this topsy-turvy kind of assignment. (We had helped) destroy selective pieces of the Italian economy. How do we get it all put together again? And literally, in some of the cases, we knew so much about what had been destroyed that we could really plan pretty well how to get it back together again. Our first job was the invasion of Sicily. We had to produce a whole plan for how people were going to get fed and how long it would take them to get the farms back in business and get the mills working and stuff like that. And the invasion became more and more successful—though still with a lot of casualties and a lot of trouble: (Anzio Beach), Cassino, and all that. And finally the (Allies) got to Rome and they retook Rome. At that point we wanted to establish a real government there. The Allies had established an Allied Control Commission (ACC) for Italy. And we were sort of the economic backstop of (the ACC) on the American side. And the head of the whole Allied Control Commission was (a U.S.) admiral named Ellery Stone. He'd been a top executive of the ITT before he was sort of a reserve admiral, I guess.

WN: What is the ITT?

HC: ITT, International Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. He had a vice president of the Allied Control Commission named William O'Dwyer who was a New York political leader who had gone into the service as a brigadier general—sort of a political general. And when it became possible to go somewhere and do something other than sitting in Washington, I applied to go to Italy because that was what I knew about, although I didn't at that time know Italian. So I was put into a job to be staff assistant to Bill O'Dwyer.

WN: In Italy? This is in Italy, right?

HC: In Italy, in Rome.

WN: This is about '44?

HC: It was in '44 'cause they (didn't) release (overseas service as a civilian) until '44. Rome fell somewhere in the summer, I think, of '44. I got there early fall of '44. There were some interesting and wrenching personal issues involved. Our twins were pending. Lois was pregnant with the twins [Anne and Alan].

WN: Now, Zoe was already born.

HC: Zoe was already born.

WN: She was born in '42. . . .

HC: [Nineteen] forty-two, yeah. And the twins were to be born in '44. And it so happened that they were born somewhat prematurely at just the same moment when my orders came through to get on over to Italy for this new job. I have to confess that it didn't even occur to me to say, well, the hell with the job then. It was---the wartime psychology to be part of what was going on was very strong.

WN: You were living in Washington, D.C. at the time?

HC: We were living in Arlington, [Virginia] yeah, in Buckingham. And so I took Lois to the hospital where at first she was just going to be examined to make sure it was going to be twins. And they kept her there and had the twins.

WN: How premature were they?

HC: Lois will be able to tell you exactly. It was about maybe a month and a half or something like that. They were both in incubators for a while. It was a long labor. And I needed to go and arrange about my transportation. The doctor said, "Well, this is going to take hours so why don't you go and do your thing?" So I went to the airport and arranged for leaving within a couple of days. While I was at the airport, over the intercom---that's the kind of thing that you only dream of happening---the intercom said, "Paging Mr. Cleveland, paging Mr. Harlan Cleveland. Please come to such-and-such desk. Your wife has just had twins." (Chuckles) When I got there [i.e., the desk] there was a sizeable clump of people gathered around to congratulate me and hand me cigars.

(Laughter)

WN: Strangers, you mean?

HC: Strangers. Just people who happened to be in the airport at the time. Great drama. So I rushed back to the hospital. Lois was pretty ill and the twins were still in the incubators so she hadn't seen them. So I actually saw the twins before she did. But then I had to leave.

WN: So this is the idea of you were going to leave for the job by yourself?

HC: Yeah. There was no possibility of taking her anyway. The war was still going on. Germans were still occupying all of northern Italy, in fact. Even Florence.

WN: And who was---what about Zoe?

HC: Zoe was there with us but being taken care of by a friend of Lois', the wife of a Canadian foreign officer. A good friend of ours. She was taking care of Zoe while Lois was in the hospital. So I witnessed the twins and said good-bye to Lois, and got on the plane, in effect. And I really felt guilty because the plane was held up by weather in Bermuda. We were

several days in Bermuda. And what were we going to do in Bermuda? We went out and played golf. (Chuckles) So the idea of going out and playing golf in the middle of a war with my wife in the hospital at home seemed (chuckles) (a rather) disorienting experience.

WN: Oh, boy.

HC: Anyway, Lois can tell you some interesting stories. And maybe when you come back, mayhaps you might as well talk to her about that.

WN: Yeah, I think I will.

HC: I got back a couple of times during the next year and a half on consultation trips.

WN: Is that all? You were gone for . . .

HC: I was gone for about a year and a half. (After the war was over)—in early '46—I guess it was about a year and a half—early '46, then she came with the three very young children to Italy to join me when I'd just transferred to UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration].

WN: Okay.

HC: But some tales to tell between then and now. I got over there and I was supposed to work for General O'Dwyer. On the day that I got over there, he announces to the press that he's going back to New York to run for mayor, which he subsequently did and was mayor for several terms [1946–50]. So suddenly the person I was supposed to work for had disappeared. A quick decision was made to put the guy whose job was executive director of the Economic Section, who was a civilian named Tony Antolini. He was an Italian American fluent in Italian, though far from fluent in economics. But he had good relations with all the Italians. So he was promoted to the vice president in charge of the Economic Section, and (that vacated) number two job in a section that had about 1400 people in it, mostly officers. Some civilians, but mostly military, British and American. Then there was the question of who would become executive director. I'd just arrived, I was twenty-six years old. But I was the only generalist. Everybody else knew everything about ports, or everything about transportation, everything about something, you know. And a week or two after I got there, there was a rush need to get to Washington (over one weekend) for use with Congress, a calculation of the balance of payments and internal accounts of Italy. Of course, Italy had been in such a mess that nobody had tried to do any such calculation. So I collected two or three young economic analysts from here and there on the staff and we went off and hibernated for a couple days in a hotel room and calculated and to some extent invented the first balance of payments estimate for postwar Italy.

Now in that ambience, that was regarded as an absolutely miraculous thing to have done. With my experience in being a Washington bureaucratic analyst, it was what we did every day. You know, pull together our figures and try to make some sense, and make sure they were internally consistent, but never quite knowing whether they were a reflection of reality or not. So that was something I knew how to do. But to the people around there, it seemed like an absolutely genius thing to have done. And so, in a relatively short time it developed that I was being recommended for the executive director job. And on the Washington end, where it was people I'd mostly worked with there, they were pleased with (the idea) and didn't get any

flack about it. Also, there had been some objection in London, so I never heard about it. The next echelon below me, in that job, were British brigadiers and American full colonels. I wore a uniform, but no rank on my shoulders.

Fortunately, they gave me a wonderful guy, Colonel Densmore, to be my assistant. And he just took it as sort of a personal challenge to make this young squirt successful, (chuckles) and he was brilliant at it. He knew everybody, he knew just how to do everything. He knew where all the bodies were buried. He was the kind of person you have to have in an office. And of course, I'd just arrived. I didn't even know the names of the people mostly, let alone what motivated them and what their rivalries were and all that sort of thing. And so I'm catapulted into this job.

WN: At twenty-six years old.

HC: I'd never worked so hard in my life. I worked seventeen, eighteen hours a day. I read every cable that came in or out. I just absorbed myself in the task. And with Densmore's help, it came out all right. I mean, I was able to do the job, precisely because I hadn't been a specialist in any one of the subjects but I knew something about all of them and I'd been working on the (whole) subject matter, (the economy of Italy), from a distance for some time before.

WN: So generally, in essence, you got the job, well, among other things, the fact that you were a generalist.

HC: I think so, yeah.

WN: Which is probably what they were looking for.

HC: Well, they probably didn't know what they were looking for, really, but they needed somebody who'd deal with a lot of different subjects and lot of different kinds of people. And who could be the executive.

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)

HC: And that was in the fall of '44, this was happening.

WN: Was there an Italian government to speak of?

HC: Well, we were sort of trying to form one, get one put together. It finally developed that it could be done if you got representatives of the six partisan parties that had been rather successfully doing guerilla warfare against the Germans. The Parti Repubblicano, and the Azione, and the Communists, and the Socialists, and so on. It took some interesting negotiation on our side to convince ourselves that it was all right to have the first Italian government have a minister of finance who was a Communist. It was a little hard to fathom for people in Washington and London.

Then they couldn't decide where to have (the first cabinet meeting), this group, because none wanted to meet on another's turf. Tony Antolini and I had a huge suite, just an enormous suite, in the Grand Hotel. Two big bedrooms and a huge living room in between. And we said,

"Oh, we have a big enough room. Why don't we meet here?" That seemed fine with everybody. The Allied Control Commission was running the show anyway, I guess they figured. So the first meeting of the postwar Italian cabinet was held in our sitting room. By that time I was beginning to be able to follow what was going on. Never learned Italian from any books or anything. I just learned Italian by listening to Italians talking.

WN: Did Tony speak Italian?

HC: Oh, fluently, yeah. Very well. But he didn't speak the language of the subject matter which was finance, and economics, and so on. And I had that language but I didn't have Italian, so it turned out to be a pretty good combination actually.

WN: So, in essence, you were part of the, I guess, so-called occupation-type forces?

HC: Oh, yeah. We were the occupation.

WN: You were the occupation.

HC: We were the occupation.

WN: Were there troops as well, though? There were troops as well stationed in Italy.

HC: Yes, a lot of troops. And a lot of civil affairs troops, so-called, which was the occupation.

WN: Which wasn't just American.

HC: No, British also. But only American and British, not the other Allies. The Eighth Army, British Eighth Army, which had been Montgomery's army, had come up one side of Italy and it was the Fifth Army that came up the other side. The air forces were all over the place. We had a lot of force in there. The military headquarters for Italy was outside of Naples. But the civil affairs business, the Allied Control Commission, was planted right in the middle of Rome. My office was formerly the office of the Minister of Corporations. On a clear day you could actually see down to the other end of the office, you know. It was a huge, massive, Fascist-type office. I had a colleague, Woody Holstein, who came with me and shared that office. And I gradually got to know and to some extent change the people in various sections. But it was a very big staff and a lot of remarkably good people.

And then I guess it must have been the early part of '45, the Germans began to be really pushed back out of northern Italy. And there was a period of (two or three) months when northern Italy was back behind the Allied lines but it wasn't yet a part of what the Italian government was responsible for. So it was still under military occupation. So I was assigned as the economic commissioner for northern Italy—I was twenty-seven by then. That job meant that I had the final decisions as to what the ration (of pasta) would be to all the people in northern Italy; which industries would get how much power; and so on. Decisions (had to be taken) week by week as the rationed resources (became) available. And we kept appealing for more, of course, to come from Britain and America. At one point a little later in the game, we figured that we had three ships a day coming into Italy from across the Atlantic. This was a lot of traffic. The ports had to be cleared—of mines and (of war debris)—and reorganized and rebuilt—and above all gotten back into the hands of the Italians.

The fortunate thing about the whole operation was that, unlike Germany and unlike Japan, (the Allies were) clear from the beginning what the purpose of the exercise was. In Germany, nobody really knew whether we were going to occupy Germany forever or get out of there or what was supposed to happen. But Churchill and Roosevelt had gotten together over a hot dog barbecue in Hyde Park [President Roosevelt's home] and had decided that the purpose of occupying Italy was to give it back to the Italians as soon as possible, (and therefore) to build up the strength of the Italian government. To make it a democratic government, obviously, and get it back in business. So we worked very hard with the government, sort of as mentors. And even if they didn't like our advice, they knew (that we were importing) most of their gross national product in the form of aid and so they had to take us seriously. And some of us knew quite a lot about the economics of putting Italy back together because we'd been working on it for a long time.

So then northern Italy was brought back in the picture, (under the governance of the Italian government). And pretty soon it was V-E Day and the war was over in Europe. And that made it possible to expedite the business of giving Italy back to the Italians. But the U.S. particularly, and to some extent Britain, thought it was about time for other people to share the burden of helping Italy. The U.S., of course, was focused now on the Far East and the war with Japan. So it was decided that we should transfer the responsibility for what would now be called "foreign aid" that was now half of Italy's economy from the Allied Commission (to UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). The word "Control" was taken out of ACC's name when the war was over.

WN: I see. So it just became the Allied Commission?

HC: Allied Commission. And Antolini went home. And I was promoted to be the acting vice president, the job that O'Dwyer had had. I became that for the last period of my service in that agency. And there was (in London) a big Third Session of the UNRRA Council, held in London in the late summer of 1945. And I was in London as (a member) of the American delegation responsible for the item on the agenda which was (designed to get) the responsibility (for Italy) transferred to the UN from the Allied Commission.

WN: Did the Allied Commission continue after that?

HC: It continued for quite a while after that. There was a transition period of about three or four months, maybe four or five months. And for a while, we operated with a "two-hat" theory. I was appointed by UNRRA. I wasn't that anxious to stay. It wasn't part of my life plan to stay in Italy. But Herbert Lehman, who had been governor of New York [1932-43] and was a [U.S.] Senator from New York for a while, and Commander R.G.A. Jackson, the Australian navy commander who was the number two man in UNRRA—and the husband of Barbara Ward—both buttonholed me in London saying that I really had to stay in Italy and continue to do for UNRRA what I had been doing for the Allies. And that was actually a sensible idea, I thought, because it would be hard for somebody else to hit the ground running as fast as I could run by that time. I made some conditions, one of which was that the family would be allowed to join me, since the war was over. And that became a kind of general practice that people in UNRRA could. . . . There had been an UNRRA mission, a small one, even before. And it had a chief already. So I was appointed deputy mission chief, in charge of the economic, essentially the stuff I had been doing anyway.

WN: You just did it under a different boss.

HC: Yeah. And with different kinds of (regulations), different sources of money and everything else. But for about four months I was both the acting vice-president of the Allied Commission and also deputy chief of the Italian mission. And the key condition I had made with Lehman and Jackson—which I didn't think they would agree to, but they did, was that they would let me take the 100 best people out of the staff that I already had—the 1400—and just bring them with me (into UNRRA) to do this new job. Every member of the Allied Commission staff, and of the army generally, needed a (postwar) job now. Everybody knew they were going to be looking for a job. So it wasn't very hard to persuade the best people to stay and do what they were doing so well. And by that time I knew who the best people were. So we formed an UNRRA group that was in quality better than what we had. (The whole AC staff) was really too big for the task ahead, but it had some superb talent in it.

WN: This is still Italy? You're still responsible for Italy, right?

HC: Yes, just Italy. And then I brought some people over, including two key members of my old Italian division staff, Italians, both of whom were, by that time, seeking American citizenship. I had to get them top secret clearances, even though they were "enemy aliens." And they were very helpful in liaison with the Italians. But I learned something why it had always been a good idea not to send as ambassador to a country—for example ambassador to Italy, an Italian American, or an ambassador to Portugal, a Portuguese American, so on. Because I found that these Italians who had almost become American by now, were so fluent in Italian and so sure that how things were done in America was better that they would just keep imposing our ways on the (Italians. The rest of us) were more inclined to try to do it by consensus and get everybody's opinion, that sort of thing. It was an interesting lesson in psychology.

I did that for a year. At that point, they decided to stand down almost all of UNRRA, the postwar emergency agency. It was a huge agency—by far the biggest (operational) agency, I think, that the UN has ever mounted.

WN: Even since? I mean . . .

HC: Even since. Operating on a large scale in Italy, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, a good many other places, and China.

WN: What about rehabilitating Germany, for example? Was that part of the UN mission?

HC: No, that was entirely taken on by the—essentially by the Americans, no, by the Allies. French and the British were in there, too. You know, we had pieces of Berlin and sections of Western Germany that we were responsible for.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

HC: By the spring of 1947, UNRRA had done its thing in Italy and in Europe, generally, and the

rest of the world. The decision was being made to close it down.

WN: You mean, close down UNRRA?

HC: Close down UNRRA. But there were some things in Italy and Yugoslavia and elsewhere. There was a big refugee element that had to be taken care of so they set up a special agency for refugees, and also set up UNRWA, U-N-R-W-A, to run the camps for Palestinians.

WN: What's that stand for?

HC: UN Relief and Works [Agency], or something like that. So there were several bits and pieces that were now spun off and became agencies themselves. But the decision was made to carry (UNRRA) on in China for one additional year. I wasn't involved in any of that overall decision-making. But I got a call one day from Commander Jackson, who by that time was a very good friend and remained a very good friend for many years afterwards. (Many years later) I stayed with him and Barbara Ward when they lived in Ghana. We had Dame Barbara Ward to lunch in London, a few weeks before she died. Anyway, Jacko, as he was called, Commander Jackson, called and said the director of our China Office, which was by far the biggest (UNRRA) mission, has gotten sick and they had to bring him home. "There's nobody out there that can take over that mission. Can you go to China for a year for us?" So I was young and foolish, and twenty-nine years old, and I said yes. I came back and talked with Lois about it and we decided that we'd better not try to make this a family affair.

WN: Lois was in Italy?

HC: Lois was with us. We were there together living in a sequestered area; they called it a house that had been "commandeered" by the Allies. It used to belong to a Fascist industrialist, I guess, outside of Rome. But one of our daughters, Anne, one of the twins, had gotten quite anemic. I didn't see how she could get anemic on Italian pasta, but apparently there wasn't any nourishment in the vegetables because they weren't getting the right kind of fertilizer and so on all during the war. So we couldn't really take her anyway. And we decided that it would really be best for Lois to cope for a year with the children (in the USA). And then we'd get back together somewhere after that.

So we hightailed it for home. I leave Lois with my family on Cape Cod. It was May [1948] by then. She (and the children) later went (to Oregon) and stayed with her parents. And I went around Washington, [D.C.] talking to everybody who knew anything about the China operation. And one thing I got that I'm so proud of having been bright enough to do, I got them to give me the authority that the mission chiefs in Europe already had, to "reduce the force" quickly, you know, without preferring charges against people and stuff like that. I'd just say, "Okay, you're finished here." Because when I got there, I found a darn good deal of corruption. But if I'd had to go through hearings and everything else about people, it would have taken forever to change the staff. But I was able to use this liquidation authority like a dictator. (Chuckles)

WN: This is in Shanghai?

HC: In Shanghai, yeah. We had a mission of 4,000 people scattered all over China, with fifteen regional offices in the middle of a civil war.

WN: Mm hmm, that's right.

HC: A thousand of those people were in Shanghai. The rest were scattered around. About a thousand of them---less than a thousand of them were foreigners, expatriates, Australians, British, and French and others, Americans. And the rest were Chinese employees, local staff, some of them in quite senior positions because they were quite senior people. It was again a tremendous challenge and a wonderful experience. We spent altogether two-thirds of a billion 1947 dollars, which was a lot of money to try to stuff it into a very underdeveloped country.

WN: This was to rehabilitate China due to the effects of World War II. Did it have anything to do with the civil war going on at that time?

HC: Well, the problem was that UN wasn't supposed to be taking sides with the civil war although the majority of the UN was in favor of the Nationalists. But we were supposed to operate on both sides on the line. One of (our staff, even) younger than I, was Jim Grant, who recently died. He was executive director of UNICEF, children's fund, for his last ten or twelve years. It was his job to go across the lines and negotiate with the Chinese Communists about the conditions under which we would give them aid; that was a very dicey assignment. But working on that scale, with that big a mission and a cross-cultural and cross-language situation, no matter how much I'd learned, every day was a year's course in something, you know. (Chuckles) I've since said that I learned more in that one year than any other five years of my life and I would still hold to that. I still think that's true.

WN: So you have the United Nations in a country undergoing a civil war at the time, supposed to be neutral in something like this. But was it, though, pretty obvious, or . . .

HC: Well, the Nationalists held the lion's share of the country at the time.

WN: So, in essence, it was . . .

HC: So the Nationalists got the lion's share of the loot. But north in the Yellow River Valley, we had one of the great construction jobs of history going on. The rebuilding of the dikes of the Yellow River. The Yellow River had been diverted by the Chinese as a defense mechanism against the Japanese early in the war and it was traipsing all over the countryside with its huge silty flow. I visited one village where the only thing you could see above the sand was the tip of what had been the only two-story building in the village. And everything else was just a sand dune.

WN: Now, why did they divert the Yellow River?

HC: Oh, because, I don't know, it was a judgment about defending that part of China.

WN: The Chinese did it?

HC: The Chinese did it themselves, yeah. The Chinese Communists were still in Yen'an at that time, but they were fighting in the Yellow River Valley. They didn't have control of it, but neither did the Nationalists, really. We were trying to rebuild the dikes there. And this was a huge project. I mean, the engineer in charge, a wonderful American engineer named O.J. Todd, told me that this was the earth-moving equivalent of building the Panama Canal, except

we were doing it in a couple of years. That meant that (our Yellow River project was) tied for second in world history as the biggest earth-moving task, the Great Wall being by common consent the greatest piece of (earth-moving) work that's ever been done.

So this just was a huge task involving thousands and thousands of workers and a lot of machinery, much of which rusted, with the clutch assemblies disintegrating. There weren't enough clutch assemblies to send in, so a lot of it was still people, you know, with bamboo things (on their shoulders holding) two baskets of dirt, going up to the top of the dike and dumping it, and coming back and getting some more and so on. The job was conceived, of course, to be done by bulldozers. I asked one of the engineers, I said, "This is a travesty to have these bulldozers rusting there."

He said, "Well, let me just show you, come in." And he drilled off numbers and charts on a blackboard in his shed and convinced me that that (they were doing it) right, that the cost of keeping that machinery going when there wasn't a machine shop within 500 miles (would be much greater). So ultimately you had to do it with human labor. But it did get done. There was a moment of drama, I don't know whether that story was in one of the papers I sent you.

WN: Yeah, I think it was.

HC: About the ceasefire that we declared.

WN: I remember that.

HC: We decided to declare a ceasefire in the Yellow River Valley. I couldn't imagine that UNRRA headquarters consulting with all the governments' foreign offices would ever approve the idea. So my staff and I decided just to spring it on our own initiative. We declared a ceasefire in a very eloquent declaration, saying that this was for the future of China, whoever turns out to be in charge, this was for the future of China. We couldn't keep having fire fights going on when the workers were supposed to be working because they'd all head for the exits and there wouldn't be anybody there to rebuild the dikes. An extraordinary story, because the fighting stopped. Both sides told their people to stand down. It's almost impossible now to imagine the prestige that the UN had at that time. This was done in the name of the UN, you see. And so they didn't know whether to take it seriously and like most military (commanders), if they don't know you, they take you seriously.

From Washington I received confidential words of support from Commander Jackson, who was quite a risk-taker himself. The foreign offices would have poured boiling oil on the idea if they'd heard about it ahead of time, but didn't want to pour boiling water if it seemed to be working. So the whole situation was sort of frozen there for several weeks until one night some Communist party [troops] knocked off a nationalist outpost and the war was on again. But the net effect was that both sides had come to realize that UNRRA was serious about rebuilding those dikes (and they acted with some circumspection after that).

The Communists had probably—although I don't know this from direct knowledge—had probably figured out that they were pretty soon going to have the Yellow River for themselves and that was going to be very much in their interest. So they fought with circumspection after that. I mean, they tended not to fight in the places where we were working that week and that month. And so our job got done before the end of the UNRRA period. And that was the most

biggest and most dramatic part of the program. It was only a part of the two-thirds of the billion dollars. I mean, we had modern fishing boats brought in there to revolutionize the fisheries, (and many other major projects).

WN: And this was only for one—I mean, one year remaining. You took over from someone else?

HC: Yeah. Took over from a major general of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who had been governor of the Panama Canal [Zone] at one time. So he was an obvious choice for it at the time. Wonderful guy, General Edgerton, but he just (became ill) and couldn't continue.

WN: And then, did you stay in China after that year?

HC: No.

WN: Shall we end today?

HC: Okay.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape Nos. 25-6-4-96 and 25-7-4-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

April 8, 1996

Minneapolis, Minnesota

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

[NOTE: Also present at the interview is Lois Cleveland (LC), HC's wife.]

WN: This is interview number four with Harlan Cleveland for the UH presidents oral history project. The date is April 8, 1996 and we're at his home in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay, why don't we begin. Okay, well, Harlan, last we left off when we were in Hawai'i we finished discussing your role as director of the China Aid program for the Economic Cooperation Administration. And we need to eventually or soon get into your years as president of the University of Hawai'i in 1969. So I know that's skipping over a large portion of it, but what I'd like you to do is to just briefly summarize or talk about some of the things that you have been doing between 1948 and 1969.

HC: Okay, that's relatively easy to do. I came back from the UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] experience (in the spring of 1948, just when the Marshall Plan was about to start). When (Paul Hoffman), the new administrator of the Marshall Plan agency, which was the Economic Cooperation Administration, realized that he also had (to handle a) China Aid program, he sort of looked around a little desperately for somebody to entrust that to because he wanted really to work on European (recovery), which was the big cheese. And all roads led to my desk because I had been in a little group of consultants (with Paul Nitze as the chairman), helping to invent the new agency. And as Title IV, (the China Aid Program), went through Congress I was the person that sort of handled that because I had just come back from China, so it was an obvious connection. So anything anybody wanted to know about the China Aid program, the strings led to my desk, you know. So I became first a consultant, and then director of the new China Aid program. I think I mentioned to you before, we didn't run out of money like most aid programs do. We ran out of country. We wound up with a big appropriation and only the island of Taiwan as "China." So, (Dean Acheson), the Secretary of State and Paul Hoffman went up with my help to (Capitol Hill). We suggested to the (relevant) committees in the Congress—it never went through a new piece of legislation—that what they meant when they appropriated this money for China was, quote, "the general area of China," unquote. And that was ratified by the committees and on the basis of that, we took (\$100 million) of the money that (had been) appropriated for China and used it to beef up the two programs we already had in South Korea and Philippines, and to start new programs in Indonesia, Burma and the three associated states of Indo-China, so-called, Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia. And I was put in charge of that operation to build those programs in what was called the Far Eastern Program of the ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration]. Indonesia was just about that time becoming independent, I think it got its independence in '49. [Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, although the Dutch did not withdraw until 1949.]

WN: These are countries that are I guess, so-called friendly with the United States. Good relations with the United States at that time?

HC: Yeah. There were a lot of problems. Sukarno was president of Indonesia [1949-67] and his foreign minister [1957-66] was a Communist named Subandrio, who had been a neurosurgeon. And I had a chance to talk to him about that later on and asked him, "How come a neurosurgeon winds up in a job like this?"

WN: (Chuckles) What did he say?

HC: He says, well, see, the Dutch wouldn't let you get your doctoral degree except in medicine. And they figured based on Dutch experience that doctors are stable and conservative people, you see. So what happened was, he said, "All of us radicals went into medicine. Because that was the only way we could get advanced education." (Chuckles) That was probably it. Anyway, we started a program there. And these other places, I didn't get out there very much because I was kind of handling the Washington end and getting people appointed and so on. We had already developed what we called a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China. And that became the centerpiece of our aid program to Taiwan. And it was a very, very successful centerpiece. This joint commission, which was three Chinese and two Americans, persuaded the government to do a real land reform. But instead of giving the landowners compensation and money, what they did was they gave them shares in state-owned industrial enterprises. This had the effect of privatizing the (public companies). Which was an arrangement that Russia and some of the other countries now might have used for privatization but it was really unique doing it this way. And the landowners, of course, would stand around with these pieces of paper in their hand saying, "I don't want to be an industrialist. Does anybody want to buy this factory?" And there were quite a lot of people around who wanted to buy factories. And that sort of created a capital market.

WN: So these factories were once government-owned?

HC: Yeah. Anything from sugar mills to consumer goods and assembly plants and so forth. And that plus the very strong emphasis that JCRR had on health, with a string of rural health clinics all over the country, and with strong emphasis on rather primitive birth control methods, and a strong emphasis on agricultural productivity. I think Taiwan at that time developed a higher (yield) per hectare of rice than any other place in the world. Even higher than Japan. So . . .

WN: So when we're talking China we're talking just Taiwan.

HC: This is just Taiwan.

WN: The mainland China was going through turmoil.

HC: They were still trying to make communism work. And part of what we did in that program, with a good deal of support from Congress was to lay the basis for what quickly became known as the Taiwan economic miracle. You know, it was just an extraordinary growth rate made possible by the fact that Japan had permitted Taiwanese to be educated in higher education, whereas in Korea, their colonial policy had been to suppress the Koreans.

WN: I wonder why they did that? I mean I wonder why they allowed . . .

HC: Well, they must have figured that the Chinese were less likely to raise hell if they became students. (Chuckles) And maybe that was right. Because the Korean students have had a long history of hell-raising, you know. And of course in Korea, it was the generals who had a technological war to fight. They figured that they better get everybody educated. So they decreed universal education in South Korea. And a generation later that turned out to be a miracle, too. With, of course, massive inputs from the United States of all kinds. And it proved to me something that has been very useful to me ever since. That it's really education and the organization of knowledge that is the key to development. I had a deputy in the Far Eastern division of ECA who had been born in North Korea of missionary parents. And he used to complain from time to time that if they were just going to give us half of Korea to work with why didn't they give us the decent half, the part with all the iron and coal and so on? And we know now from the history of the last fifty years that it turned out that the real bet was on the brains of their children. And having bet on that, they just surged out not only ahead of North Korea but ahead of most developing countries in the world. And when the generals said well, the war is sort of over and so now we don't need to have all this (education), every parent in Korea was (already) convinced that their children were going to go to college, (and the government couldn't turn off these rising expectations). It was sort of like Hawai'i in that way.

And so later when I got to Hawai'i, this was very much on my mind: that if you're going to develop an ex-colony, the most important thing to bet on is education. It's one reason I took the job [as president of the University of Hawai'i], really, and one of the reasons we worked so hard on making universal access come true, which we did, I think, during my time. We can come back to that.

I'll just finish the story much more briefly. After the Far Eastern program [of the Economic Cooperation Administration] was set up, I was promoted to be in the central administration of the agency [ECA] as the assistant deputy administrator, I think it was called. But I still focused primarily on the developing countries, you might say, the underdeveloped parts of the system which were becoming more and more important but were not of as great interest to the experts on Europe and the experts on monetary policy and so on. More sophisticated economics stuff. I was deputy to Dick [Richard] Bissell who later became famous for being the [deputy director of the] CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] who developed the Bay of Pigs disaster. Very, very bright economist. And good to work with because he was so bright. And then at the end of 1951 we were coming up to the fourth year of the Marshall Plan, which had started in 1948. And you may remember that was supposed to be a four-year program. And that's one of the few programs that I've ever seen that actually did stop at the end of the original time. But they reorganized the government at that time, and ECA disappeared. In its place was an agency called the Mutual Security Agency. [W.] Averell Harriman was in charge of that and also a special assistant to the president. This was still during the Truman administration. And I was then promoted again to be assistant director for Europe of the

Mutual Security Agency, which meant, in effect, that I was supervising, from the Washington end, the fourth year of the Marshall Plan. So I was really more on the European side in that last period, not on the Far Eastern wing.

WN: Which did you prefer? Which area did you consider yourself more knowledgeable?

HC: Well, I considered myself more knowledgeable, I suppose, on the developing-country problems because there weren't very many experts on development in those days. So I was in a way more unique there. And the . . .

WN: The developing countries, meaning South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and so forth.

HC: Everything outside of Europe and Japan.

WN: I see.

HC: But the European thing was also fascinating and I knew a lot of people in Europe and spoke French and Italian and a little German. So I was very comfortable with the European context. I was not so comfortable with the economics, not being an economist. I became a sort of a horseback economist. But I learned it on the run, you know. And anyway, 1952 and early '53 that's what I was doing. Then the Democrats lost the presidency and [Dwight D.] Eisenhower came in. Harold Stassen came in to be the head of the foreign aid program, which by that time was once again renamed as the International Cooperation Administration, ICA. And I decided, although I was a civil servant, I was at such a level in the government that I would look like a political appointee. I mean I was responsible for the whole Congressional presentation, for example, for the Mutual Security Agency, both the European side and the other parts because I had worked in all of them. And so I didn't think any Republican Senator or Congressman would take seriously the fact that I was a neutral civil servant when I had been carrying the policy mail for the Truman administration for several years.

WN: You think you could have been neutral?

HC: No, I didn't think I could have been neutral. But I probably could have. Because many of the things that were being done were obviously the same things, sometimes called by different names in order to make them look more clearly Republican. But they did cut back a good deal, and Harold Stassen, whom I have gotten to know very well since, did something that created a lot of criticism. He had to get the staff down somehow. He eliminated a number of people on the grounds that they were "security risks." Fortunately, I had already decided even before the Republicans took charge that I wanted to do something besides work for the government. I just wanted to try [something] different. I had a friend, Max Ascoli, who had started a political magazine, kind of a liberal magazine. And I had a standing offer to join him in New York.

And then I left, it must have been about March of '53, and moved to New York and became executive editor of *The Reporter* magazine, which was great fun and I learned a lot about how to write against a deadline and did a lot of writing and editing. And I also, after a while, became publisher, also because Max Ascoli who was the editor-in-chief and the general boss, was very uninterested in the business side. We were losing a lot of money—three-quarters of a million dollars my first year.

WN: What was the circulation like?

HC: When I joined it was about 55,000. When I left it was pushing 200,000. And it actually became the (nation's) best known, and probably our best opinion magazine (in that area). We didn't call it a "journal of opinion," we called it "a magazine of facts and ideas." But we had a four-color cover, slick paper—it was an expensive operation. As publisher I helped them start a new program, buying (other) businesses that went with our tax loss. I learned a lot about the American business system going around the country looking for the right business to buy. I was made executive vice-president of *The Reporter* Magazine Corporation so that I'd look like a businessman, you see. But it was a really through-the-looking-glass experience, because I was looking at the whole American business system through the prism of our tax loss.

We first bought a company that did about a million dollars worth of business and made about \$300,000 out of that. Huge return on the money. The (owner) was sixty and he didn't want to continue forever, but he was willing to continue for another five years or so. So we gave him a down payment and expressed the rest of the payments as a percentage, 70 percent of pre-tax earnings. There wouldn't be any taxes because we'd just take our current loss and offset it (against his profits). We could take our back losses too, you see, and offset them. So we had a big tax loss fund to work with. But we weren't interested in any business that didn't fit our financial characteristics. So it was kind of a peculiar way to be judging businesses.

WN: What was the agenda of *The Reporter* magazine at that time?

HC: Well, it was to report and comment on public and international affairs. And it was probably something more than half domestic affairs, politics, and economics, and so on. Ascoli had in mind that this would be kind of an American version of *The Economist* magazine. The trouble is, he wasn't very much interested in economics. So it didn't turn out to be like *The Economist*. But it was a very good political magazine. Lester [B.] Pearson, when he was prime minister of Canada [1963-68], once said that he thought *The Reporter* was the best international affairs—or, as he called it, "foreign affairs"—magazine in the world. From Canada's point of view our [U.S.] domestic coverage was foreign affairs, too, you see. And we had a fantastic, very loyal circulation—an 80 percent renewal rate, which was regarded in New York as just unheard of. (Chuckles)

Anyway, that was interesting. But I had been hired as Max Ascoli's successor because he was going blind. Then he had cataract operations and he was in much better shape. And it was clear by that time that he didn't really know what a deputy was—although that's what I was to him—and he certainly had no idea at all what a successor was, so that there might never be a succession. I therefore began thinking that I should probably do something else. And I had done some serious writing—particularly on the subject of how the government works. I wrote a long journal article for a meeting in Philadelphia about (the American) political executive and how he works with the civil servants. At the end of my talk which was an after-dinner lecture at this Philadelphia meeting, Paul Appleby came up, whom I knew vaguely, who had been a New Deal . . .

WN: Appleby?

HC: Appleby, who was dean of the Maxwell [Graduate] School [of Citizenship and Public Affairs] at Syracuse [University]. And he said, "How would you like to succeed me?" just like that.

(Chuckles) One thing led to another and that's what I finally did. That job—I was there for five years—was particularly interesting and particularly relevant to my experience in Hawai'i later on. Because there I had a major deanship. The dean of the Maxwell School was known as the dean of a public administration school. But in fact, the Maxwell dean was dean of all the social sciences [at Syracuse University] on both the undergraduate and the graduate level.

WN: So social sciences there were tied in with public administration.

HC: Well, in the sense that every time you had to hire a new professor, I, as dean, had to get involved. And Appleby had done this and I did the same thing, pushing the recruitment process toward people who were interested in government, (public affairs), and international affairs.

WN: When you say social sciences, you're saying political science . . .

HC: Political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, history . . .

WN: So it was tied in more with the public administration rather than mere arts and sciences . . .

HC: Well . . .

WN: . . . and the humanities.

HC: . . . yeah. Public administration broadly conceived.

WN: Right.

HC: Because we thought of public administration as not just how you do the pick-and-shovel work in a bureaucracy. I thought of it as kind of a horizontal overlay on the social sciences. And we used sociologists and anthropologists and historians even, as well as economists and political scientists as our faculty for the graduate program in public administration. We had no undergraduate program. And I was against having an undergraduate program for a professional degree like that. I even said that I didn't think that there ought to be an undergraduate program in business—that people ought to get a general education first, you know. But I wasn't able to sell that in Syracuse or anywhere else. But the Maxwell School had great prestige already in academia and also in New York State. It was very well known and so I became pretty well known in upstate New York. And consequently I got into politics some. I was asked whether I would run for [U.S.] Congress at one point. At one point the Long Island newspaper, *Newsday*, ran a boomlet for me to run for governor of the state of New York. This was a time when the two main people running for governor were both multi-millionaires, [W.] Averell Harriman and Nelson Rockefeller. Somebody called up and said, "Is this serious? Are you going to do this?"

And I said, "Well, the first person that comes up with \$5 [million] or \$10 million dollars for a starting grubstake, I'll begin to think about it seriously." (Chuckles) Of course, that didn't happen. But it did lead to my becoming an appointed delegate to the 1960 Los Angeles [Democratic National] Convention, the [John F.] Kennedy convention. They elected delegates from each congressional district. But then the New York State Democratic Party had a certain number of slots that they allocated, just because they wanted individual people there. I mean,

they wanted Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt to be a delegate. They didn't want to make her run in some local election. So they appointed her as a member of the delegation. And I was one of those appointments. I was actually half of an appointment because they split some of them in half. I once wrote a article for the *New York Times* magazine which I withdrew when I joined the Kennedy administration. It was about the convention and my title was, "I Was Half a Vote at Los Angeles." I (had to withdraw the article, but it was rather uncomplimentary about some of my prospective colleagues in the new administration.) I was especially sorry to abandon that good title.

WN: (Laughs) Now, being appointed dean of the Maxwell School back in [19]56, you know with the prestige that it had, and to get appointed to a prestigious position like that, and the way you talked about it was as though Paul Appleby just sort of approached you and said, "Do you want to take it over?" I'm sure it was much more complex than that.

HC: It was much more complex. He had to (resign) because Harriman had asked him to be budget director of New York State when Harriman was governor [1955–58]. So there was going to be a vacancy. And the vice-chancellor liked Appleby very much and was guided by him, I think, in his choice. Also their idea of what they wanted fitted me pretty well. What they wanted was a reflective practitioner. They didn't want a career academic. And the disadvantage, my disadvantage, was that I didn't have a Ph.D., not even a master's degree, because I'd gone to Oxford and then the Rhodes scholarship had been folded up after my first year so I never finished there. But having decided that they wanted me as dean, then they had to make me a full professor with tenure. And I have since told my academic friends that that's the way to start an academic career. Start as a full professor with tenure. (WN chuckles.) It was my first academic job.

WN: Did you consider it an academic job or a political job?

HC: No, no. It was very much of an academic job. Academic administrator job. The reputation of the graduate school and much of our outside renown was based on being the chronologically first, and by most people's lights, the best school of public administration in the country, [but] being an academic administrator was not—that phrase is sometimes used with a sneer, as being sort of a lower order of being compared to real faculty. . . .

WN: (Laughs) Well, university president is an academic administrator. (Chuckles)

HC: Exactly. But that's---I once wrote a piece, if I can find it, or you can probably find it in the library in the *Public Administration Review*, called "The Dean's Dilemma," which is a wholly tongue-in-cheek piece—arguing that the reason that the deans get paid more and have thicker carpets (than professors) is that somebody has to do all that menial administrative work, so (universities) have to bribe people to do those jobs. But the real thing to do is to be a historian, you know, or something like that.

(Just before moving to Syracuse), I had been discussing with the Carnegie Corporation (the idea of) taking a leave from *The Reporter* magazine and doing a study for them about Americans abroad and how they ought to be educated. That was, for those days, a big project. A hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars [\$175,000] was, you know, like a million-dollar project today. But when I got the offer from Syracuse, I called them up—John Gardner and Jim Perkins were in charge of Carnegie at that time—and I said to Perkins, "Well, it looks as

if I won't be able to do that because I'm going to go up and do this job in Syracuse."

And he made a wonderful comment. He said, "You think it would be a disadvantage to you to carry a \$175,000 Carnegie project with you to Syracuse?"

I hadn't really thought about it that way. It turned out, of course, to be a tremendous bonanza for the [Maxwell] School and for me. Because the [Maxwell] School had been operating on a rather peculiar endowment from a fellow named Maxwell who had owned a big synthetic textile plant. But he'd been a patent lawyer so he didn't really push the research and development (on synthetic fibers). And technology just gradually went beyond what they were doing. So the last trickle from that Maxwell money came in the year before I arrived. The problem when I arrived was how were we going to supplement what Syracuse University could do? What kinds of "soft money" could we get? And I had arrived with this brilliant star of a research program. And with it, I was able to attract several people to come to our faculty to work on the project and teach. And several of us went around the world. It's remarkable how far that money—which doesn't seem like very much money now—went. And we eventually produced a whole lot of papers and pamphlets and so on.

WN: Just hold on a minute. . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

WN: Okay.

HC: And we finally produced a book, *The Overseas Americans*, which was my first book, really. Co-authored with two professors there and I was the senior author and actually the writer of most of the final version of the book. It was published by McGraw-Hill. And it did quite well and was widely used for years and years and years in training programs for people going abroad in business and in government. It developed some theory about what was the difference in working abroad and therefore, what kind of preparation people should have and so on. So again, that was useful in developing programs at the Maxwell School and later on in Hawai'i. We started in the Maxwell School, a Syracuse semester in Italy, for example. Because we found that (some of the best) foreign experiences of undergraduates were Junior Years Abroad. And that wouldn't work except for people in the humanities. If you were majoring in chemistry, you really had to stick around and do chemistry, you know, for the junior and senior year. So we said, well why not provide the opportunity for students, no matter what they're majoring in, to go abroad in their sophomore year—and go abroad with intensive experience with oral(-aural) language training (and local homestays). And so we established this program. We had a house in Florence. We rotated faculty into it. We partly taught our own courses there and we partly got people from the University of Bologna and other good universities there to come and teach about the Renaissance and so on. And of course, we had the Renaissance all around us in Florence. So it was a very successful program. My daughter, Anne, later went on it from Barnard [College]. It was an open program, it wasn't just for Syracuse people. And it survived, it survives today even.

WN: Now these are graduate students? Or was this undergraduate?

HC: No, undergraduates, sophomore semester.

WN: In public administration?

HC: No.

WN: Oh, okay, I see.

HC: In any field.

WN: I see.

HC: Usually . . .

WN: But was run out of the Maxwell School.

HC: Yeah. And the Maxwell School, remember, was the social science division of the university, in effect.

WN: Right. I see.

HC: So we even had people who were going to major in science (and mathematics) coming into it. It was what we considered a part of a general education to get some experience abroad and get another language and learn something about art and history and so on.

WN: So the idea of Maxwell School actually running or overseeing the social sciences at the university, and was there a link or some kind of a progression where after you get your undergraduate degree you go on to public administration?

HC: Well, or to any of the disciplines in the social sciences.

WN: So public administration was one option for a social science student.

HC: Was one option. But we had such renown in the field of public administration that we were getting students from all over the country for that program. So the people who came through our Syracuse programs into graduate work were a pretty small minority of our total. We had another program, too, called the doctor of social science, D.S.S. program, which was an interdisciplinary program. Unusual at the doctoral level. And again proving to myself that it was possible to be interdisciplinary at the doctoral level. A person writing a dissertation in the doctor of social science program had to use the methodologies of three different disciplines. You know, history and economics and politics, or something like that. And that program was very large. We had about a hundred doctoral candidates at any one time. So we found that it was good both for people who were looking to teach in small colleges where, you know, you'd have to be a political scientist in the morning and an economist in the afternoon because it wouldn't be a big enough faculty. And it was good for quite a number of mid-career practitioners, reflective people who wanted more education and so they'd come and take our doctoral degree because it was broader. They couldn't afford just to specialize in one narrow

subject the way most Ph.D. programs require you to do. And so that was another learning experience about what a university ought to be doing that stood me in good stead later on.

WN: This was already in existence or did you implement that?

HC: It was already in existence as a program primarily for people who were going to teach in small colleges. And we expanded it when we saw that it was of interest to mid-career practitioners as well. And that turned out to be quite a flood of clientele.

So anyway. . . . Lois and I went to the Los Angeles convention (in the summer of 1960). We were Kennedy delegates even though [Adlai] Stevenson was—if Stevenson had been running I probably would have been a Stevenson delegate but he kept saying he wasn't running and I was taking him seriously. And most of the New York delegation was for Kennedy anyway, so.

And I had gotten to know Kennedy a little bit because he came up [to Syracuse University] in 1958 as our commencement speaker. And it was natural that I was asked by the university administration to squire him around while he was in town, since I was the public affairs dean. And so I got to know him a little at that time and liked him very much and admired his very quick intelligence. And also his sense of humor and his capacity to handle himself in public situations. We organized a press conference for him, mostly local press people and some wire service people who were following him around. There had been some talk about his running for president but he wasn't formally running yet. This was only 1958. But one of the local press people asked him what must have been the usual question at every press conference during that season, "Do you think, Senator, that a Catholic could be elected president of the United States?"

And Jack Kennedy looked back at this journalist as if it were the first time the question had ever come up, and said, "I don't know." Just in that tone of voice. It had an effect. It was the perfect answer. It was honest. He didn't know. (Chuckles) There had never been an elected president who was a Catholic. And it also was a conversation stopper. What do you say after a guy says, "I don't know?" (Chuckles) I thought it was just a beautiful answer. But he was full of techniques of that sort that I found very attractive. So being a Kennedy delegate suited me psychologically just fine. Then in the . . .

WN: Was it expected as a dean of public administration at Syracuse to be active in politics?

HC: Yeah . . .

WN: Was Appleby active?

HC: Well he was an ex-New Dealer and he was. . . . Yes, he was active. He helped Harriman and then he became Harriman's budget director, and that seemed quite a logical step. And also in those days, that was mostly Republican territory up there. So a reasonably prominent upstate Democrat was noticed, you know.

WN: Now you also had a foray into elected politics at that—while you were dean?

HC: No, that was back when I was at *The Reporter* magazine.

WN: Oh, okay.

HC: It was in Westchester County where I was living in (Larchmont, in the town of) Mamaroneck. And I think I told you that I was supposed to be an asset to the ticket because I could speak Italian.

WN: (Laughs) That's right.

HC: But it turned out that my opponent for that particular council job had an Italian name so that didn't turn out to be a big advantage.

WN: You mean your Republican opponent?

HC: My Republican opponent, yeah. And it was mostly Republican territory up there anyway in Westchester, unlike the city. I said to one elderly gent on the street corner—I talked Italian to the older people, I learned that you don't talk Italian to people under forty because they think that implies they can't speak English. But the older people rather enjoyed it, being accosted in Italian.

WN: So you probably got the old peoples' vote.

HC: And I asked this fellow, "How come you folks around here are all registered Republican?" In the city most of the Italian-Americans were registered Democratic.

He gave me sort of a pitying smile and said, "Young man, you obviously don't know the first thing about American politics."

(Laughter)

HC: He said, "My father, and the great-grandfathers of the young people around here, came over to this country when our big hero was Garibaldi. Now Garibaldi was against the monarchy. So he was a Republican, see. So we're *Repubblicani*." (Chuckles)

Later in the campaign I gave a speech saying that I thought that was the most logical reason for being a Republican I had heard all fall. (Chuckles)

WN: The Republicans also freed the slaves (chuckles) so.

HC: Yes, but it didn't do them very much good in the voting (in 1960).

WN: Now, as dean at Maxwell School, and you've obviously had some background in politics and so forth, was there a strong tie between academics and politics at that time? I ask you this because I'm probably going to be asking you this when we get into your University of Hawai'i days, but what was the link between politics and academics?

HC: Well, there was a lot of linkage between government and the Maxwell School, because we were trying to train people to be effective public servants. That was the centerpiece of public administration. And so we did a lot of writing about that and we participated in policy forums on all sorts of subjects. When I was doing this *Overseas Americans* book—that project went

on for most of the time that I was dean there—whenever there would be any kind of a discussion meeting or a visiting speaker on about international affairs, they'd generally invite me, too, to comment. So it was a natural tie-in between our kind of academic institution and policy, what you might call "policy politics." There wasn't as natural a tie to party politics, except that in practice most of our faculty were Democrats.

WN: Okay.

HC: Probably because they'd grown up during the New Deal as I had and, you know, that was the exciting thing to be [i.e., a Democrat] if you were interested in government at all.

WN: Was there any controversy in your appointment? You didn't have a Ph.D., you sort of came through the ranks through hands-on experience rather than academic training . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . was there any kind of . . .

HC: Well . . .

WN: . . . resentment?

HC: . . . I think there was some opposition by people in the faculty just on the grounds that I didn't really look like a normal faculty member. But the external renown of this school, which was very beneficial to the university, meant that the administrators of the university pretty much liked the idea of getting a practitioner, a person who had had policy experience in the government. And I'd been at a pretty high level in the (federal) government, you see—for my age, especially. And so they were able to sell that locally, and the fact that Appleby thought I was the right person (helped a lot), too. I had also done some serious writing that, you know, got circulated around and people said, "Well, he seems to know what he's talking about."

WN: Who were the other candidates?

HC: Well, by the time that Appleby brought me into the picture, there didn't seem to be any other candidates. I think there had been one or two internal candidates, that they had sort of decided that they wanted to reach out farther. Two of them actually became vice presidents of the university. Both excellent people and both members of our Maxwell faculty, which again was quite useful because we had our people scattered all through the university administration, so that gave us a lot of internal clout. And both of those men, Frank Piskor and (Clark Ahlberg), went on from being vice presidents of Syracuse University to being university presidents themselves. One at a small college, Saint Lawrence College, in upstate New York.

WN: And these two were . . .

HC: (That was Frank) Piskor. The other (colleague)—Clark Ahlberg was his name—became president of the University of Kansas at Wichita, one of the major elements of the University of Kansas system.

WN: And they both had academic—formal academic . . .

HC: Oh yeah. They were both Ph.D.s and they both taught. They continued, while they were vice presidents of the university, to teach in the Maxwell School.

WN: Okay, what we can do, I know your experience at the Maxwell School, much of it has been documented through interviews that were done by the school?

HC: Well, not very systematically. My papers from that period are stashed in the [Syracuse] University library.

WN: Well, we'll probably be referring back to those days when we talk about the University of Hawai'i and I'll probably be asking you to compare, make comparisons with your leadership . . .

HC: Right.

WN: . . . at Maxwell School and presidency at the University of Hawai'i. In 1961, then, why don't you tell me why . . .

HC: [Nineteen] sixty-one.

WN: . . . you left the Maxwell School.

HC: Well, I was kind of hankering after getting back into the government. And I figured if the Democrats won in 1960 there might be a good chance. And because of that good chance I passed up several other opportunities that came up around 1959. In [19]59, for example, I was not only offered, I was urged to become the chief editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica, which was a big job. It was headquartered in Chicago. And I was then getting, I think, \$20,000 a year or something [at Maxwell School], if that. And that [Encyclopedia Britannica] was a \$75,000-a-year job and with all kinds of perquisites. And possibilities. And Bob Hutchins, who was on their board and who had been president of the University of Chicago, wined and dined me about taking that job. But I kept thinking that what I wanted to do with my life was not to edit an encyclopedia. And also that if the wheel turned in a favorable direction in 1960, there might be an opportunity to go back in the government in a policy job, and I didn't want to close that off by undertaking something else just before.

WN: So that was your real love.

HC: That was what I really wanted to do. And I was interested in public management. Not only doing it, I was interested in it as a subject. (By that time) I had done some writing about it, too. I got a prize for an outline for a book, from a Ford Foundation sub-foundation called the Foundation for Adult Education. They wanted to improve the literature in public administration and so they offered a prize for the best outline. And I did an outline of a book that I wanted to write. I wanted to write it because I had been teaching (public administration), and I had found that most of the stuff I found most useful in teaching had been written by the (reflective) practitioners. Sometimes they were also professors like Woodrow Wilson, but Caesar and Cicero and Hannibal and all kinds of people down through history had written things. [Charles] DeGaulle was writing. And [Winston] Churchill had done plenty of writing. And I'd found that stuff the best stuff for teaching purposes. So I overcame my diffidence about writing in a field where I didn't have a Ph.D., you know, and projected a book about the

public executive role, which I did know something about and had done some writing about (in professional) for journals. And then when I was tapped for going into the Kennedy administration, the foundation agreed to put the substantial prize, which was around \$8,000, in escrow for whenever I could get around to the book. 'Cause I obviously wasn't going to be writing a book while I was in the State Department. So when I came out of that roughly eight-and-a-half years [1961-69] of very intensive experience as assistant secretary of state and then later as [United States] ambassador to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], I was in a much better position to write the book then because I had more personal experience.

WN: And you're talking about *The Future Executive*?

HC: Yes. That's the book that turned out to be *The Future Executive*. And it sold pretty well, 25,000 roughly, in a hard cover. I never put it in a soft cover. And it has now been published in a pirated edition in China. First edition was 25,000 and the second edition, I don't know how many, but it's now clear that there are more copies of that book circulating in Chinese than there are in English. It was also translated into German and several other languages.

WN: Actually, the idea came while you were in the Kennedy administration or before that?

HC: No, it was before that. I had already had a full outline.

WN: That's right, that's right.

HC: Which, of course got changed a lot. And I had this subsidy, so I was able to take some—I started working on it even before I went to Hawai'i. During the summer that I was . . .

WN: That's right, you finished it in Hawai'i.

HC: And then I finished it my first year in Hawai'i. And it was published in '72. Finished it on a beach in Maui. We took one of those cabins, you know, that's right on the beach, at the Sheraton Maui. And I just whaled away there on my typewriter day after day. Occasionally went in swimming.

WN: Very interesting because now that I look at your time line here, it all makes sense here. Because when you left the government the first time [1953], it was right when the Republican administration came on board . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower, and then when you came back into government it was a Democratic administration [1961].

HC: Sure.

WN: And then here we are now in 1969, leaving government again and getting into your University of Hawai'i presidency, you know, another change in administration from Democratic to Republican.

HC: But the story is a little more ragged than that because [President Richard M.] Nixon asked me

to stay on for a few months [into Nixon's first term].

WN: So Nixon got on in 1968 [1969], and you were U.S. ambassador to NATO at that time. Okay. Why don't you continue with that story then.

HC: And I was asked to stay on, partly because they didn't know who to put in the job, I guess, and partly because we had arranged that the twentieth anniversary meeting of all the NATO countries, with all the foreign ministers and all of the defense ministers and so on, would be held in Washington in April of 1969. We had cleared that plan with both the Humphrey campaign and the Nixon campaign. Because we didn't want to do it if any prospective president was going to say, "No," when he came in. So we cleared that and the Nixon people remembered that. And it was, I guess, pretty obvious that it would have been hard to put a new person in to get that organized—because it was really my job to organize that meeting. And so the logical thing to do was to have me stay on for a few months during the transition. I had gotten to know Nixon a little because twice he had come to Paris as a private citizen. And both times he had visited me at length asking about European politics and alliance politics and so on. And I was impressed with him. I was impressed with the fact that the second time I saw him, he remembered what I had told him the first time and went on from there. And that he listened. So although I didn't vote for him or agree with most of what he stood for, I'd had a good experience with him as a person. And he, I guess, had the same feeling because the message that I should stay on came indirectly, but really came from him. And since I didn't have another job waiting for me, that suited me all right, too.

WN: So when you learned that, well, when it became obvious that we were going to have a Republican president, what was going on through your mind at that time?

HC: Well, what was going on through my mind was that (a university presidency was the) one kind of job that I would really like to tackle—again because of my professional and academic interest in administration, in how things get done. It seemed to me that being president of a university was the most difficult form of administration. The staff was not really responsible to the so-called boss. A chemistry professor would regard himself as much more responsible to the field of chemistry nationally than he would as part of the university. An urban hospital would be the same kind of situation—maybe one ratchet (more "horizontal,") in that the faculty there, the doctors, are not even on the payroll of the hospital, but they are on the payroll of the third-party payers—(insurance companies and the like)—who pay the tab. So maybe a university wasn't the ultimate case in "horizontal" administration, but it was close enough. And I had already projected in my thinking, then later projected in the *The Future Executive*, the notion that most (administrative) relationships were going to be horizontal in (the foreseeable future).

WN: Yeah, in the *The Future Executive* you did draw an analogy between university administration and hospital administration.

HC: Yeah, I used the university as an example. And I said that not only is this the extreme end, one end of the spectrum of horizontal versus vertical administration—I used a marine platoon, I think, as the other end. But the important thing was that all the other kinds of administration, companies and (government agencies) and research institutions, were all moving in the direction that the university already had moved. There was a chapter that I called, "The Future is Horizontal," I think, in that book. And it turned out to be a good forecast. Because that's the

way more and more companies are run (today)—without a rigid hierarchical (structure).

WN: So you were looking at university administration as maybe your next career move, whereas in 1956 again you were going from government to administration. Did you have one eye on Syracuse at that time saying, well, this is a natural progression, going into university administration?

HC: Well I thought it was a natural progression, yeah. Because it got me into what seemed to be a congenial sort of role where I could use the skills that I had already developed as an administrator, manager, to run things and supervise people. But I could also use my brain to think about the process in which I was engaged and to think about the subject matters that I was administering. Did I give you at any point a long article I wrote called—it wasn't my title, but called, "The Education of Administrators for Higher Education"?

WN: Where did that appear?

HC: It was the Henry Lecture. David Henry had been president of the University of Illinois. [The Henry Lecture was delivered by HC in April 1977 at the University of Illinois.]

WN: Right, right, right. I think I did read that.

HC: Because I had quite a lot in there about the University of Hawai'i.

WN: Okay, well let's get into that. Why Hawai'i?

HC: Well, I didn't aim at Hawai'i. I aimed at a university presidency. So I spread the word among my friends and colleagues that that's the sort of thing I'd like to do next. If they heard of anything interesting, let me know.

WN: Did it matter to you where or which university?

HC: No, I didn't really think about that very hard. I would probably have drawn the line at some places. I wouldn't want to go to Arizona because I knew I'd get skin cancer and so on. And I'd actually turned down, at one point, the job of being the dean of the LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas.

WN: Why did you turn that down?

HC: Well, because I didn't really---I knew that the person in that job would have to be in constant public admiration of LBJ (WN laughs) and I thought that would be hard to sustain.

WN: (Laughs) When was this?

HC: I think it came up while I was at Hawai'i. (Anyway, in 1969) I didn't really have Hawai'i in my sights particularly, although I'd always been interested in Hawai'i. I had stopped there when I was a student on our Orient study tour. I stopped there on my way back and was actually sort of offered a chance to be a young reporter or an intern at the *Honolulu Advertiser*. I met George Chaplin then. One of my favorite people in the Maxwell [School] faculty and one of our most distinguished professors had moved to Hawai'i, Stuart Gerry

Brown. And he had helped invent many of the systems that we had at the Maxwell School and actually ran the doctor of social science program for a while. And he was also interested in international affairs, although he was basically an American historian, you know, political historian.

WN: Cut in the same political mold as you also, right?

HC: Yeah. Right . . .

WN: Liberal Democrat tradition.

HC: . . . very much so. Yeah. And one of my really good friends there. And then he goes to Hawai'i and I go into the government. We sort of lose track. But I got a letter from him in Brussels that winter—winter of the shift-over when it was obvious that I was going to need a new job, you know—saying that they had been fiddling around here for a year and a half trying to find a new president for the University of Hawai'i and a group of us would like to suggest you. What do you think?

WN: And he had already known that you were shopping around for . . .

HC: Well, he knew that I . . .

WN: . . . a position as a university president?

HC: Yeah. I don't remember having talked to him about it but I probably did. Because I dropped the word whenever I could that winter.

WN: And I imagine your relations with Stuart Gerry Brown were pretty good.

HC: They were very good. And he was really a very good friend. And it turned out that he and George Chaplin and Gregg [M.] Sinclair, former [University of Hawai'i] president [1942–55], had gotten their heads together and—I didn't really know Sinclair. I knew Chaplin vaguely. I had met him before. So my guess is, on the basis of Stuart's testimony, they decided I would be right for the job. And they started promoting this idea, apparently, to the [Board of] Regents and I suppose to the governor and others. And it was about then that he wrote to me, and I wrote back an encouraging letter. Then we talked on the phone a couple of times; I was saying that I really would be quite interested in pursuing that and I was going to need something to do after about the spring or summer or whenever I finally phased out of the Nixon administration. And so at the end of February or early March [1969], I get a formal invitation to come out there.

Now, one thing happened before that. I was in Washington, [D.C.] for a consultation sometime, must have been in February. And [Herbert M.] "Monte" Richards and Monsignor [Charles A.] Kekumano were—I don't remember whether Bob [Robert L.] Cushing, who was the chairman of the Board [of Regents], was in on that or not—but they were going to be in Washington for something. I think actually it was something having to do with the Oliver Lee case. Some kind of negotiation with the American Association of University Professors. Because they were really afraid that the Oliver Lee case was going to blow their whole relationship with the academic profession and might be very bad for the University (of

Hawai'i). Anyway, I didn't know, of course, anything about that at the time. And when I got word that they would like to meet me . . .

WN: Could you wait just a second?

HC: Yeah.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 25-7-4-96; SIDE ONE

WN: Okay, we were talking about Monte Richards and Charles Kekumano were in Washington, D.C.

HC: So we arranged a—I guess we had dinner together or something. And I liked them both very much and I liked what they said about the university.

WN: What did they say about the university?

HC: Well, they mostly described the sort of shape and size. I hadn't realized that it was practically the whole of higher education in the state of Hawai'i, give or take a few small denominational colleges. And it wasn't formally a system at that point but it sounded as if it was working up to being a state system. And they also described that there had been a lot of ructions there in connection with Vietnam and that there were pending cases. They mentioned the Oliver Lee case, but I didn't really have any idea what it was or how it fitted in. But mainly, they weren't selling me the institution, mainly they were trying to find out about me. They were sort of interviewing me, obviously. And I presumed that this was the result of Stuart Gerry Brown and company having pushed the idea, you see. And I felt very comfortable because I didn't need a job right then anyway and I was very fully employed being an ambassador. And probably that self-confidence communicated itself to these regents. In a sense I wasn't applying and therefore, I was a more attractive applicant. And so then they went away and the next thing I heard was an invitation from the Board of Regents to visit Hawai'i for a week, with Lois, first-class travel, all expenses paid, and so on. Well, I think I mentioned to you that to get such an invitation in Brussels, where you haven't seen the sun for six months, seems almost too good to be true. I was able to arrange our work so that I could be away for a week. And we flew directly to—you know, many stops, but—to Honolulu. And they put me in the Marquette Hotel downtown. The first . . .

WN: Which hotel downtown?

HC: The . . .

WN: Blaisdell?

HC: No, I'm sorry. I think actually it was the Royal Hawaiian [Hotel].

WN: Okay.

HC: I was thinking about here [i.e., Minneapolis].

(Laughter)

HC: And they had made---there was a whole schedule of arrangements. We had arrived the beginning of the week. I was to lecture at the East-West Center on the Friday of that week. And that was kind of the "cover story," so that people wouldn't cotton to the fact that I was a candidate for the presidency. And somehow, I think probably because of George Chaplin, they had managed to convince all the media, the television people and the newspapers not to reveal---although most of them knew---why I was in town. They had gone through a long process of deciding between two candidates. One was Bob [Robert W.] Hiatt and the other was Wytze Gorter. And they'd apparently decided not to appoint either of them, but it had taken them something like a year and a half after Tom [Thomas H.] Hamilton [left the presidency in 1968]. And the natives were apparently getting restless. The newspapers were sniping at the university---and at the regents particularly---for not getting on with it, finding a new president. And that may even had been why George Chaplin became an advocate for somebody because he wanted to get that thing settled. Then . . .

WN: So the media knew but they were given encouragement or instruction to. . . .

HC: Not to blow the story.

WN: Although they did.

HC: Well, but I'll tell you---let me tell you systematically the story of how that happened . . .

WN: Okay.

HC: . . . on the Friday. Meanwhile, I was doing all sorts of things [that week] that couldn't possibly be kept secret. I was visiting with the governor, I was visiting with the legislative leaders on both sides of the aisle in both houses. I was talking with the regents, obviously. I was having meetings with various groups of faculty and students. And all of them knew why I was visiting with them. So the idea that the reason for my visit could be a secret struck me as increasingly laughable.

(Laughter)

HC: And there was a wonderful incident. Lois, why don't you come and . . .

WN: Yeah, Lois, why don't you come over here . . .

HC: Why don't you come and tell the tape your story of being taken to look at College Hill?

WN: Okay, let me set the stage, then. Now, you've had discussions with Lois and you talked about it, you were in Brussels, the prospect of coming over here and possibly living here---I mean I'm sorry not here, but Hawai'i---was a strong possibility. So they flew you over to Hawai'i and . . .

HC: And it looked like a good idea to us.

LC: (Laughs) I must say . . .

WN: You want to sit down over here?

LC: All right.

WN: Okay. So here you are in Hawai'i, so now what? What happened?

LC: Well, this was looking rather possible, imminent. And I said, "I don't want to come here without seeing the house we would live in." Well, that threw them a little.

WN: (Laughs) Now who was "them"?

LC: Who was it then?

HC: Well, the regents, mainly, involved, Cushing . . .

LC: The committee.

HC: . . . and the faculty search committee.

LC: It was finally accomplished by getting the delightful wife of the [College of] Engineering dean, Liz Shupe, who had a little, tiny, green Ferrari convertible with a black top on it. And I rode beside her in the front seat with a pair of dark glasses on, and scooped down in the seat so they couldn't see who (chuckles) was in the car. And she drove me up and past the front of College Hill, (laughs) and around the block and got out of there. That was my look (laughs) at where I would live if we moved.

WN: So you actually did scooch down into the seat?

LC: Oh yes. As invisible as I could be, just peeking up.

HC: I guess, actually, nobody was living in the place at the time.

LC: Yes.

WN: Who was living there?

LC: [Richard S.] Takasaki.

WN: Oh.

HC: Takasaki was living there.

LC: Richard and Rose.

WN: So they did move in even though he was acting [president], he did move in to College Hill.

HC: He was acting for quite a while, though.

WN: Right, right.

HC: Six months or more [in 1969].

LC: Almost a year, I think.

HC: Yeah.

WN: And did you know Richard and Rose Takasaki at the time? (LC shakes her head.) Oh, that's why you scrunched down. (Laughs)

LC: Well, they didn't want anyone to see me looking over the house because they were still keeping this a secret.

HC: Well, Takasaki, of course we had met early in the game because they were big players in the search game. But just the length to which they went not to have anybody see that somebody was eyeballing this . . .

LC: The president's . . .

HC: . . . this very conspicuous piece of real estate.

(Laughter)

WN: Now, you looked at the exterior only . . .

LC: That's right, just driving past, we didn't even slow down. (Chuckles)

WN: And what were your impressions at that time?

LC: Well, I thought it was perfectly delightful.

WN: Of course, you wanted to see inside, didn't you?

LC: Mm hmm [yes]. But I didn't get to.

(Laughter)

LC: Not until later.

WN: Now was this your first trip to Hawai'i?

LC: Second. We had gone out some years before and had a few days out there with Stuart and Mildred Brown.

HC: Yeah.

WN: Okay, so you were staying at the Royal Hawaiian [Hotel], you drove by College Hill and it looked pretty good. What else? Were there any other conditions on your part?

LC: No. Staying very quiet.

HC: Lois had grown up in Oregon and sort of been gazing out at Hawai'i for a long time.

LC: Dreaming of maybe getting there someday. But that visit with Mildred was the first time I had ever been there. They took us all around O'ahu. That was all I could see. I hadn't seen the other islands.

WN: Now, so at that time was it pretty certain in your mind that you were going to be getting the job?

HC: It looked like it because there didn't seem to be any other candidates. And more of the conversation was directed at selling me the job than at interviewing me for the job, it seemed to me, by that time. Contrary to meeting with the regents earlier. And so they, of course, were in the midst of this imbroglio about Oliver Lee, which had blown Hamilton out of the water earlier. So I was given huge sheets of paper to read about the case and what had happened in the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] and what happened in court, and so on. When I finally got to the meeting with the regents, when we were getting seriously to talk about the job, one of them said, "Well, what do you think we ought to do about this Oliver Lee case? You've read all the background."

And I said, "Look, the virginity of your new president, whomever he turns out to be, on this particular subject, is so valuable that I'm not going to answer that question. I think it's got to be off the board and settled by the time your next president takes over. Because there's no point in dragging him through that whole process."

In effect I told the board of regents they ought to fish and cut bait, you know, on the subject. And that was a kind of a risky thing to do because I didn't know whether I'd be blowing my chances right there by saying that. But I knew enough about politics and administration to have a strong hunch that that was the right thing to say. And they swallowed it.

WN: So you thought, then, that they were really looking for a president who could resolve this issue?

HC: That's right. Because . . .

WN: That was your feeling?

HC: The last thing they wanted to do was to take public responsibility for resolving it themselves. Because it was obviously going to be very unpopular, whatever they did. If they were nice to Oliver Lee, they'd turn off everybody who didn't like him. And if they were nasty to him, some elements in the campus would be up in arms. And it was kind of a no-win situation for them.

WN: So instead of looking to Takasaki to—and the board—to make a decision on it, they were actually looking at someone coming from the outside to make the decision for them?

HC: Well, they were hoping for, what is it called, *Deus ex machina*. God out of the machine.

- WN: You mean they were looking at Harlan Cleveland on the white horse coming in?
- HC: Yeah, or something like that. Anybody on a white horse would have done. But I could see by that time so many opportunities and so much that needed to be done in developing the university and making it the centerpiece of this ex-colony's move to real statehood, that I thought it would be a terrible drag to spend my first year worrying about something that had been going on for several years. So . . .
- WN: So you came right out and said . . .
- HC: So I finally . . .
- WN: . . . "Get this resolved," before you agreed to come?
- HC: Well, I didn't put it that way. I just said it really needs to be solved before whoever comes in. I didn't put it in personal terms. I was very careful not to because having learned in the government that you don't act as if you're in the job until the Senate confirms you. So that was a natural psychology for me. . . .
- WN: Okay, you gave a speech at the East-West Center. Do you remember what you talked about?
- HC: Yeah, I talked about NATO and how it fitted into our foreign policy and so on. And that was very familiar ground. I had prepared it quite carefully, I don't think I had a full text but I prepared quite carefully for it.
- WN: And weren't there people in the audience . . .
- HC: The place was jammed. It was in an auditorium at the East-West Center. And it was standing room only. I sort of suspected that the reason for the standing room only was not a dedicated interest on the part of the students in NATO, which must seem very far away in Hawai'i, but the fact that the rumor was all over the place that I was being looked at as a possible president. And sure enough, when the question period was opened after I finished my talk, the first student got up and said, "Sir, we hear that you've been offered the job of president of the university. Are you going to take it?"

And I did a quick calculation and figured that to try to pretend that this cover was still on would hurt my credibility on other things later on if I got the job. And so I said something like this, I said, "Actually that's not quite right. Nobody's actually offered me the job. But in case they do, do think I ought take it?"

I got a big laugh from the (chuckles) audience. (WN laughs.) Because there had been so much trouble, I suppose. And that was taken as a good-humored way of lifting the cover (off the secret). That evening on the TV, and the next morning in the newspapers, they all came out with the biographies they had already prepared, the cover was off. I was interested to observe the effect. It didn't bother us because it was clear that as a Democrat leaving the Nixon administration, I was going to need a job. And by that time it didn't seem to bother the regents either, because they had pretty well made up their minds that I was it if I'd do it. And we, in effect, came to terms while I was still there. But there was still some correspondence back and forth about salary and so on but that wasn't a big issue. And I learned some other

things, that we'd be living in this house and that it wouldn't cost anything. But there were two people who were built into the house—one outside, the yard maintenance man, and the other a housekeeper and cook. And that they had worked for the Athertons for a long time before the house was given [to the University of Hawai'i].

WN: So they were living in the house or on the grounds?

HC: Yeah, the housekeeper was, but Ernest was not. But the housekeeper, Kiku, it was clearly her house and we were guests there.

(Laughter)

LC: She had been there twenty-seven years. Her home was an apartment in the garage . . .

HC: Upper floor of the garage.

LC: She had the job for life. Or until she wanted it.

HC: In a sense it was part of the deed, apparently, that Mrs. Atherton wanted her taken care of. And that worked out pretty well. She was not easy to deal with, and Lois learned a lot about Japanese psychology and so on from Kiku's alternating between being incommunicado and being just normal. Because occasionally she would just turn off, yet do everything exactly right, but not communicate with Lois at all. That was hard to get used to, right?

LC: Yes, because I didn't know quite enough and I didn't learn about this until after I had left. And at the Aspen Institute [for Humanistic Studies] in the Asia Center, we studied Japanese, Chinese, and Indian cultures and sort of compared them. Fascinating. I learned about this system of behavior. Occasionally it's a drama. You get angry. And you don't speak. And they even discuss among each another, who does it well, who overdoes it, who caves in too soon. There's this whole special language about it. I'm sure I'm not telling you anything you don't already know. But that it's only done with somebody you know well and like and trust. But I didn't know it. I didn't know it.

WN: So was it a push-and-pull kind of thing?

LC: Not really. I just pretended it wasn't happening. And it went on until . . .

WN: Went on for five years?

LC: Oh no. Two or three weeks.

WN: Oh, okay. (Chuckles)

LC: They said particularly people who are in a rather dull kind of job will do it occasionally just to break the monotony and the boredom of repetitious work.

HC: It's a great drama, yeah.

LC: And then Esta Chaplin told me that her housekeeper did the same thing and she hadn't

understood it either. So obviously she had a housekeeper she liked. We had a wonderful time when she [LC's housekeeper] was in good humor. We just laughed and joked and liked one another very much. And suddenly out of some pretext, I could see the shutters coming down and closing off and I thought, "Uh oh, I've done it again." (Chuckles)

WN: Might have---lot of it too, was that you were new to her and, you know, she was—I've never met Tom Hamilton's wife but maybe your personalities were different and so she needed time to adjust?

LC: She didn't work for her.

WN: Oh, I see.

LC: The house had just recently been given to the university. It had been the Atherton house.

WN: Right. Oh so, Tom Hamilton didn't live there?

LC: No. He had a house downtown. [Later in the interview, LC remembers that the Hamiltons did live at College Hill.]

WN: Oh, so were you the first, then? Oh well . . .

LC: Takasakis were the first . . .

WN: So you were . . .

LC: . . . they were kind of getting it set and ready.

WN: I see, oh. Okay. You being a capital "D" Democrat . . .

HC: Mm hmm.

WN: . . . and Hawai'i being a pretty overwhelmingly Democratic state at that time, do you think that had a lot to do with your appointment?

HC: I don't think so. I think it might have been---if I had been an outspoken Pat Buchanan Republican, it probably would have gotten in the way of being appointed. But I had never been sort of publicly in politics so much. I'd been serving Democratic administrations, but in professional jobs. So I thought, actually, that the most difficult thing would turn out to be that I had come from NATO, because that would make me a militarist in the eyes of the students who were objecting to the Vietnam War and that even though I wasn't involved in the Vietnam policy, the aura would be wrong.

WN: Had you made any statements on Vietnam prior to . . .

HC: No.

WN: . . . coming to Hawai'i? So there was no . . .

HC: Because everything I had said about the subject I had said inside the government in classified documents and so on. And it wasn't---and I had told a lot of people privately about it, of course. I had that extraordinary week when President [Lyndon B.] Johnson sent me up to talk to the Senate liberals. A story I've told in some writing you've probably seen. But I had, well, I tried to explain the government's position to the other countries at NATO. And so I had never been publicly involved in that debate. And even though I had left in May [1969], I was hired as of September. And I wanted to take some time off in between these two jobs partly because I wanted to write something about NATO before it got overtaken by so much involvement in other things that I'd lose all my perspective. I don't know if you've seen my book about NATO but I did produce that summer a book called, *NATO: The Trans-Atlantic Bargain*. And although it didn't sell very well it was quite a good book about NATO. But it wasn't very personalized because I was too close to it still. It wasn't very autobiographical, in other words. It was really about the subjects that I was working on rather than what I felt like working on them. But it had a few vignettes of autobiography in there. . . .

LC: May I cut back in for one second?

WN: Sure.

LC: I'm wrong about the Hamiltons. They did live in the house.

WN: They did live in the house.

LC: For a time, yes. Because I suddenly remembered Kiku telling me that President Hamilton always got home to dinner by six o'clock. Harlan almost never did.

(Laughter)

LC: And it was very irritating for her to have dinner ready and he didn't come.

HC: And she had some kind of special Japanese program that she liked to watch in the early evening.

LC: It was at seven, I believe.

HC: And if I came home late, that blew that, you see.

LC: I think it was episodic, too, so she missed her story line.

WN: Were you in essence her boss, Lois?

LC: Oh yeah. Both of us.

HC: But really Lois, because I wasn't. . . .

WN: Yeah.

HC: For major occasions, we brought in people from the outside, both the food service of the university, but we also hired caterers from outside the university on some occasions.

LC: But our butler, Ernest, who had been the butler in the house, but he wanted to work outside from then on. He said he'd take over the yard. But he was the best bartender in town. He was bartending most nights for people's parties. So he always bartended when we had parties.

HC: And he knew everybody. You know, he knew everybody. He knew what they drank.
(Chuckles)

LC: He would see them coming up the walk and when they got up on the *lānai*, which was where we had most of our parties, he would put their drink in their hand.

(Laughter)

LC: Because he knew what they would ask for. He was remarkable.

WN: And he was local Japanese also?

LC: Oh yes.

HC: And quite old. He must have been . . .

LC: Died some years ago.

HC: He must have been late . . .

LC: Kiku may still be living . . .

HC: . . . late sixties at least . . .

LC: . . . she went to Japan when Fudge [Fujio Matsuda] quit [in 1984], I think. 'Cause she worked for Amy [Matsuda, Fujio Matsuda's wife].

HC: For a while. I'm not sure that . . .

LC: She didn't stay.

HC: . . . I don't think she stayed for the whole ten years that . . .

LC: Oh that's right . . .

HC: . . . Fudge was [president]. . . .

LC: . . . they got a Portuguese girl when she left. She [Kiku] retired at sixty-five.

HC: Yeah.

LC: And that was during. . . .

HC: But Ernest, I think, was older than that. I think he must have been in his late sixties when he was working there.

WN: Mm hmm. But he didn't live there.

HC: He didn't live there. But he was . . .

LC: He had children and grandchildren.

HC: . . . delightful. The life of a man with a very wry sense of humor.

WN: (Chuckles) Now Kiku was—was she a first-generation Japanese? Did she speak English very well?

LC: Mm hmm.

WN: Okay, so she's second-generation.

LC: Fairly well.

WN: Second-generation Japanese [American].

LC: Would not take phone messages because she was afraid she wouldn't get the names right. She just took phone numbers so you could call back unless she recognized the person. And in my five years she never had a phone number wrong.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape Nos. 25-8-5-96 and 25-9-5-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

April 9, 1996

Minneapolis, Minnesota

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: This is interview number five with Harlan Cleveland for the UH presidents oral history project. Today is April 9, 1996, and we're at his home in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay, we have you now at the University of Hawai'i. Prior to coming, why don't you give me your perception of the University of Hawai'i? What did you know about the university before coming here?

HC: Well. . . .

WN: I mean, did you know anything about its programs?

HC: I knew something about its specialties, particularly in marine sciences. And, that's one thing that I worked quite hard on the first year, because I had been told that the University of Hawai'i, despite its natural advantages as a marine sciences university, had been passed up in the first allocation of Sea Grant money to the universities from the federal government. That struck me as very strange, and I was kind of curious as to why that was.

When I got there, it became very clear that the reason was that the marine sciences were scattered around. There was the Coconut Island marine biology and there was a strong geophysics element with George Woollard, who was good at landing federal grants. But there wasn't any centerpiece, and nobody available to talk to the federal government people about that whole subject. And I could talk to them about the whole subject but only in such general terms that I didn't think it would be very effective, so, I began right away thinking about the need for a person to coordinate—preside over—the marine sciences and symbolize them to some extent.

John Craven had been one of the candidates, apparently, a year before, for the [UH] presidency. He'd been on the list, I was told. And I knew him a little bit—I'd met him in Washington—but I didn't really know him. So I arranged an early trip to Washington to get together with him. At that time he was up at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], for a one-year (appointment)—he had just left the government. He'd been chief scientist of the Polaris program and an expert on small submersible vehicles. He was, interestingly, a combination of ocean engineer and lawyer. He had a law degree also. So, in effect I talked to

him about the potential of being a very large fish in a comparatively small pond, about having the whole Pacific as his oyster, compared to being one of many good scientists at MIT, and he liked the idea. And the governor [Governor John A. Burns] liked him. And soon after he came, the governor made him also the state coordinator of marine affairs. So with those two jobs, he was in a very strong position to do what I wanted which was both to pull together the marine sciences inside and to advertise them, sell them, symbolize them, outside, particularly to Washington.

WN: And prior to that, the programs were scattered and there wasn't one being overseeing all of them . . .

HC: No, we established what amounted to a staff deanship. He [Craven] had a small staff, but he wasn't in charge of a big unit anywhere. And we kept the marine sciences where they were, in biology and geophysics and so on, but we were able to symbolize their combined strength by having somebody in the middle. And he then also developed some other programs, the so-called Marine Options Program, which was for undergraduates, an opportunity for almost anybody—no matter what they were majoring in—to get wet, to learn what rough-water swimming was like, to learn to sail, and to learn to scuba dive and investigate coral reefs and so forth. It was a very popular program there for a while. I don't know whether it still . . .

WN: Yeah, it still is.

HC: And the Sea Grant program was under his supervision.

WN: That's the Law of the Sea Institute?

HC: That was (something else). The Law of the Sea Institute was in the (East)—but it was a little bit in the doldrums. And so the people primarily responsible for it saw an opportunity to strengthen it by moving the headquarters to Honolulu, and making John the director of it. But that didn't start (right away—it was) maybe two, three years (later. When John Craven) retired from the university, he still taught a course in the law school and had an almost full-time job running the Law of the Sea Institute.

The Law of the Sea Institute was a very good example of the kind of thing that's developing in international relations more and more—a privately sponsored non-governmental organization to which most of the official negotiators are related. And they were having that huge long negotiation, (the U.N. Convention on) the Law of the Sea called UNCLOS, which finally wound up with a major, new rewriting of the law of the sea. It took about twelve, fifteen years, something like that, but it was a great success story. And John would convene the negotiators in private meetings between official sessions and they'd sort of argue with each other and work out what to do at the official sessions, and then it would be ratified officially. And that was an important function, because otherwise there was no venue for the negotiators to meet informally.

We later replicated that idea here in Minnesota on women's affairs, and Arvonne Fraser became a worldwide coordinator of the women's movement as far as it reached into UN treaty making and that sort of thing. So I think that was an important invention.

But anyway, I knew about the marine sciences. I had not realized that Mauna Kea was

potentially the world's best terrestrial site for astronomy, nighttime astronomy. I knew generally that there'd been a history of solar astronomy based more at Haleakalā than Mauna Kea, but I quickly learned my first year. . . . I really got religion about Mauna Kea and pushed very hard for UH to be ambitious. We fortunately had a very good director of the Institute for Astronomy, which had already been set up, named John Jefferies, who had started life as a solar astronomer, and was in charge of the Institute [for Astronomy].

An arrangement had been made, before I got there, for the university to have a ninety-nine-year lease on the whole top of (Mauna Kea). But we only had one small telescope there; it belonged to the university. So the whole runaway take-off for that whole astronomy program happened during my time, although some of the telescopes we negotiated for didn't actually get constructed until after I left. We bid for what was going to be one of the world's great telescopes, what came to be known as the France-Canada-Hawai'i telescope, which was a joint venture between French and Canadian astronomers. They came, I think reluctantly, to Hawai'i to look at the site. They had previously visited all the places in the world where they had any ambitions about astronomy and where French was spoken, and didn't find any of them satisfactory from a scientific point of view. By happenstance, the three people that they mostly dealt with when they got to Hawai'i all spoke French. I had just come from NATO, which is a bilingual community, and I was fluent in French at that time—more so than now, it's rusted over now. John Jefferies had had part of his scientific training at the Sorbonne, in French. And the chief astronomical engineer, Hans Boesgaard was a multilingual Dane who also spoke French. So, somewhat to their surprise, having come to these islands where they thought most of the people were in grass skirts and so on, (the French site visitors) found people talking in a civilized language. (WN laughs.) And I always thought later that at least 75 percent of their positive decision was based on the scientific characteristics of Mauna Kea—the black night, the lack of pollution from below and so on, the 9,000-foot inversion of the clouds so that it kept such pollution as there was down and kept it off the top of the mountain—but that maybe 25 percent was just of a cultural feeling that, "These people must be all right. They speak French," you know. (Chuckles)

WN: So, when you looked at astronomy and you looked at marine sciences, you looked at potential at this point . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: Was this your philosophy? Did you look at programs which had already achieved excellence or had the potential to achieve excellence as your top priorities?

HC: Well, as far as the Mānoa campus was concerned, the problem was to make it truly a world-class research university, and we were already on that ladder, on a bottom rung somewhere. But, there was an opportunity to take advantage of Hawai'i's natural advantages. That was true not only in science, but it was also true in the humanities and social sciences. Because we had the East-West Center there. We were getting a good deal of federal money to sponsor visitors from Pacific islands and Asian countries, and so we were able to develop there a major demographic operation with one of the world's best demographers that we hired for the East-West Center . . .

WN: And who was this?

HC: Paul Demeny his name was, D-E-M-E-N-Y. We naturally had a lot of Asians around, and Pacific people, and we also had the opportunity for people who were really interested in that kind of research to come out of the faculty of the university and also have a research house in the fact that they could pay for their salary and they could energize. In the humanities, it seemed obvious that there was an opportunity in Hawai'i to take advantage of its multi-ethnic background, and become a major center for Far Eastern languages, particularly Japanese and Chinese and Korean. One of the things that was clear from the beginning was that we could be a center for Korean studies—and Korea, having had the historical importance for us of being the venue of one of our great wars, there was a lot of interest in Korea. We had a very good professor there, Dae-Sook Suh, who was in fact an expert on North Korea, and actually wrote a book about Kim Il Sung [*North Korea After Kim Il Sung*—was one of the first people later on to be allowed to travel in North Korea. So when that question came up, I took the line that the question wasn't whether we ought to have a Center for Korean Studies—that we were the center for Korean studies in the United States. I think I put it in the "Prospectus for the '70s" [a series of articles written by HC appearing in the *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 14–21, 1970 and published as a pamphlet as well]. We must have had a dozen or so members of the faculty whose main research interests were Korea, in different departments.

WN: You mean nationwide?

HC: Nationwide: one at Harvard, and two people at Columbia, and one person here and there around the country, but nobody had anything like the critical mass that we already had.

So my strategy was to announce a Center for Korean Studies. And then later—I can't remember which years, second or third year—I went on a trip to Korea and negotiated with the minister of education there a deal whereby they would put up half the funds to build that building, and then we passed the hat in Hawai'i. And interestingly, I thought we'd be depending mostly on the Korean-Americans there [in Hawai'i], and maybe some Korean-Americans on the Mainland and so on, but the Japanese and Chinese communities also were very helpful. I was afraid they might regard this as a competition: if we work on Korea, we'll forget about Japan sort of thing. But they thought of it as calling to America's attention that there was another side to the Pacific over there, and so we had quite a good fund-raising for that, and also some wonderfully interesting complications.

In order to build (the Center for Korean Studies) building, they had to import workers from Korea. At first, our intention to do this was alarming to the American (labor) unions in Hawai'i. We had a meeting. I remember at one point asking at the meeting, "Do any of you know any single worker (in Hawai'i) who knows how to make a roof that goes down and then comes up like this and is made with tile ribbing the way the traditional Korean and Japanese and Chinese buildings are?" They all sort of sat there looking blank. "Well, that's the point, we've got to get people who have some experience in doing this." So that was another kind of opportunity—taking sort of a natural strong-point and then pushing out there.

WN: Were there areas at the university that were weak, but you felt needed to be strengthened?

HC: Well, to some extent weak, but it was more a scatteration. (For example), there wasn't any Asian language and culture center. There were people who taught Japanese, there were people who taught Chinese, and some of them were in the university, some of them were in the East-West Center. And there were people in sociology and anthropology who had done research in

these areas. My problem was to dramatize a concept, and then to attract—usually not very many new faculty into it—pull together the faculty that was there, and find somebody, either internally or externally like Craven, who could do the coordinating and be the external symbol.

WN: So actually, reorganization and consolidation were key.

HC: Yeah.

WN: In other words, instead of creating new programs, you looked at what were existing and then you sort of tried to . . .

HC: . . . tried to develop them, yes. Because most of the natural seeds were already planted, but they weren't growing very well, mostly because (the university administration wasn't) pushing them and paying attention to them.

WN: It also seems like in these programs of strength, you tried to internationalize them a lot more.

HC: Yeah. Well, that was a natural—what the French call a *déformation professionnelle*, a professional deformation of mine. Since I'd worked so much in international affairs myself, I (thought of) the university as an international institution really, in that sense, more than a University of Hawai'i, a university of the Pacific. And that was one reason I supported so (strongly) the development of what came to be known as PEACESAT [Pan-Pacific Education and Communication Experiments by Satellite], the (communication) satellite program. I told you the story about that enterprise?

WN: I don't think so.

HC: There was fellow there named John Bystrom, who was a very well-known person in the field of speech communication, and he knew quite a lot about the coming technologies of the information age long before most people were turned on by them. I was sort of beginning to get interested in that, as I did, of course, much more later, and wrote a book called *The Knowledge Executive*, and so on, and have been active in that field ever since.

John Bystrom was one of the people who turned me on about the potential of electronic communication, and particularly of satellite communication. And he got wind of a NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] satellite, one of the very early ones—I think it was called ATS-1, Advanced Technology System One—which was up there in the sky, and had been up there for several years, and then the research and development at NASA and elsewhere had gone past it, but (the satellite) was still healthy up there. NASA didn't have a job for it anymore, because they were working with more advanced technology, partly for military purposes. And so they kind of---they issued us all a half-hearted announcement saying, "Anybody want to use an old satellite? Anyone who wants to use it for some educational or non-profit purpose, we'll (make it available free)."

Bystrom caught that ball in mid-air, and conceived the idea that we should develop a Pacific-wide electronic communications system [in 1970]. This is before anybody was really talking about e-mail and so on. And the idea as we developed it was that we would have a communication system that would exchange information among all the higher education institutions in the Pacific, including Alaska, and Fiji, and Tonga and so on. We had to have a

technology that wasn't too expensive for communicating with the satellite—we got the satellite free. And NASA liked this idea very much, because we were going to use something that they had put up and we could show that they were doing something for humanity and so on. And our congressional delegation liked the idea and was very helpful in pushing it. Senator [Daniel K.] Inouye was very helpful, and Senator [Spark M.] Matsunaga, too.

But we needed a technology. We needed a ground station [to access the ATS-1 satellite]. And there was a very imaginative—some people called him crazy—professor of engineering in the College of Engineering, who was a ham radio enthusiast [Katashi Nose]. And he said, “My goodness. I could put together a ground station out of stuff I could buy off the shelf in a ham radio store.” I had a fund called the President's Innovation Fund. I had persuaded the legislature and the governor and also the faculty senate to agree to a concept that I should scrape off 1 percent of the academic budget . . .

WN: The G-fund [general fund] budget, or the overhead?

HC: No, it was not just overhead, it was of the---I can't remember what it was called. It wasn't called the G-fund.

WN: Oh, the revolving fund, research and training revolving fund?

HC: No, it was really 1 percent of the university's budget, not counting some of the buildings and maintenance and stuff like that. And that wasn't a huge sum, but it was a sizeable—I can't remember how much we had, maybe \$40[,000], \$50,000. I hadn't squirreled it away secretly, it was in an open negotiation. But I said that the problem with any organization, even if it's expanding, is that what you're already doing fills up the budget. The only way to start anything new is to have some money that doesn't require cutting somebody's budget. So, the thing to do was to make an across-the-board cut ahead of time, so that nobody was feeling the pain.

So we had this fund we called the President's Innovation Fund, and I told Bystrom and this engineer [Nose], “Here's \$5,000. Why don't you see if you can make it work?” And for an amount that turned out only to be about half the \$5,000, they constructed a ground station on the roof of the engineering building, of a small engineering building—it wasn't the big one, but a small one on the campus, a two-story building, it had a flat roof—and started communicating with ATS-1.

We soon got a letter from the Polytechnic University of New Zealand, saying, “We've been monitoring ATS-1. We notice that you're communicating with it. What goes on?” And we corresponded with them. They said they'd like to be in on whatever experiment was going on. So that gave us Alaska and New Zealand as a base for this, and eventually, I think we had every (institution of higher education in the Pacific as part of the system). We had the University of the South Pacific, we had Tonga. The king of Tonga couldn't be left out if something was going on, you know.

But we spun off this technology to a private company, and then directed everybody to the private company to buy the ground stations. We didn't try to produce ground stations ourselves; we thought that would be sort of a non-university thing to be doing. But we supervised it, and quality-controlled it. And the British Council, the organization that

controlled funds for higher education in the British system, got interested in this and put some money into putting a ground station into Papua New Guinea, which had been sort of a British colony, through Australia. We were also able to get the [U.S.] Department of the Interior to buy a ground station for Guam. So it was that kind of an operation.

And within—I don't know, a year, a year and a half—Bystrom had this thriving business going, where for two or three hours every day, there would be an exchange of views and discussion by what we would now call e-mail. You'd type out a message and it would go out on the system. And we had a headquarters in the same building (that had the "ground station" on its roof). I can't remember her name, but there was a woman in charge of that who was very enthusiastic, and very bright and very good. And altogether, for peanuts (as a university investment), it was possible to make a major (innovation in satellite communication)—because the satellite was free.

So that was again partly taking advantage of Hawai'i's location—it's of obvious interest in being a Pacific university—but also betting on the imagination and drive of a senior professor [Bystrom], who has since died.

I think his wife was still interested in that, and at some point an award was given to the program. I can't remember by whom now, but you could probably find out. I think that award came through after John Bystrom died. It is a great story.

WN: But still continuing today.

HC: It got quite a lot of newspaper coverage and so on, locally, just because it was an imaginative idea and nobody else was doing it.

WN: Now this emphasis on internationalization, the Pacific, Asia, and this emphasis on research, making it [University of Hawai'i] a world-class research organization, was that one of your mandates? Given your international reputation and experience, do you think that was one of the reasons why you were sought out for the job? Is this where the university wanted you to go, do you think?

HC: I think it was---nobody sat me down when I came and said, "Now, you've got to accomplish one, two, three, four, five." There was sort of an assumption that I'd figure that out myself. I think part of the case for my going there, built by Stuart Gerry Brown and company, was based on what he'd seen me do at the Maxwell School in Syracuse, where I came in, internationalized it, starting with this (big "Overseas Americans") research project, and put the Maxwell School in position to get some very large grants from Ford [Foundation] and Carnegie [Foundation] and others, and put it on the map. It had started as a city management training institution back in the [19]20s—started in '24 . . .

WN: You mean Maxwell School.

HC: Yeah, and then Paul Appleby, who'd been in the New Deal—was a journalist really, from Iowa I think—he'd been under secretary of agriculture and he'd been deputy director of the budget and was very much a top New Dealer, so he added a federal government dimension to the Maxwell School, and I came in, reinforced that, but then added an international dimension.

WN: Let me just . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

WN: Was there any opposition at all to this emphasis?

HC: Not really . . .

WN: Well, today, nowadays with the budget situation the way it is, there's different camps in terms of where a university should be heading, and there's the research, international, external grant viewpoint, and then there's the undergraduate education, taxpayer-supported state university mission. Did you come across any of that when you were starting out?

HC: Well, that wasn't a big---there wasn't that kind of a problem in those days, because the university budget was on a roll. More than half of the state's budget was going into education—the university and [lower-education] school systems. And the governor felt strongly about that. There was a sense of destiny on the part of the political leadership.

The one thing that I had to watch—and also got started on very early—was that it was a statewide system, and that we needed to have strong, outlying precincts, and not just the research university in the middle. I traveled to Hilo almost immediately, and visited around to Maui Community College and Kaua'i Community College, began to lay plans for a Windward Community College, and started talking about open admissions as a right for every citizen of Hawai'i, as an entitlement, in effect. And because the budget was growing each year, there was not a big issue about the division of the pie because the pie was growing so fast. That had been true in Hamilton's time also. It only ran out of gas toward the end of my period there.

That's one of the reasons I left, actually, 'cause I had a feeling that—from then on for quite a while—it was going to be a maintenance operation, not an institution-building operation, and I'm an institution builder by temperament, not an institution maintainer. But by that time, we had gotten the law school and the medical school and some of these science programs well established. And also we had managed to get people to think of the community colleges as very much a part of the system. It's very unusual, you know, for community colleges to be part of a state university. I think maybe in Georgia they did that for a while, but most states are enough bigger (than Hawai'i) so that community colleges are a separate system. California has a (separate) community college system and a (separate) state university system—you know, Long Beach State University, kind of thing.

WN: That's right. The [California State University system and] the UC [University of California] system . . .

HC: The University of California at Berkeley, and Los Angeles, and so on. And so there was inherently a lot of clash between them when they stopped growing so fast. When they were all growing, they were cooperating very well. You can bury almost any problem in growth, but it gets harder when you're allocating scarcities.

WN: What were your thoughts when you came here, to discover that it was under one, statewide, centralized system? Is that something you were in favor of?

HC: Well, I didn't regard it as an option, to change that.

WN: Would you have wanted to change it?

HC: I don't think so, no. 'Cause once I got into it and visited the community colleges and so on, and saw what a lot of ambition there was for education beyond high school, and figured that—I had made a lot of speeches on this—that I used to say in ten or twenty years, there aren't going to be any jobs for just people from out of high school. Everybody's going to have to have some further education (beyond high school)—vocational or community college, or bachelor's and master's and Ph.D.'s and so on. And I felt strongly that that was an important part of converting Hawai'i from a colony to really being a part of America.

WN: Well, let's look at your "Prospectus for the '70s." The number one point you made was universal postsecondary education.

HC: Yeah.

WN: That was one of your goals.

HC: Yeah. I haven't looked back at that document for quite a while, but I worked very hard on it. What I did was, I established a committee which Dick [Richard H.] Kosaki chaired, for the universitywide community to think about, essentially to think about the strategy for the university during my period. That's what I was thinking about. And they held a number of hearings and developed quite a literature on what was possible. It was in that process that I had realized that we were already a Center for Korean Studies, for example. And it was during that period that I began to get an inkling that Mauna Kea was going to play a special role and it would be noticed worldwide.

And also, I began to worry about, "What about the best and brightest of the students who come through the community colleges? Are they going to get a chance to go on, since it was all one system after all?" I came to regard that as a kind of an entitlement—that if somebody did well enough in community college, they ought to get a chance to get to the Mānoa campus, or later, to the Hilo campus, for a four-year degree or (even beyond into graduate work).

It was a part of my educational philosophy, but it was also a political judgment, based on having seen what was happening in other states, where the smaller, more spread-out parts of public higher educations were vigorously supported by the local legislators from those districts. The people from Kaua'i weren't very much interested in Coconut Island and marine biology, but they were very interested in Kaua'i Community College. And I came to feel very strongly that we should encourage the maximum flow of people through the community colleges to the Mānoa campus. And that our arrangements for admitting students to the Mānoa campus should leave plenty of room for ambitious youngsters from the (neighbor) islands and from outside of the Honolulu complex itself.

And that was as I said, both educational philosophy, but it was also political judgment, that if

I didn't do that, if I didn't seem to be paying enough attention to the outlying districts, that the outlying districts would come up and bite the university, and say, "What are we doing all this nonsense about astronomy and so on? Why don't we get our kids educated?"

WN: So you sort of made a link between the local constituency, which would be the legislators supporting the community colleges, and you tried to make a link with Mānoa . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . so that you could support it all as one package.

HC: Yeah, and what that required was—and we didn't get around to this until about the third year, I think. It's hard to remember exact chronologies, so long ago. But we developed a proposal, which I made to the faculty senate in Mānoa, that we should develop the principle that any student that does satisfactory work and gets sixty credit hours of transferable work—you couldn't apply this to the machine shop (work and other "vocational" programs), but language and political science and other subjects like that—anybody who was able to leap that hurdle should have not just the opportunity, but should have a preferential right to move to the Mānoa campus for the rest of their education. And that was very hard for the Mānoa faculty to swallow. First of all, there was an attitude that these are probably inferior (students), they're country folks who really wouldn't understand how to survive on our campus. Then it turned out that they [Mānoa faculty] didn't really know what was going on at the community colleges. There weren't many friendships of community college faculty with Mānoa faculty, and I used our innovation fund to support a whole series of lunches and dinners. (For example getting) the mathematicians on the Mānoa campus together with the people who were teaching mathematics in the community colleges. And some of it was very revealing, because the (Mānoa faculty) didn't know what was happening (in the other parts of the statewide system). In some cases, they were surprised that it was so good; in some cases they were distressed that it was so bad, and began to take responsibility for helping the community college people in their fields to do teaching that would mesh with the teaching on Mānoa campus when the students came, you see. So, it was not just a question of passing a rule. It was a question of developing a whole new culture. A new culture as far as the community colleges were concerned, too, because they—especially the community college in Hilo—was very sort of vocationally . . .

WN: Oh, Hawai'i Community College.

HC: Yeah, Hawai'i Community College was very vocationally oriented, and they felt that, you know, they didn't want to be swallowed up by these highfalutin people from Mānoa. They wanted their own independence, and so on. So, that was the most difficult case among the community colleges, and still is, I gather. I believe that Joyce Tsunoda [chancellor, UH community colleges] has always thought that it would be better for the Hawai'i Community College to be part of her system rather than part of the University [of Hawai'i] at Hilo. So we were bucking two different cultures at once and trying to pull them together.

But we finally—after, I think, negotiating about it for more than (two) years—we got the Mānoa faculty senate signed on to the policy, which for the first time meant that University of Hawai'i—which had been talking about open admissions for years, but that was the first time that it really was open. It wasn't just open admission into (the university) somewhere, which is

what most people (meant) when they talked about “open admissions.” I said “open admissions” means not only that any child can aspire to postsecondary education, but that any child that’s bright enough and works hard enough can aspire to the whole system, and can start in a community college and wind up with a microbiology Ph.D., if they’re good enough.

WN: That’s a daunting task that you had, and I would imagine a unique one. It’s diversity that you had, and also the fact that you were in essence heading one statewide system.

HC: Right. And that’s one of the reasons we did the reorganization, to set up chancellors in Hilo and Mānoa.

WN: Okay, let’s talk about the reorganization, then.

HC: That was the reason for it—to demonstrate that the central administration of the university was not just the central administration of Mānoa, but was the central administration of higher education in the state. And that bought us a lot of support. The speaker of the house was a very, very bright and very local kind of a guy.

WN: Was that James Wakatsuki?

HC: No. He was an older man [Tadao Beppu, born March 26, 1919]. He was probably in his fifties or even sixties when I was there. He was a very skilled politician, legislator. And he had very good support locally, and he was a bulldog on making sure that Kaua’i Community College got its share of the budget and so on. And he really became a very important supporter of mine in general, and mainly I think because I was really working at cutting the outlying precincts into the system.

WN: And in relation to that, another topic in your prospectus was the growth situation of Mānoa; the fact that it had sort of maxed-out in terms of potential to accommodate students, and so you were looking at other options.

HC: Yeah, because it was already getting to be more than 20,000 students, and after a while, we sort of put a mental ceiling on Mānoa of about 23,000, and figured if we needed more four-year work in the state, we needed to do it somewhere else. And that was the case for developing Hilo, the four-year part of Hilo, and setting up Hilo as a sort of special unit of the university. That was not just another community college, but it was a “University of Hawai’i at,” sort of status. That was also the case for beginning the plan for our West O’ahu campus, but the case for that really depended on future growth, and it was hard to estimate what the future growth would be.

But I still feel—even more strongly now—that an American youngster, growing up, had better go beyond high school. First of all, he or she had better get a good high school education, built on a good grammar school education—and that doesn’t seem to be happening in some places in this country, compared to Japanese or German or other lower-education [systems]. Even assuming today that a good general education was available at the undergraduate level, that there should be opportunities, whether they were vocational, technical, or union apprenticeship programs—which were also a part of the university, I found to my surprise—and also graduate work in the [hard] sciences and social sciences and humanities.

WN: And when you talked about undergraduate education, you stressed study-abroad programs, again keeping with this theme of internationalism.

HC: Yeah. I felt that, ideally—it wasn't possible to think of that in terms of budget—but that ideally, every undergraduate student should have a chance to go abroad during their undergraduate life. I mentioned, I think, in connection with the Maxwell School, that we had started a "(sophomore) semester" in Italy, and we had various other programs that were available for students as undergraduates. And also, I got to know a lot of students [at UH], particularly Japanese-American students, second- or third-generation Japanese, who never really learned Japanese [language] very well, yet who'd grown up with a natural advantage that they didn't (appreciate), of being bicultural, bilingual people, and that we should be deliberately trying to help people grow up as bilingual, bicultural people. But the whole weight of a university system militates against that.

I remember—I don't know if I mentioned this to you before—I remember arranging a year in Japan for a very good engineering student. And I was quite proud of myself for having gotten a very good deal for this student. So I asked him to come in and talk about it. I explained that he was going to get a chance to spend a part of his (university) time in Japan. And he was at least a third-generation, and had had that thing that you find so often with immigrant families that was true of Italians and Irish and others, that the children resist learning their parents' language, and are sort of ashamed of the fact that their parents have a funny accent in English. Of course, from going to school with regular students, they realized how English was supposed to be spoken. Even if in the play yard, they wouldn't speak that [standard English]. They would speak that special Hawaiian way that the kids talk to each other—the kind of . . .

WN: Creole.

HC: Well, kind of pidgin, different kinds of pidgin. But, anyway, so I put it to this young man that he was going to have a great opportunity, and the first question he asked me shocked me. He said, "But does it lead to being an electrical engineer?"

I said (chuckles), "My friend, that's the wrong question to ask. You can get to be an electrical engineer if you have the motivation and the talent, but without this kind of an opportunity, you'll be stuck in one situation, probably in Hawai'i. But there's going to be all kinds of engineering relationships between Japan and the rest of the developed world, and you could be one of the pioneers in developing that. But you can't do it if you can't speak Japanese. And even if you look Japanese and go to Japan from America, you will instantly be tagged as a foreigner. They won't want to talk frankly to you, and so on. So you've got to be a truly bicultural person."

Well, he bought it, and he finally went, and I think did very well. I've sort of lost track of him since, but, I was just shocked that his first reaction was so orthodox, you see.

(Laughter)

HC: "Does it lead to being an electrical engineer?"

WN: You were shocked, but on another plane, maybe you weren't shocked, because, as you said, it's a very orthodox question. (Laughs)

HC: Well, I assumed that he would already have caught the spirit of what I was trying to do . . .

WN: (Laughs) Oh, I see. After all of what you did. (Laughs)

HC: But, he hadn't—as the women say—"got it" yet.

(Laughter)

WN: Okay, well . . .

HC: You wanted to talk a little bit about the prospectus?

WN: Yes. Well, I think, you know, it sort of outlines your philosophy. Well, it does outline your philosophy, and your goals, actually . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . because it was written, actually, before you took your tenure.

HC: It was written [during] my first year.

WN: Let me just summarize. You had one, two, three, four, five, six, seven installments, and, you know, it was number one, universal post-secondary education, which you talked about. The second issue was growth . . .

HC: Mm hmm.

WN: . . . and the need to expand UH Hilo, and to build a new West O'ahu campus. Third was community colleges. Fourth was graduate education and research, focusing on areas of natural advantage: Asia-Pacific, marine programs, astronomy, and the East-West Center. And then, sixth were the professional programs, the law school and the four-year medical school . . .

HC: Mm hmm.

WN: . . . and then, finally you talked about other special programs. But basically, that was your prospectus.

HC: Yeah. And, it was a very valuable exercise in three different ways. First, it was very valuable to me, because, after all, I'd been working in Europe on security problems. I'd been working for four years on subject matter that had nothing to do with Hawai'i at all, or the Pacific, for that matter. So, it was an excuse to get immersed in the subject matter of the university's purposes.

WN: Hadn't there already been some plan in place? Was there something called the Academic Development Plan?

HC: Yeah.

WN: Uh huh. Did you sort of look at that and scrap it and put together your own?

HC: Well, I didn't overtly scrap it, because a lot of people I liked and admired had worked on it. But I didn't think it really carried a tune. I didn't think it sang, you know. I didn't think it would buy anything from the legislature, or help organize the governor's thinking about. . . . Because he had the vision, but he didn't know a lot about the university, so, my job was not to sell him vision, but to sell him the components of the vision he already had, which was a great thing. I mean, I could very easily have had a governor who didn't have the imagination. But, he really had a strong sense of the centrality of education in developing Hawai'i, and that was an enormous advantage from my point of view.

But, the prospectus was not only good for me, it was good because we were able, through the Kosaki committee, to involve a lot of people in the faculty, and show that I wasn't coming in here with a set agenda that I'd cooked up on the plane coming over, but that it really would be built out of ambitions that people there had. And it was, in fact. There were a number of things that went in there that I hadn't realized, I hadn't even imagined before. The Korean studies center was one of them. I had no idea that Korean studies was a field even. And I certainly didn't know that it was dominated by the University of Hawai'i, or that there would be good support for it from Korea itself. I had learned all that in this process, probably because this very bright professor, Dae-Sook Suh, had helped me understand it.

WN: So, the prospectus is, in essence, your general sense of direction . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . that you had talked about in *The Future Executive*, and you didn't say exactly how you were going to go about it, but you need that general sense of direction before you can proceed.

HC: You remember my definition of planning was improvisation on a general sense of direction. That [prospectus] was the general sense of direction, but in this case, I thought that it really needed to be put down on paper and widely circulated.

WN: And it was also important that you put down that general sense of direction, instead of inheriting one.

HC: Well I thought so, and I didn't see there was one to inherit. I saw bits and pieces of this map, but I didn't see a single vision that. . . . Then we got lucky, because again [George] Chaplin [editor of the *Honolulu Advertiser*] was helpful. And he decided, to my surprise, to run the whole thing as a series of articles in the *Honolulu Advertiser* from January 21, 1970, entitled "Prospectus for the '70s." He preempted the op-ed [opinion and editorial] page for a whole week, and just ran this in big chunks, full text.

WN: Right. Was it ever a speech?

HC: No. I made a lot of speeches about it, though.

WN: I see.

HC: But it was much too long for a speech. It was a whole pamphlet. And of course, we published it as a pamphlet, too, and circulated it quite widely. But the real thing that got attention was the fact that the newspapers were taking it so seriously. They used all this ink on it. That

meant that nobody dealing with anything about the university could admit not having seen it. You know, if it had just been a pamphlet, "Well, I haven't really gotten around to reading that, Harlan." But, if it was in the newspaper every day—this was really before the age when TV news began to take over from newspapers, their function. The morning [*Honolulu Advertiser*] was something that everybody was presumed to have read. And so when we go to testify before a legislative committee on anything, one of the first questions would be, "Well, was that in the 'Prospectus for the '70s?'"

(Laughter)

HC: And, if it was in the prospectus, then that was 50 percent of the validation it needed.

Another thing that I'd learned—really from [former Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara—during the [19]60s, McNamara produced each year a memorandum for the president on strategy—on what we were trying to do in the world in terms of congressional appropriations and kinds of equipment and kinds of training and so on. And this would be produced by a group of whiz kids in his office. And he worked on it very hard himself. Then, [it would] be exposed to internal constituencies first, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies, State Department and so on, that would be involved. And sometime during that process, it would also be exposed to the White House. And I noticed an interesting thing about the annual memorandum to the president. It was always called "Draft Memorandum to the President," and there never seemed to be a final version of it. So that McNamara was always in the position of saying, "Well, we're still working on that. Yeah, we'll take what you're saying into account, because, you know, we haven't frozen anything in stone here." And that helped his consultation with the generals and admirals and other people he had to deal with, and industrial firms that contracted for weapons production and so on. So I decided that maybe that would be the thing to do with this [prospectus]. So that even the pamphlet itself—I can't remember now whether it's still marked draft (WN laughs), but I treated it as if it was always a draft.

WN: Did others treat it as a draft?

HC: No, others treated it as the Bible.

WN: Did that lead to problems?

HC: No, that was good because I could always say that it was adaptable, you see. But if other people thought, "Well, you said you were going to get a Korean studies program and here's the money. Why isn't it happening?" You know, so . . .

WN: But it could have worked the other way around, too. That if you thought it was adaptable and they didn't, and you're requesting something that's not stated in that prospectus, did that lead to problems as to, "Well, it's not stated in your prospectus, so why should we fund it?"

HC: Well, but we generally tried to phrase everything we did with the legislature in terms that came out of the prospectus. There was enough philosophy in the prospectus to cover almost anything we'd wanted to do. (WN laughs.) But, I think that as a way of starting in on a new job of this kind—I didn't invent this way, and nowadays, it would probably be called a strategic plan or mission statement or something, and that kind of thing is done more and

more. But it was, at least in Hawai'i, on the first of January, 1970—it [i.e., the pamphlet] was dated the first of January, 1970—and a decade looked like a long time, so we focused it on the [19]70s.

WN: Okay.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 25-9-5-96; SIDE ONE

WN: Okay, we're talking about the prospectus.

HC: I had this big advisory committee, helping to put together material for it, and Stuart Brown and others were involved in that. [Richard H.] Kosaki was the chairman, and . . .

WN: Do you remember other names? Because obviously you needed a circle of consultation . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . for such a document.

HC: But it wasn't an inner circle. It was deliberately people from the other campuses and so forth, as well. But my guess would be that Werner Levi would have been on it, 'cause he was kind of the leader of the faculty for much of the time I was there. But it was also balanced ethnically, as everything had to be.

But I took the position very early—and Kosaki was very skillful at making it come out this way—that I wasn't setting up a committee to write the prospectus. I was setting up a committee to help me understand what was going on and what was possible. After all, I was fifty-one, and a published author of already several books, and I was pretty sure that I could write it, if I knew what to say, you know. And Dick [Kosaki] managed to work it around so that nobody resented the fact that when it was finally written, it wasn't really the committee's document, it was mine. I didn't want them to start nitpicking sentences or concepts. And so I went off over Christmas vacation and—I think that was also done at the Sheraton Maui, which was one of our favorite places to disappear to—and wrote, or rewrote, every section of that document. And I worked very hard to get it done by the end of the year. I'd only arrived in September [1969].

WN: Right.

HC: Because I wanted it to be dated, symbolically, January 1, 1970, because we had the whole decade as the object of our attention. And so it doesn't—I haven't read it for a long time, but my impression, even at the time, was that it didn't read like a committee document. It read like a . . .

WN: You're right.

HC: . . . like a document coming out of one brain. But of course it was a composite of a lot of people's ideas, and I gave a lot of people credit in it for ideas. But I wanted it to be not a committee document, and I wanted it to remain a draft. These were my two ideas ahead of time.

And, as I say, it had an enormous impact, both in assuring people who weren't watching very carefully, "Well, the university seems to know where it's going." It created that impression. But it also, for those who were involved—the governor and the legislators and the faculty leaders, student leaders, and parents and supporters around the state—gave them something to sink their teeth into. And it helped them understand that, for example, if their particular interest was in the future of Maui Community College, that Maui Community College was not an alternative to doing something about a Korean studies center, or marine biology, or geophysics or astronomy, because they were all part of a plan.

And when I was leaving, there were several efforts—I think the best one was probably in the [*Honolulu*] *Star-Bulletin*—to say, "Well, this guy came in with all these ideas. What's happened to them?" And they went through the prospectus, more or less point by point, and concluded that most of it had been done or was under way. And that was because it was in fact a general sense of direction on which I was improvising every day, and as it turned out, a lot of other people were too.

WN: Now, this circle of consultants, did it include non-university people as well?

HC: As I recall, it did not. I think it was just a university group. Later, we set up a thirty-six-person, all-university public advisory group. And I still remember our great difficulty in making sure that it was balanced, and wanting to make sure that the list would look all right, would look balanced, to the board of regents. I can't remember whether I appointed it or whether the board of regents did, but it was essentially to be advisory to me and to the board. I still remember how we were sort of struggling with the problem of getting the right ethnic mix and the right geographical mix, and the right mix of professional and other kinds of people and so on. We spent a whole weekend with a group, trying to figure out who should be on it. And I still remember at the very end of Sunday afternoon, my assistant—it may have been Alan White by that time—poking me in the ribs and saying, whispering, "Hey, if we can just find a Korean woman from Kaua'i, we've got it made."

(Laughter)

WN: I guess Hawai'i presents a unique . . .

HC: Not unique. It's . . .

WN: Yeah.

HC: It's Tammany Hall all over again.

(Laughter)

WN: Well, this is all part of expanding your web, so to speak, and you talked much about horizontal leadership, and expanding your web of consultants and so forth. So it all seems to

be pretty consistent with your basic philosophy.

HC: The phrase I used in the book, *The Future Executive*, was a "web of tensions," arguing that it wasn't bad to have tensions. That, in fact, if there weren't some tensions, the top administrator had no options. He didn't have anything to choose from. So, you didn't want people to be agreeing with each other all the time.

WN: When you say "web of tensions," now, if there is a web of tension—webs of tension—how do you come up with a decision? Is it by consensus, after consultation with this web?

HC: Yeah, it's by consensus, by my definition of consensus, which is the acquiescence of those who care, supported by the apathy of those who don't care about the particular decision. I mean, you couldn't decide something about Kaua'i Community College that the speaker [of the house] didn't agree with. That was just off the chart. But you could decide something about Kaua'i Community College that people from Hilo might grumble about, but it didn't really make any difference, because it wasn't their pigeon, you know? That's how "consensus" really works. It's not unanimous consent.

I once---I don't know whether I mentioned to you before that I once watched a Samoan village make a decision in Samoa. I had a Samoan sitting next to me; we were sort of hidden by some trees on a knoll nearby. The islanders had all gathered around in a circle. In view of the climate in Samoa, they didn't need a campfire, but it was like getting around a campfire. The decision had to do with something happening at one end of the island. But there were people there from all over. And so my consultant, who was telling me what was going on, said, you will notice that some people are kind of moving toward the outside of the circle. They're playing with their children there and talking with their families and so on. But other people were hunching themselves in (closer to the center of the circle). They were all sitting down on the ground and getting in close to the center where they could make themselves heard. Those were people from this end of the island, whom the decision really affected. And I was struck—later I wrote something about it—that when the decision was made, it was made in the form of a declaration by the tribal elder, in effect the elder statesman. If he got it wrong, they'd argue some more. But if he got it about right, everybody would say, "Yeah, I think that's all right."

You see this in a committee meeting now, where the chairman will say, "Well, what I hear you all saying is," and try to summarize it. But then, at that point, under Western procedure, what would we do? We'd ask all those people who hadn't been listening to come in. "One person, one vote." And they'd blow the consensus.

(Laughter)

HC: And I've seen this done by masters, and mistresses. There was a woman who was the chairman of the Council—in effect, the board of regents—of the University of the South Pacific. I was a member of that council. They had set up the council with, and built into the (statutes), that the president of the University of Hawai'i would be one of the members. They only met once a year, and I tried to get down for it each time [to] Suva in Fiji. And the woman who ran this was just absolutely wonderful, very persuasive and very low key, and very good timing. She'd wait three-quarters of an hour while people were arguing about a subject. And then she'd sort of lean forward and say, "Well, what I hear you saying is this,"

and that would be the decision, almost every time. She got it right, and she delivered it in a way that wasn't—didn't sound like a command, didn't make anybody resentful, but sounded like kind of a god-like authority.

WN: Even when it really wasn't the true wishes of the . . .

HC: Well, even when it was more in the direction that I knew she wanted (WN laughs) than the group.

WN: Do you liken your style with hers?

HC: Somehow, after she had spoken, it was very hard to say, "I still disagree with that," you know. And, yeah, I tried to emulate that. And that's the way I've described the functions of the executive in those two books about leadership.

WN: Okay, well let's get into your relationship---I know you talked a little bit about John Burns. How critical was it to get John Burns' ear and to get him on your side?

HC: It was absolutely essential. The Democrats had a huge majority [in the state legislature], and he had been there forever. I mean, he was in his third four-year term. And he knew where all the bodies were buried and he knew the long history of every issue that came up, and he could remember. In addition to that, he invented a, what I thought was a extremely astute way of handling legislation. At the beginning of the session, he would go in with a shockingly low budget. He had a group of economists advising him. And somehow, at the beginning of the session—at the time of his State of the State message and so on—they were always very pessimistic about the prospects for state revenues. So he'd go in with this very low floor. It didn't occur to anybody in the legislature to cut anything. So the whole legislative session was devoted to what would be added to this budget on top. And as each thing was added, the legislators sponsoring it would get good publicity about what, in (the U.S.) Congress, would be called the authorization. But it wasn't an appropriation. And at the end of the session, they would put all these authorizations on the governor's desk. And then through the summer and fall, the governor would make decisions, and would decide to allocate money for this, but not to allocate money for that, and so forth. So, in effect, he had arrogated to himself the appropriation function of the legislature. But they had already gotten credit for good works, you know, for . . .

WN: For introducing the bills.

HC: . . . for introducing the bill, and getting the bridge approved, and that sort of thing. And then, during the summer and fall, Burns got the credit for those same things in separate stories, equally front-page, and so on. So his release of the monies was the critical act, in effect, each year.

WN: So then, the original university budget that comes out of your office and through the board of regents to the governor was always low, because they give you a low appropriation, or a low [ceiling].

HC: Well, they gave us a pretty low figure to shoot at, yeah. But once I got the idea of how this game was played, which took me, I guess, a year or two, then we could put most of our star

functions in the form of supplemental authorizations on top. I think the Korean [studies center] probably went through that way, and some of the [Institute for] Astronomy stuff went through that way. These were things that I knew the governor wanted, so it was a good bet that, if we could get it through the legislature, then the governor would approve it sometime during the year. And that's the way it worked, because he really wanted them.

WN: Did you have to start out cutting programs because the original ceiling was so low?

HC: No, because we were on a kind of an upward trend anyway. And also we were a big chunk of the governor's budget. I mean, more than 50 percent of the money was going to education. And we were probably getting 20 percent, or something like that, of the whole state budget. I don't remember what the figure was, but it was 15 or 20 percent. It was very big, and of course, the [public] school system [was] getting a lot more.

WN: So, there was enough, when you started out, to at least maintain current services, maybe even increase here and there. But by the time it got through with the legislature and back to the governor, it was . . .

HC: There'd be some more.

WN: . . . a very different budget.

HC: Well, there'd be a lot of goodies on top of it. (WN chuckles.) And most of the legislative session would have had to do with those goodies, in the hearings and so on. And there was no---I didn't feel any pressure from the governor. I wasn't a member of the state administration, although some people in the state and some of the regents were unclear about the relationship, really.

WN: Well, you were a member of his cabinet, weren't you?

HC: No, I sat in on meetings of his cabinet, which he asked me to do at the very beginning, and I said, "Well, the constitutional situation is that I'm responsible to the board of regents. And even though you've appointed all the members of the board," because he'd been in so long that they were all his appointees, "I still have to maintain a certain distance. But it'll be very valuable to me to listen to what's going on, participate, from the point of view of higher education, if that would be helpful to you. But I'd have to ask to be excused if you started discussing how you're going to raise money for the next election, or something like that."

He smiled and said, "Yeah, I understand that." (Laughs)

WN: Were you ever asked to campaign?

HC: No.

WN: I know he ran for his third term in '70.

HC: Yeah.

WN: You were never asked to . . .

HC: I was never asked to campaign. And the answer would have been that I couldn't. And he knew that. So, he was the kind of person that didn't ask a question if he knew the answer to it, you know?

(Laughter)

HC: He was an extraordinary person to deal with. You would go into his office, which had the biggest desk I've ever seen anybody sit at, and the desk was literally piled high, but not helter-skelter—a pile here, and a pile there, and a pile here, and a pile there. I came to have the feeling that he knew exactly what was in every pile. In fact, sometimes he would say, "Well, let's check that," and he'd pull something out of a pile. (Chuckles)

He literally had the whole state government on his desk, in a very personal filing system. If you knew just what you wanted, and argued it clearly enough in terms of the vision for the state, you might find he was making the decision while you were there, in the room. But he was quite uncommunicative. He would rumble and grump and cough, and so forth, but he. . . . It was often not a two-way conversation, really. And I don't think that was just because I was articulate enough to keep the conversation going (chuckles), even if there wasn't anything bouncing back from the backboard. But I think it was just his way. In that respect, he was--- everybody said he was sort of a typical Irish politician, but in that respect he wasn't typically Irish.

And, the superintendent of schools, and the [adjutant] general who was in charge of the [Hawai'i] National Guard, also sat in on the cabinet, on the same understanding. And on several occasions when they started discussing party politics, the three of us would get up and excuse ourselves.

WN: Because you weren't political appointees.

HC: Yeah. And he would even occasionally say, "Well, Harlan, you know, you wouldn't need to stay for this," or something like that, which I took as a signal that they were going to get more into party and less into policy politics.

But it was very valuable to be able to observe the policy politics at work, and to get to know the other members of the cabinet, so that I was sort on a first-name basis with them, and I could call them up if I needed help with something. And it was good for them to see that the governor always treated me very courteously. He never gave me an order or anything, that wasn't his style anyway. But, it was good for them to see that I had his respect, in effect.

WN: Did any tensions exist between you and him on any issue? Do you remember?

HC: Well, not really, because on the big issues, all the ones that I've mentioned—both the interaction of the community colleges with Mānoa, and the sort of headliner items like the astronomy program, and the marine sciences and so on, and the law school, and the medical school. . . . But I always felt, you know, that I didn't know him very well. He was the opposite of self-revealing, very. . . . Taciturn wouldn't be too strong a word.

WN: Were you nervous with him?

HC: I guess I was always a little nervous 'cause I didn't know what he was thinking. But over time, that wore off because his actions spoke louder than his words on university things. And, toward the end [1974] when he was really sick, and I didn't really see him hardly at all, and he appointed several people to the board [of regents] who were more like political pay-offs, than like trying to make sure that the governance of the university was going right, I had less of a feeling of support. But, most of the time, I had kind of a feeling of tacit, even taciturn support. I think he liked the fact that I came out with a clear agenda early in the game, and that I was sensitive about the rest of the state and not unduly focused on (the central campus)—although I spent most of my time, obviously, on Mānoa affairs.

I also liked Mrs. [Beatrice] Burns very much. And Lois liked her very much, too. But he wasn't somebody who encouraged intimacy, or small talk. We had seats together at the football games, around the fifty-yard line, so on. He always came, and I always came.

WN: This is at the old [Honolulu] Stadium.

HC: In the old stadium—the “termite palace.” And, he had a group of people, and I had some university people there, usually. And Lois came, and so on. But, you know, half an hour would go by without him saying anything, even though we were sitting together. And, you know, that bothered me at first—I thought he was being stand-offish—but, after a while, I just sort of got used to it—used to a very unusual political style and personal style.

WN: At any time, did you ever feel that he was micromanaging, telling you, “You should be doing this?” I'm not talking about a general sense of direction. I'm talking about maybe a specific program here and there. Anything like that? That you thought maybe he was out of line?

HC: No, I thought that he was---on issues of substance, I don't recall anything that he wasn't essentially supportive of. You know, we'd discuss tactics, or who to go first to for money for this or that. And he was always very much interested in any buildings that were going to be (planned or built). 'Cause that was, you know, like other public works, like bridges and stuff. But he signed on some big monies for physical improvements during that time. He had a little of the same feeling that a good many of the regents had, that the athletics program was very important. And he was a early advocate of our becoming a member of the Western Athletic Conference.

WN: Did you agree with that?

HC: Yeah, I thought it would be useful to be part of a conference. Because otherwise, the planning would tend to—the opponents that were selected, you know, usually three, four, five years ahead of time, would turn out to be those who were most interested in having their kids [i.e., athletes] visit Hawai'i, and sometimes it would produce very inappropriate rivalries. Whereas if we were in a conference, it would be a little more in our league. And when Arizona State University—from which I had an honorary degree, by coincidence—left the Western Athletic Conference, and joined, I guess, the Pacific . . .

WN: Pac-10.

HC: Pac-8 became Pac-10.

WN: Pac-8, right.

HC: . . . that created a vacancy, which we were able to get into. And he was very pleased about that. But on the---even things like the Larry Price issue, and the basketball coach, Red Rocha, and so on, the regents who were pushing may well have thought and may well have been right in thinking that they were pushing what the governor wanted. But the governor never tackled me about it. He had enough of a sense of the constitutional situation.

WN: So do you feel that he tackled it with the regents, so that they could tackle it with you?

HC: Maybe to some extent but he wasn't---it wouldn't have been his style to be proactive in that way. If Wally [Wallace] Fujiyama had gone to him and said, "Well, don't you think we ought to do this?" he'd probably grumble, "Yeah, probably a good idea, yeah." And then Wally would go back with a mandate, you know.

But he never really pushed us in the opposite direction from where I thought we ought to go. But that was partly because I was ambitious for the university and so was he. And the general sense of direction of that ambition was not only obvious, but had been set down in print so it was. . . . I'm trying to recall whether---I don't think I ever cleared the prospectus with him, for example. I'm sure I sent it to him ahead of time. He didn't just read about it in the newspapers, and we talked about it some after it was already out.

I sent it to the regents, of course, ahead of time, also. And, in fact, I think when it was first presented, it was presented at a regents' meeting. It was released as a report to the regents. And I consulted some of them about some aspects of it. I was able to work very well with some of them, especially in the early stages.

WN: Why don't we stop here.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape No. 25-10-6-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

April 9, 1996

Minneapolis, Minnesota

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: This is an interview with Harlan Cleveland, for the UH presidents oral history project, on April 9, 1996, at his home in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay, I want to start this session with this question. You were talking about Governor Burns and your relationship. I'd like to move over now to the legislature. How were your relations with the legislature?

HC: Well, I think they were pretty good on the whole. At least, the results were a continually growing budget, and approval of the main things that we needed to get approved. Sometimes they were rocky. And they were not as tolerant as Congress is. If you don't know the answer, you just say, "Well, I'll stick something in later on about that." They [i.e., state legislators] sort of expected me to know everything about everything in the university. But this university---I kept reminding them that one out of every sixteen people in the Hawaiian Islands was our student, and a little hard to keep track of them all.

But we had a pretty good and close relationship with the chairmen of the higher education committees. They were organized then—I don't know how they are now.

WN: It's the same.

HC: With higher education and [lower] education, through high school, as separate . . .

WN: Separate.

HC: . . . handled by separate committees.

WN: Mm hmm. It's still that way.

HC: We got---the university, of course, got a lot of coverage in the newspapers. There was a full-time [university beat] reporter, both in the [*Honolulu*] *Advertiser* and the [*Honolulu*] *Star-Bulletin*, who every day had to find something to write about, and . . .

(Knocking at the door. Taping stops, then resumes.)

HC: So, sometimes the discussion would not be about legislation, but about ructions on the campus, and who said what to whom, and so forth, or about some scandal that had been reported or alleged, that would be more interesting to the legislators than the bill that was up for consideration.

Of course, everything was strained through the prism of state politics. I remember one time, when we'd done some statistical work and figured out that roughly one out of sixteen people, resident in the islands, was a student of something. Sometimes in a part-time apprenticeship program or something in the . . . But a lot of full-time, too. And I was down seeing Francis [A.] Wong, who was then the chairman of our . . .

WN: He was the house, right?

HC: Yeah, in the higher education committee. No, I think he was the senate.

WN: Oh, was he senate? [Francis A. Wong served as chair of the state house committee on higher education, 1967–70. He was elected in 1970 to the state senate, where he became chair of the senate committee on higher education.]

HC: Yeah. And I mentioned that figure to him. I still remember he looked up at the ceiling, and you could see the political wheels going around. (Chuckles) And he said, "God, what a constituency!"

And I said, "Francis, don't worry about it. We could never get them all to agree on anything or anybody."

(Laughter)

HC: There was one fellow, and I'm sorry that I can't remember his name at the moment, who was chairman of the house higher education committee for a time, who became a very good friend and supporter, but also an astute advisor about Hawai'i politics and about the legislature. He represented a district over on the—well, beyond Pearl Harbor somewhere, but I can't remember his name at the moment.

WN: It wasn't Larry Kuriyama, was it?

HC: No. No, I knew Larry Kuriyama, of course, well—who was murdered [while returning to his home the evening of October 23, 1970], as I recall.

WN: Right, 1970, I think.

HC: Yeah. But I'd gotten to know him quite well, just in the first year that I was there. Did they ever figure out who did that?

WN: I think they did. I think they did. I don't really know the details.

HC: Well, he was a very bright and very engaging person, nice person.

It took quite a lot of time, because we were dealing with several committees, and of course

also with the Speakers and the presidents of the senate, and so on. But one interesting thing was that a good many of the staff people in the committees were either graduate students or recent graduates of the university. As a result, when there was anything about the university itself coming up, we had—without really organizing it—we had a very good intelligence system. That is a student staff member would call up and say that somebody better talk to Senator So-and-so because he's off on the wrong track. And that's a valuable asset for an executive agency to have.

WN: Did you have a liaison, on the UH staff, that sort of took care of the legislature, getting the testimony ready, just coordinating all of this?

HC: Yeah, it was sort of in the public affairs part of the. . . . But, most of the organizing of testimony and so on was done by various units, and not by my office. We had to be pretty well decentralized, because it was too big to bottleneck it all through my office.

WN: So it didn't have to go through your office, before testimony was presented?

HC: Not if they were presenting what they knew I knew they were presenting.

WN: Were there instances where groups went off on their own and. . . . For example, legislative add-ons, added on by the legislature, without your approval?

HC: There were instances where a unit would try to get something. But generally speaking, the legislative leaders would call up, you know, they'd call up Kosaki or me or Kenneth Lau, was his name?

WN: Lau.

HC: Lau, who was very . . .

WN: He was your vice-president for business affairs [1969–70]?

HC: He was, in effect, the person responsible for getting along with the state. And so, he would be, often, the source of some rumor that people were. . . . But we were on such a roll of expansion, that it was pretty hard to get offside, in the sense that it was pretty hard for a subordinate person in the university to be farther ahead than I already was in advocating improvements and expansions and so on. And it was important to the major units, like the Institute for Astronomy and the Hawai'i Institute for Geophysics and so on, to make sure that I and my colleagues in the central office were on board for what they wanted to do, because we were the key to getting the governor's approval.

But we didn't have a lot of that kind of problem. We had some interesting byplay, of which I'll give you an example. When we were trying to get the law school approved—and in the senate, the senate minority leader, Republican leader, was very much opposed to it. He took the line that lawyers of his generation often took, which was, "Well, we had to go to the Mainland for law school, but it worked all right in my case. Why don't the kids want to do that?" you know.

And I kept arguing that any community that isn't producing some of its own lawyers and

some of its own doctors is still a colony, and, "If you guys want to be a colony of California, that's all right, but I don't think we ought to be." It turned out to be a pretty powerful argument. Anyway, his name was Yee, I think.

WN: Oh yeah, Wadsworth Yee.

HC: Wadsworth Yee. That's it. Well, he was very much opposed to it.

WN: Who made the initial push for the law school? Did it come from you, or did it come from Burns, or who?

HC: Well, it was an idea that was floating around when I got there, and it's in the prospectus, as the medical school was, too. But there wasn't any plan for doing it. We had to develop a plan, get some consultants from the Mainland, and so on.

WN: The legal community, locally, was in favor of it, generally.

HC: Generally, yeah. Later on, when we had the law school set up and running, Wally Fujiyama in particular felt that two of his functions as a regent would be to decide who got into the law school and what they should be taught. We had a little micromanagement trouble with him about that. We didn't have similar trouble on the medical school, by and large.

WN: We're talking about expanding from a two-year to a four-year medical school.

HC: Yeah. It wasn't really a medical school before. It was some post-graduate work designed for people who were then [eventually] going to go to medical school.

WN: But generally, you could get the first two years of medical school there [University of Hawai'i], couldn't you? And then transfer to a four year?

HC: Well, that was the theory at the beginning. But, when I started consulting around about medical schools, with friends on the Mainland—one of my friends was president of Johns Hopkins [University]—and said, "Whatever you do about medical school, don't have a [university] hospital," he said. "It takes half my time and half my budget." (Chuckles)

Anyway, Wadsworth Yee was opposing the law school. But at the same time, he was trying to help his son get into law school on the Mainland. He told people, in fact—I don't remember if he told me, or if he told somebody who told me—that he was a good friend of the governor of Colorado, Governor [John A.] Love of Colorado, and so he would call him up. And so at one point, he does call Governor Love up, about his son. And the governor, I gather, said something like, "Are you kidding? I can't even get my own son into that law school."

(Laughter)

HC: So, the next day, as a result of that phone conversation—as I understand the story—he was standing on the floor of the (state) senate, saying, "The Mainland schools are discriminating against our kids. We can't have that. We've got to have our own law school." Just, bang, like that.

WN: This is still in the process of lobbying for it, or is this after you had gotten it?

HC: No, this was while it was still under consideration as a bill (in the legislature). And he was against it one day, and the next day he was for it, just like that, on the basis of his personal experience. And since one of the things we'd been saying, out loud, was that our kids tend to get discriminated against, because they don't have an alternative.

WN: Yeah, I know Wally Fujiyama came out publicly saying that, you know, "My child can go anywhere, but a kid from Nānākuli, who wants to be a lawyer, should be given that opportunity."

HC: Yeah.

WN: I remember him saying that.

HC: Yeah, he was for the project. And the [Hawai'i] Bar Association—which he headed for a while—came out for it. That was quite influential, because there were a lot of lawyers in Hawai'i, as there are everywhere.

WN: So the law school was a little more complicated problem than the four-year medical school, wouldn't you say?

HC: Well, it wasn't more complicated. There tended to be more local politics involved in it, because so many of the legislators, and outside people, were lawyers, and had their own idea of what a law school should be.

We had some consultants in, including a guy who was dean of the Stanford [University] Law School, who later became president of Indiana University. And they developed a very imaginative kind of a curriculum for a law school, which involved much more clinical work earlier, and didn't start with the usual torts and contracts and so forth in the first year. But the local lawyers, both in the legislature and out, were not about to make our law school a big educational experiment, which they thought might get in the way of its being helpful to their kids, you know. And they may have been right about that, actually. Anyway, we did start the law school in a more normal way.

WN: Plus, a law school doesn't require a huge sum of money, initially.

HC: Not as big. We did have one interesting innovation in the law school. I don't know whether they're still doing it. We had the students come in during a part of the summer, probably in August, and played a game of legal and political maneuvering and negotiation and so on, in which each of the students had a role to play. This was before they'd learned anything about the fundamentals, just to give them a feel for what kind of intellectual activity this is, being a lawyer. And I think that was a very good thing, and was very popular at the beginning, as a way of starting, and it was unusual and got some notice on the Mainland. A different way of starting law school.

The medical school was much more expensive inherently, and there was also a big argument about whether we ought to have a hospital. The guy who had been heading the two-year program had come up through, I think, UCLA [University of California at Los Angeles], and

to him a medical school was something that had a hospital attached. So we imported a group of consultants to think about it, and they came up with what I'd hoped they would come up with, which was, "You guys don't need a hospital. You've got some fine hospitals around here. You've got [The] Queen's [Medical Center] and you've got. . . ." What was the name of the Japanese one?

WN: Kuakini [Medical Center]?

HC: " . . . Kuakini . . . "

WN: Saint Francis [Medical Center].

HC: " . . . and Saint Francis, and so on. You've got good hospitals. Your problem is to make them part of your program." And that turned out to be the hard part. Because to make them part of the program meant that you had to get faculty members who could be physicians on their staff, and you had to make sure that those physicians on their staff, who are faculty members, were in control of the educational program in the hospital. And I'd been in several negotiations with the Russians and with our allies in Europe, and it struck me that I'd never been in anything so difficult as negotiating with the hospitals in Hawai'i. And I think it would have been the same anywhere. And that's probably why so many university medical programs have their own hospital.

But we finally were able to work out the whole thing. Terry [Terence A.] Rogers, who was our first dean, was not himself a physician. He was a physiologist, Ph.D. But he knew a lot about the medical business and had been in it for quite a while, and was a very tough bargainer in those relationships. Once or twice, we had to get the governor into it. [The hospitals] were all heavily subsidized by the state, one way or another—and the governor would have to imply that they'd get their water cut off if they didn't cooperate with the university.

(Laughter)

WN: Well, why the difficulty? Was the difficulty the administrations of these hospitals . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . or the doctors themselves?

HC: Well, it was both. It was a jurisdictional issue, in effect. All hospitals do a certain amount of education. They all have interns, and so on. And when the senior doctor goes on his rounds, he's followed by a cluster of young doctors, watching what he does, and so on. And we felt, on the basis of what we had from our consultants, who included a (doctor) named Walsh McDermott who was in charge of the Cornell [University] medical facility in New York, which is a big facility with a huge educational program, and he had been the head of a couple of national commissions and was a very well-known guy, and extremely nice guy. And he said, "You've just got to have control of that. You can't have a constant negotiation between your faculty and the rest of the doctors about how people are going to be educated. It's got to be part of your curriculum." We stuck to that and finally made out all right, but it was a rough negotiation.

One of the most interesting parts of that professional school issue was that the two projects—one for medical school and one for the law school, both of which were in the prospectus—were carefully timed to come up (for legislative approval in) different years, so that we wouldn't overload the circuit. But through one accident or another—I don't remember exactly how it came out this way—they both came up for approval the same year. We had, of course, an ace-in-the-hole, which was that the governor wanted them both. And that's probably why they got through. But I kept getting calls from the legislative leaders and the Speaker and others, saying, "Look, this is ridiculous. We can't have them both come up this year. Which one of them do you want, Harlan?"

And I'd come back with my standard response, that any community that isn't producing its own doctors and own lawyers—some of them—is going to be a colony, and, "You're asking me, in which respect Hawai'i should still be a colony. And I don't know whether I'm going to be here for the rest of my life, but you probably are, and so you ought to answer that question." (WN laughs.)

But I don't really think that it was that argument that got it through. I think it was the governor's support. He was just determined that there be a law school and a [four-year] medical school, and for the right reasons.

WN: Now, in the grand scheme of things, were these professional schools a high priority in your book? I always talk about priorities, because, you know, right now, the university's going through a prioritization process. And maybe that wasn't really in your vocabulary at that time, because of the budget situation being so favorable. But, you know, if you're talking about undergraduate education, research, community service, and so forth, was professional schools, professional graduate schools, a top priority?

HC: Yeah. Well, I think my attitude toward it was greatly colored by the enormous opportunity involved in having a growing budget in all and very good support from the governor. And I did not really think in terms of priority. I thought we could develop the community colleges and develop a first-rate medical school at the same time. I kept expressing that ambition everywhere I went.

WN: And those who were against the law school and the medical school, were they arguing from a budgetary standpoint, basically?

HC: Well, when it came that we were going to have them both, then it became, "Well, that's really too much money for us to do this year," and so on. But I never got the feeling that they were saying, "Let's not do it this year," as a way of saying, "Let's not ever do it." And in the case of the law school, the issue was primarily this issue between sending our kids to the Mainland, or doing it here. And I think most people came down about where you quote Wally Fujiyama as coming down—that, "Maybe I'm wealthy enough to send my kid anywhere, but it's not true of somebody from Kaua'i. It's just not going to happen, and they won't have their chance unless we have it at the university."

And since there wasn't any other alternative, in higher education, to the University of Hawai'i, we didn't ever even have the kinds of questions that you have in most states. "Well, should the next medical school be here or there?" you know.

WN: The only ball game in town.

HC: We had a monopoly. And it was a problem sometimes, but it was an advantage more times.

WN: Well, let's talk about the faculty, now. Are these professional schools something that the faculty supported?

HC: I don't recall that there was a big ruction in the faculty about this. I think there were probably more reservations about the medical school, because it was much more expensive, even without a hospital. But there was never a sort of an issue drawn on the subject in a faculty meeting that I remember.

WN: For example, a faculty member in the College of Tropical Agriculture [and Human Resources], you know, looks at, say, the medical school as possibly draining some valuable funding from maybe his ambitions? Nothing like that came up?

HC: Well, that's such a familiar pattern these days, but it was really not a familiar pattern then, because we were still on a cusp of growth that you could bury most of those priority questions in growth. You could not only start a medical school, but you could build another building for tropical agriculture the same year. I don't want to imply it was easy, because we obviously always had the question of what we were going to put our energy behind, but it wasn't anything like the searing budget fights that you have now on every campus.

WN: That's fascinating. (Chuckles)

HC: And that's of course part of what made it, probably, more fun than my successors had.

WN: While we're on the subject of the faculty, aside from, say, some of the skirmishes you had relating to the [Vietnam] War—which we can get into a little later—how was your relationship with the faculty?

HC: Well, I think that most members of the faculty saw, in my ambitious approach to the university, good things for themselves and for their fields, as well. Generally, I had a—maybe from their point of view—even a surprisingly can-do attitude. Almost anybody who came up with an interesting idea could get a favorable hearing for it. And, you know, after a few yesses to off-beat ideas, that word gets around.

I think that the one thing I learned, Warren, which was very interesting to me, that—I may even have written this down somewhere—the sort of conventional wisdom about faculty versus administration, in the university, is that the faculty always wants to micromanage the administration, and deprive the administrators of the power to make decisions, and bury everything in committees, and so forth. And in times of tranquility, that conventional wisdom holds. But in times of turbulence, it doesn't.

That is, when the students were beating on my door about Vietnam, for example, nobody proposed that there be a faculty committee to settle this thing, rather than me, see? There was a, you know, "Leave it to George . . ." (chuckles) kind of willingness to delegate that kind of authority upward.

I think it is true that faculty members—like other members of groups, but perhaps even more so—are different people, as individuals and as members of the faculty group. You hear people in faculty meetings saying things that seem so, sort of, ridiculous or un-thought-through, or even occasionally just stupid (WN laughs) from people who, you know, have international reputations as very bright scholars, and local reputations as very good teachers. But somehow, getting into a group does something to the psychology.

Maybe that's what Hitler was able to show; that you get large groups of people mobilized, and stir them up enough, you can get them to do things that they wouldn't do as individuals. I think that happened in Germany, in Nazi times.

I've puzzled about that ever since; why are people in groups less thoughtful, and more inclined to pitch issues in terms of procedure, rather than substance? In a faculty meeting, meeting of the faculty senate or faculty committee, you almost never got people disagreeing with each other on a matter of educational substance. It was almost always a procedural issue.

WN: For example, can you give me one?

HC: Well, a favorite ploy, if you didn't want something to go through, was to say, "Have you asked for the attorney general's opinion?" or, "There wasn't enough notice for this meeting. We didn't know this was going to come up this way, and so we can't really discuss it today."

WN: But this was before Sunshine Laws though.

HC: Or, "You haven't provided enough copies of your proposal for the meeting." Sunshine Laws were just coming in at that time. Well, you know I've done a lot of writing about that. You've seen, at least, the chapter in *The Knowledge Executive* that deals with that.

WN: Right.

HC: And that was a kind of a short version of a substantial pamphlet that I wrote for the Association of Governing Boards. Have you seen that?

WN: I don't think so, no.

HC: "Sunshine Laws and Higher Education," I think it's called. I can get you a copy. I think I must have extra copies of that, in the office. If you've got a scrap of paper, let me make a note about that. Or I can do it on this.

WN: I'll turn the tape over, in the meantime.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

WN: Okay, the faculty senate as a body, was that a viable body that you needed to consult and/or contend with? Or were you more comfortable dealing with individual needs of individual

faculty?

HC: Well, it's always easier to deal with individual needs, of course. But the faculty senate is regarded as the faculty as a whole, meeting and making judgments. The favorable thing about the faculty senate from my point of view, at the University of Hawai'i was, one, that the presiding officer was me. That was rather a surprise to me, when I got there, that I was chairman of the meeting. That changed after unionization, but. . . . And the other thing that was good about it was the quality of the leadership. The two people that were heads of the faculty senate during most of the time that I was there were Werner Levi and a geographer, economic geographer, who later was the number two man at UN University in Tokyo.

WN: Well, I'll get his name. He was in geography?

HC: Yeah, as I recall. I think he was chairman of that department, in fact. A very wise and a very good scholar. Very knowledgeable about the Pacific, and a patriot for the university, you know. So during my time, really, we had sober heads in faculty leadership that were, therefore, not only possible, but fun to deal with, because they were bright and interesting people in themselves. I got to know them well, and we were in each other's houses, and so on.

WN: So it wasn't an adversarial relationship.

HC: So I didn't feel a strong adversarial relationship. But partly that was because we were able to bury so many problems in our growth, and focus people on where we were going, because we had the resources to do that. But when I'd get into a tangle with the regents about an athletic problem or something like that, the faculty senate used to stay out of the cross fire.

WN: The faculty used to stay out.

HC: Yeah.

WN: Oh, I see.

HC: They did come out on the issues of dissent versus disruption, on the campus. They did come out with a couple of very useful and strong statements. And they agreed with the doctrine that I suggested, my first year, when the issue of a student strike came up, which was a strike about the Vietnam War. I took the position that any student that has paid tuition has a constitutional right to stay away from classes. We don't have a constitutional obligation to give them an A as a result, but it was not illegal, from our point of view, for them to strike. But the rest of us, the faculty and administrators, were employees of the state of Hawai'i, ultimately. We were public servants. And in serving the state and serving the parents and so on, it was up to us to be in our classrooms, whether anybody turned up or not. And so, during the strike period, our doctrine was, "Professors will be in their classrooms. Anybody wants to come learn something, that'll be nice."

WN: I'd imagine that would be pretty unpopular with certain faculty members and, generally, with students.

HC: Yeah, well, they didn't like it of course. But a lot of students did in fact get together with their professors, and a lot of professors contrived exercises about the Vietnam War, figuring that, if

everybody's interested in that subject this week, let's do some education about it. And I encouraged the faculty to work out ways of molding their educational purpose to the subject, in whatever way, whether it was engineering or economics or political science or whatever.

I remember one young history professor picketed his own class. Walked back and forth with a sign. But we didn't have a lot of that. And, I learned something about the sort of dedication to education in Hawai'i, that's right there in most families, and not very far under the surface. That week, the head of our library system—we had several libraries, you know, Hamilton Library and an undergraduate library, and a number of specialized libraries—the head of the whole library system reported to me, toward the end of that week, that the attendance in the library had outstripped any previous week, in his memory. There [were] a lot of kids [who] said, "Well, okay. We don't want to fight with our student leaders about striking, but I sure want to get an A in that course." So they just took the occasion to bone up on the next thing in their courses. And that gave me a very good feeling, I must say. (Chuckles)

WN: There was also that interim session. I think that was fairly new—when you had like a one month break between semesters, and I think you used that time to have education programs and . . .

HC: We developed a whole series of classes, not only for our students, but for other people, for adults who wanted to come in, or for people who wanted to try a subject. "Will I like anthropology? Should I consider that as a major?" And so you have a couple of anthropology teachers demonstrating what studying anthropology was like. And that was a useful, off-beat kind of thing. We had, also, some special things, like New College, that were really radically different ideas.

WN: Let's get into New College next time. Let's talk about Vietnam. The war took up a good part of your first year of your administration. It's something that sort of held you back in terms of getting certain new programs started, and so forth. Let's talk about that. One of the things that came up was [U.S.] Marine [Corps] recruiting on campus.

HC: Uh huh.

WN: And, I remember you had some . . .

HC: That was one of the . . .

WN: . . . incidents about that.

HC: . . . one of the incidents, which was quite a ways along (in my first year). I think it was probably after the October moratorium, but sometime that year, that academic year. There was objection to the [U.S.] Marines recruiting on campus. But we took the position that it was a free country, and a free campus, and anybody could come to the campus that wanted to. And it didn't even require an administrative decision, like, it's okay to use that building, because most of them were held outdoors. And so, they had a [U.S.] Marine group with a table in front of them, and with a wall in back of them, which was so they couldn't be surrounded very easily by protestors or anything, and they were making their pitch, and getting a lot of catcalls and so on. But several students climbed up on the wall in back and came around, and one of them snatched the hat off one of the marines, and then jumped off the wall and set it afire.

And the interesting thing was that the reaction of the crowd of students was immediate revulsion at this action. Probably because so many of the crowd were (students) who had been in the military, and one of them shouted out, "Hey, don't do that! That's his property. That's not a government thing. That belongs to him." And it just turned the whole atmosphere around. The crowd was then pointed at: "How can we make amends to this young man who has just had his personal property snatched and set on fire by a student?" And one of the young veterans took off some kind of a hat and started passing it around for contributions, and collected quite a lot of money, and just gave the money to this [U.S.] Marine officer to buy himself a new hat. And that to me was a striking example of. . . . If you'd planned it carefully, you couldn't have contrived a better way of turning that crowd around. It didn't mean that they were any less opposed to the war. But it meant that they were very clear that there was a difference between dissent and disruption.

And it was that line that I kept trying to call attention to, in the writings and talks that I gave, and so on. What happened at the beginning of that fall—I arrived only in September [1969]—and the middle of October, I think it was the 15th, there was sort of a general movement on campuses around the country to declare a day of special calling attention to the Vietnam War. And it came to be called the October Moratorium.

And so we considered it with some of the faculty leaders, and some of the regents and so on, and decided it was all right to have a day off for talk about that, and that it would be a good thing for every professor who could think of a way to do it to make it a day of thinking about the war in Vietnam through the prism of their discipline. And we, actually, officially called off classes. I can't remember whether it was for the day or just for an afternoon. I think it was probably just for the afternoon, a Wednesday, I believe it was, and so there could be a big meeting on the subject. Student leaders very much wanted a big protest meeting.

They invited me to come to the meeting and speak. I think I surprised them by saying, "Yes, I'll come."

WN: You were in office for one month, right?

HC: For just a month and a half or so, yeah.

WN: And you still were carrying this baggage of being associated with the federal government and the State Department, and therefore probably hawkish on the war.

HC: But (I had just been) with NATO, which was thought of as a military organization, even though my part in it was really being a member of the political board of directors, and trying to think about how to make peace with the Russians, and so on.

I hadn't previously said anything publicly about Vietnam. But when I issued a statement that called off classes and made this meeting possible, I had said that everybody wants the war over. It's just that there are different ways of wanting it over. But nobody wants this war to continue. Which was more or less true.

And then, when the students running this meeting gave me the floor, I had prepared a very strong and, as I look back on it, eloquent analysis of why we ought to get out of the war. I wasn't able to use the phrase, because Senator (George Aiken of Vermont), I guess it was, had

already used the phrase, "Let's declare victory and get out." But that was my theme. It became known with some of my colleagues as the "Vietnam-is-our-Algeria War," because I had this phrase in there about, "We ought to do what de Gaulle did about Algeria, and just walk away from it." And I had a line designed as an applause line, and it turned out to be a headline line, to the effect that if the reason we're not getting out is because we've got "face" problems involved—which I thought was a way of putting it that would mean something to a largely Oriental-parentage audience—"The face of my nation is not worth the life of my son," I said. That was emblazoned over the top of the newspaper, the next day. It was by far the lead story of the next day, and somewhat transformed my relationship with students in general, and the student leadership in particular.

It also transformed my relationship with Admiral McCain, who was the CINCPAC, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, whose son—now a senator from Arizona—was still a prisoner of war (in Vietnam). And so coming out against the war was a stab in the back as far as Admiral McCain was concerned. So Lois and I were cut off his hospitality list for the rest of his tenure; but we were put right back on as soon as his successor, (Admiral Noel Gayler, took over at Pearl Harbor).

WN: I also read that you were---I think Veterans of Foreign Wars came up for your resignation due to those remarks.

HC: I wouldn't be surprised. But that wasn't an organization with a lot of clout on higher education. And there was so much noise, in general, that that more or less got lost in the noise.

But, the interesting effect was on the student leaders, because most of them. . . . Well, my office and my job was still kind of a target, because I was the nearest symbol of authority. And, it was easier for students to walk to my office than to get to Pearl Harbor to protest. I was rather glad that College Hill, our residence house, was three or four blocks away from the corner of the campus, and therefore was almost never a target of demonstrations. They always came to Bachman Hall, which was right in the middle of things.

WN: So then, that speech really helped remove some of the adversarial situations.

HC: Well, it didn't really quiet the indignation about the war, but it took me personally a little bit out of the firing line. And it gave me an opportunity for some educational experiments. People would come in and conduct sit-ins in my office, and I figured since they were sitting there, they might as well be learning something, so I'd give them things to read and we'd discuss them. I was particularly fond, at that moment, of a book that I'd just read, that I'd read in French, but that had just come out in English, by Raymond Aron about "Les Evènements de '68" the events of 1968 which was just the year before in the Sorbonne and around in France. It is a long and very brilliant essay about the distinction between dissent and disruption. At one point he says that there's no way in which any administration can prevent protesters from becoming martyrs, by laying themselves down in front of vehicles, or getting themselves beat up by the police, and so on. But he goes on to say that, "They're able to generate great opposition to practices which they both desire and denounce." They want to be hit over the head. They want the blood to show, because they want to be able to denounce it. And to get the student leaders of this essentially peaceful protest to focus on what happens when it gets out of hand and non-peaceful, I thought, was a very good opportunity for educating people

about the important distinction between dissent and disruption.

WN: We were talking about demographics of student leaders. I know you made a comment once where you sort of characterized the typical student leader as being *Haole*. And really questioning whether or not they spoke for the rest of the student body. And, you know, I guess any time you make a statement relating to race like that, you're going to get some . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . some feedback from the community. Do you remember . . .

HC: Well, it's true that it wasn't only *Haole* in the usual sense. But it was true---Jim Anthony was a Fijian, and there were others coming from other countries. And some of the leaders were alumni of the Berkeley protest of two years before, not students, who'd come over and were living on a beach somewhere and came in for the fun. But I think it was broadly true, as a racial generalization, that the students of Oriental parentage were not---they were not only not the militant ones, but they were also not the ones who spoke up in class either. (They thought) their job in class was to listen to what the professor was saying, get it all down, and give it back to him in the exam.

We constantly had this phenomenon of a visiting professor from the Mainland, coming over for a semester or so, and the first couple of classes, he'd complain that he was really engaging the students in the front row, but they mostly seemed to be the *Haoles*, and that all the Japanese girls were back in the . . . And then he'd give a mid-term exam, and the top ten grades for the mid-term exam would be names he didn't know and could hardly pronounce (WN laughs) because they'd be these demure young women sitting in the back row, not saying anything and not calling attention to themselves, but getting it all in here. (Chuckles)

WN: In your head, you mean.

HC: In their heads, yeah. So I think that probably that cultural difference had a good deal to do with the fact that, while we had a lot of protesting, we had almost no violence. The most violent act was the burning down of an old temporary building that was being used by the [Air Force] ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps].

WN: This is down lower campus.

HC: Down on the lower campus. And off-hours, so nobody was there. It turned out that the perpetrators of that particular incident were. . . . None of them were actively connected with the university at the time of the offense. The one who was associated by the most people as being a university person was a young turk named Larry Jones. But he was not by that time on the payroll and he wasn't acting in the university at all.

So that whole period was a very important steep learning curve for me. And in a way, it was one of the things that had motivated me to want to take this kind of job.

WN: Crisis management, you mean.

HC: Well, I'd been abroad for four years, and I'd been in the State Department and not really

connected up with the country, with our own country, very much, for almost five years before that. So for most of the decade I'd been away from campuses and mostly away from young people. And I was just desperately concerned with what's eating them. What's the problem there? What's creating all the ruckus? And I had a good chance to watch it at close hand, fortunately in a situation that didn't give rise to violence. I did have three assassination threats, but . . .

WN: Really?

HC: But only two of them were for real. The third one was---after the first one, they assigned a full-time security guard, who acted as my chauffeur—I usually drove my own car—and sat around the house when I was there. He was a huge, extremely cheerful [person], must have been 300 pounds and all of it muscle, you know, a sumo wrestler type. And the third assassination threat, turned out on investigation, to have been put in by him. He liked the duty.

(Laughter)

HC: Kiku would bring out cookies to him from the kitchen, and so forth.

(Laughter)

WN: So, in what form did it come out as a threat? I mean . . .

HC: Well, it was a telephone, anonymous threat, you know.

WN: Oh gosh.

(Laughter)

WN: Oh my goodness. Okay, I think I have one more question. (Pause) Well, I think we'll end it right here.

HC: Okay.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape Nos. 25-11-7-96 and 25-12-7-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

April 10, 1996

Minneapolis, Minnesota

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

[NOTE: Also present at the interview is Lois Cleveland (LC), HC's wife.]

WN: This is an interview with Harlan Cleveland, on April 10, 1996. We're at his home in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto. This is for the UH presidents oral history project.

Let's begin.

Okay, this is session number [seven]. Let me just---I just have a couple of questions on the Vietnam era. I've been told that one of your major strengths during your administration was your ability to negotiate, and to work with student protesters and. . . Good face-to-face negotiating ability. What can you say about that?

HC: Well, it's nice to hear. I had a lot of practice, of course. Not only in diplomacy—for about 8½ years just before that—but also, I already had 5 years as an academic dean so I was sort of used to the dynamics of a university, of university negotiations. And also, quite early in life, as you know, I had several, as I look back on them, rather high-ranking jobs in cross-cultural situations, in China and Italy. So there, too, I was always bargaining and negotiating and trying to work things out. So I guess it sort of came natural by that time.

WN: What kind of a special situation did working with student activists pose? Or problems?

HC: Well, I operated on the assumption that the attacks were going to be verbal, and not physical. And in nearly all cases that was true. Jim Anthony, I guess, was the main exception to that. And I figured that it was important not to get into a slanging match with students or some of the younger faculty who were also involved. And I was tempted, I was tempted very much when (pause) you know, when a student shouted out, "Mother fucker," my first instinct was to say, "What, are you judging from your own family?" But I didn't, you know. (Chuckles) And I think the fact that I didn't, helped a lot in the relationship with the students, because getting into a slanging match with them would have been—correctly, I believe—seen as a sign of weakness. So I kind of operated on the old children's slogan, "Sticks and stones can break my bones, but words can never hurt me." And I think that, the more I saw of it, the wiser that old aphorism sounded.

WN: Give me some examples of negotiating. In other words, what were things that you could offer? What were some of the things that they were demanding?

HC: Well, in most of the demonstrations they were demanding things that I couldn't do anything about. I mean, I couldn't stop the war. In one case, they were insisting that I sign onto a statement that they had drafted that would be sent, I guess, to the [U.S.] president and to the Hawai'i congressional delegation, and so on. And I said that I would sign onto it, if they let me write it. And then I rewrote their---as the emotion was still strong, but they got more respectful and polite (chuckles) I think, than they had been. And they finally figured that having the university president sign onto the statement was more important than have it sound more fiery, I guess.

And when they wanted a moratorium. After a consultation with colleagues and faculty leaders and so on, I figured that the moratorium could be converted to an educational opportunity. And so not only did they [the students] stay away from classes for a day, but I called off classes for, I think, as I remember, it was a whole afternoon. It may have been the whole day. And issued a statement about the war, and about the fact that everybody really wanted it stopped, and that its impact was pervasive in all fields of knowledge, and recommended to the faculty that they take that opportunity in their classes during that week, and to the students, that they take this as an educational opportunity. Later, when they had a week-long strike which was in the spring, I think, of that first year---that would be the spring of 1970---it really did work out that there were education opportunities. When they sat in my office, you know, as I had mentioned, I'd give them things to read and discuss---didn't leave myself for them to occupy my office, but . . .

WN: Would you say a turning point in your relations with the student demonstrators was that speech?

HC: Yeah, I think so. There had to be, in their minds, some distinction between the target that they were fighting against and the target that they could reach, which was my office. I also tried very hard to not create a procedural issue. I had noticed in my earlier lives, that procedure was often a surrogate for substance, as we discussed yesterday.

And so for example, when they'd have a big demonstration, several hundred students---in a couple of cases a thousand---they were always outdoors, of course. And so, I would go over and be there, listen to what was being said. And because of my height, I was always rather noticeable. I mean, nobody had any doubt that I was there. So there wasn't any point in saying, "Well, let's march over and tell this to the president," you know. 'Cause, there he was. (WN laughs.) Or it tended to dilute charges of inaccessibility that are always one of the procedural issues that a mob can be stirred up with. So I made it rather a practice, when there was a crowd forming around something, to saunter over there. I thought that was kind of a high-priority thing to do.

As Lois mentioned yesterday, we went together down to the ROTC buildings when they occupied them. But on that occasion, we were sort of impressed with the fact that the leaders, or at least most of them, were quite sensitive about the situation in which they found themselves. And the ROTC students were their fellow students, after all. They weren't the enemy. So they wrapped up and handed out to their colleagues outside the building some of the awards---cups, you know, things that were used for awards by the ROTC---and sort of

segregated them outside so that they wouldn't be stolen or hurt by some particular act of frustration on the part of an individual or a small group.

Lois was sort of apprehensive about going down to that. But I think that it was a rather reassuring experience. When we told people downtown, you know, later, that Lois had found this to be a reassuring experience, people were surprised, you know, because all they'd been reading was what the newspapers were saying about it, or watching television, but it. . .

WN: Well, let me ask you a question about the media. You know, what you said earlier, that you didn't want to get into a—what is it? Slanging? Is that the word you used?

HC: Slanging.

WN: Slanging match. Were you constantly aware that, you know, whatever you say or do as university president will probably get reported in the media, and you'd need to play it out as to how it would be reported in the media? And you're someone who really utilized the media quite a bit in your own writing and so forth. So I'm sure you were very much conscious of the media.

HC: Yeah, I've gone for a long time (on the assumption)—and those incidents just reinforced my feeling—that, for a public official, there isn't any such thing as keeping things secret. As the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] keeps finding out, information leaks. And, therefore, I assumed that whatever I said would be reported and, the media were almost bound to report the most violent thing that was said. The media were almost bound to report the most provocative or vivid metaphor that was used, or something like that.

WN: Were you ever misquoted, or mischaracterized, do you feel, in the media?

HC: Yeah, I think so, precisely because even if the quote was right, they took a few words out of a half-hour talk, and as far as the reader was concerned, that was the whole talk, you know. So that the context of strong statements—even in my speech, the thing that really hit the headlines was, "The face of my nation is not worth the life of my son," which I thought was a pretty good phrase myself. But it was a contained, a rather carefully written and rather long analysis. And most of the television, particularly, of reportage, of course, didn't pick up the text. They---as I remember, the [*Honolulu*] *Advertiser* ran a whole text of what I . . .

WN: Right. I think so.

HC: Because I had it prepared ahead of time and released it. So to be sure that they had it available if they were inclined to print it. And under George Chaplin's leadership, the [*Honolulu*] *Advertiser* was trying, I think, to be fair, and even supportive. 'Cause I think they saw, I hope correctly, that the net result of my low-key style and of a willingness to be expository and explain rather than argue had a calming effect on the campus. And they shared the general community view that it would be nice if the campus weren't so turbulent. The *Star-Tribune*—not *Star-Tribune*—the . . .

WN: The [*Honolulu*] *Star-Bulletin*.

HC: The *Star-Bulletin* was, I would say, at least marginally less careful in its coverage as far as

news was concerned. But Bud. . . . What was his name?

WN: Smyser.

HC: [A.A.] "Bud" Smyser also had a very responsible view, so their editorials and what they put in the op-ed [opinion and editorial] page and so on—was also very helpful. They did a very interesting thing several times. I think they may have been a little bit caught off-guard by the fact that the *Advertiser* printed the whole text of the "Prospectus for the '70s." And instead, they did a long, long interview with me, which ran for a page and a half or more of the newspaper, in which I went over the same ground, in fact, but extemporaneously.

And then a few months before I left—I think it was the spring of '74, Smyser decided to do that again and had a huge, long piece, which I think I still have a copy, in which they were probing, "Okay, you said five years ago what you were hoping to do. Now let's look at what really happened." And it was a very favorable comparison which, of course, I thought was fair.

(Laughter)

HC: But in order to make that point, it just took an awful lot of ink. And under different leadership the newspaper wouldn't have bothered to try and do that kind of analysis.

WN: Did you make any requests or demands on them regarding putting in full texts or . . .

HC: No.

WN: . . . interviews, or anything like that? Because I know you and Chaplin go back a long way. I'm just wondering if you had some kind of an agreement or . . .

HC: No, it was, I suppose in a way, it was a tacit agreement. I mean, I assumed that Chaplin would be helpful. And when I thought it would be nice if they used the whole thing, I'd usually send him, personally, a copy as well as giving it to whatever reporter was reporting.

He and I also worked together on another thing that became quite an interesting drama in itself—what came to be known as the Community Media Council, I think it was. It was an idea that actually started, I think, with Stuart Gerry Brown. The big organizations around the community—businesses, military, the government, the university—were always, of course, complaining about the way TV and the newspapers were handling their stories about organizations.

And so, the idea was developed, I think originally by Stuart or maybe by Stuart and George Chaplin together, to have a group. It wouldn't be an independent group, in the sense of outsiders, but would consist of the leadership of both the media—television, radio stations, and the newspapers—and the heads or top officials of the other main movers and shakers in the community. And, as things turned out, the best way to start that seemed to be a university initiative. So it came into being as a result of an invitation that I sent to all the people that we wanted to be there. Then we got it sort of institutionalized, and we met a number of times.

I think it had a kind of a sobering effect on the relationship. The relationship is always going to be somewhat tense between the fourth estate—the communications media—and the actors in

a community. And the temptation on the part of journalists is always, sort of, to have it both ways. To say, "Well, we're just observers. We're just reporting what's going on and commenting on it." But often their reporting and comments constituted an action in the community. If people didn't know about it, nobody reacted, but if they did, they did. And I think that Chaplin in particular—Smyser to some extent, too—Chaplin in particular came to have a lot of faith in the usefulness of printing full text of things that I said.

I remember when I was finally invited, about my fourth year, the first time I was ever invited to a Hawaiian organization to speak. I mean, an ethnic Hawaiian organization. I can't remember the name of the organization, but it was a major player in the community. And I took the invitation very seriously, and I wrote a full probably half-hour speech, or twenty minutes or something. And I, as usual, sent the whole text to the media. But I was rather surprised and very pleased that they printed the whole thing. And as a result, I got a number of telephone calls from people I had never heard of reacting to it, mostly very favorably.

I remember one Hawaiian woman—she was a Mormon—who had worked for some years in Utah as a schoolteacher, and had come back to Hawai'i, to the northern part of O'ahu to teach school there. And she said to me, "You got it surprisingly right, you know, for a *Haole*, for a foreigner." And explained that, in Utah, the culture was that if the child tried and wrote an illustration, you know, depicted a picture, the general reaction of parents and so on would be, "Gee, that's wonderful," you know. "Keep trying." But she said, "In our Hawaiian culture here, it's really different." She said a reaction to the child's picture quite likely would be, "Ah, that's ugly." And she explained, with a metaphor that I'd heard, but I'd never quite grasped what it meant. How did she put it? Crabs in the barrel, I guess it was.

WN: Crabs in the bucket.

HC: Crabs in the bucket. That if anybody got up too far and was looking around too much, they'd get dragged down by the rest of the community. And she said that [attitude is] obviously getting in our way and we need to do better, and so on. But that [conversation] never would have happened unless—I never would have known enough to send her a copy, you know, of what I said. But it was the fact that it was picked up by the newspapers that gave it standing.

WN: Well, let's talk about your relationship with the community. Did you feel at any time that there was this locals versus Mainlander kind of thing, or locals versus *Haole* kind of thing? Because, you know, as University [of Hawai'i] president, I don't know if you realized it at the time, but that's a difficult, difficult job. Because when you think about it, you're working with university faculty which is about, I'd say, about 95 percent or 90 percent Mainland *Haole*, and then at the same time, you're working with the legislature, which is 95 percent local Pacific-Asian. And then you have the board of regents, which is, I'd say about 70 to 75 percent local Mainland slash Pacific. Was there this feeling of being an outsider at all?

HC: Yeah.

WN: Maybe I can ask both of you this question.

HC: Very much so. I never felt that even if I lived there for the rest of my life, that I would feel like an insider. Yet I saw some *Haoles* who managed to sort of feel that way. People like [J.] Russell Cades or George Chaplin or Governor Burns, for that matter. So I think my implicit

assumption, although I never said it out loud, was that I wasn't going to stay there for life. Several people had told me that they thought it was a mistake for Tom Hamilton to stay and become head of the tourist bureau [after his tenure as University of Hawai'i president].

WN: HVB [Hawai'i Visitors Bureau].

HC: HVB. He liked it in Hawai'i and wanted to stay there. On the other hand, we loved the place, and it was the one place that we had ever lived we that felt we couldn't shake the dust off and just go on to the next thing, which is why we got the condo on the Big Island. But I never felt I wanted to retire to Hawai'i, because it was never quite home, you know.

(To LC) What would you say, does that sound like . . .

LC: Well, we thought about it for a little time. Remember, we got the house over on Kailua Bay, and a wise realtor said, "Don't plan this for your retirement. By the time you retire, you won't be able to afford to live here on retirement money." And she was right. We bought that for a reasonable price, and it was not fee simple, but it was about [\$]400 a month for the fee. And just shortly after we left it went up to [\$]2,000. And she said that's what most of my neighbors were paying. And then it went way above that. Last time we heard, it'd sold for about \$400,000. (Chuckles) Was just a wooden shack on an absolutely beautiful piece of oceanfront there in Kailua. And we realized we wouldn't want to be going back and forth, that our children probably couldn't afford to come out to see us on any regular basis, and we better give up this dream and get on back.

So, finally, this small, one-bedroom place, five miles from the nearest town (laughs) down on the southern coast of the Big Island, has just been wonderful.

HC: Besides which, the realtor correctly predicted that one of these days, the Castle Estate was going to decide that they were never going to be allowed to build profitable condominium projects on (Kailua) Beach.

LC: That area was [owned by] Kāne'ohe Ranch, and they gave up on it. They wanted to build condos along there, but it was all one-family houses, so it always got turned down. So they gave up. So that lot sold for a quarter of a million [\$250,000].

HC: So then they offered the land underneath the houses for sale at prices that we couldn't have afforded. So, but the . . .

LC: The **people** who bought it from us went broke. The monthly payments were so high, 'cause they'd tried to buy the land, and it . . .

HC: But we can't complain, because in the four years that we owned that place, it almost doubled in price. And that's what enabled us to buy the condo, in fact, was that inflation.

But come back to the *Haole*-local business. I was very conscious of it, and you had to be. I had said yesterday, it was like Tammany Hall politics. You had to think about the Italians and the Irish and the Blacks and the Puerto Ricans and all the rest of the different parts of the community. And so, everything we did, we tried to make a balanced ticket, one way or another. And that was true even in the central administration, because it would have been quite

easy to have an all-*Haole* central administration.

WN: Okay, let's talk about your administration then.

HC: But I always tried to have at least one local person in the central. . . . Dick [Richard H.] Kosaki, of course, and later on, [Fujio] "Fudge" Matsuda in the business side [i.e., vice-president for business affairs]. And Kenji Sumida was there [as vice-president for administration], for a time, on the business side.

LC: Dewey Kim.

HC: And Dewey [H.] Kim. So it was important even there, maybe especially there. But also, whenever we set up an ad hoc committee to advise about something or sort out some issue, it was important to make (balance) it. I mean, I came to realize that Hawai'i was special in my experience, because it was the only place where I'd ever lived where everybody was a "minority." There wasn't any majority. So that everything was an exercise in coalition government. And the coalitions tended to break down by ethnic groups, although the continuous intermixture and intermarriage and so on made the borders between groups less and less distinct, of course.

But I remember—I don't know whether I've mentioned this in one of the earlier sessions—when we realized that the basketball team was going to. . . . The first five in the basketball team, one year . . .

WN: The Fabulous Five?

HC: . . . was going to be all Blacks from the Mainland. And I deliberately sought out a person on the board of regents that I thought was the most "localitis" oriented, who was Charlie [Charles S.] Ota, from Maui. And I asked him, you know, "Charlie, it looks like we're going to have five Blacks on the first team. How will that play in the community?" For one thing, I was puzzled by whether Blacks counted as *Haoles* or not.

(Laughter)

HC: In local parlance. Charlie thought for a minute, and then came back with a wonderful answer. He said, "Well, as long as they keep winning basketball games, they'll be honorary locals."

(Laughter)

HC: It showed how, sort of, shifting these concepts were to work with.

WN: Now, in your case, was that a feeling that you had? If I do a good job, relate well with the community, I will be considered—I could be considered an "honorary local"?

HC: No, I never really thought that I'd be considered an "honorary local." But I thought that if I did a good enough job, and advertised the University of Hawai'i nationally and brought in enough money from elsewhere, that I'd at least be regarded as sort of a patriot for the fiftieth state. But I never aspired to being an "honorary local." I didn't think that was a (WN laughs.) reasonable aspiration.

WN: Looking at the town-gown relationship, or the relationship between the university and the community, you know, I'm sure there was always this sensitivity to take down those ivory towers and really become part of the community. And I think College Hill probably had a lot to do with a lot of these breakdowns. Were some of the---were the social functions related, would you say, more to the community or to the university?

HC: Both. We used it very heavily. It was a wonderful place for it, because it had that huge *lānai*, and the weather was usually good, so you could usually have things on the *lānai*. We did everything from entertaining the French ambassador and getting a specially catered meal, or entertaining Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus, who was very much in the news those days. Since he was an archbishop, I invited him to say grace at the beginning of the meal. And he said it, of course, in Greek. And I sort of said, "Well, what sentiment were you expressing?"

And he cocked an eye at me and said, "It was all Greek to you, huh?"

(Laughter)

HC: Which I thought was a nice comeback.

WN: You set yourself up for that one.

(Laughter)

HC: I set myself up, yes. I was the straight man.

(Laughter)

HC: But we used it that way, and we used it to bring in people from the community that we needed to interact with. We used it for internal purposes. I remember a wonderful evening we spent with a group of Hawaiian students and a couple of more senior Hawaiian leaders, ethnic Hawaiian, trying to figure out what we could do to help support the Hawaiian students in the difficulty they were having. 'Cause if *Haoles* were having difficulty accommodating the community, Hawaiians were having even more difficulty, and feeling that they had sort of been pushed aside by, not only the *Haoles*, but by the Japanese and Chinese and Koreans and others who were sort of climbing over their backs. So we got some of these senior undergraduates, and a number of the more recent undergraduates, and a couple of senior people from the outside community, and we sat down and had a long seminar on what to do about this. And decided that evening . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

WN: Okay, so you were having a long seminar with a group of Hawaiian . . .

HC: And we decided that evening to develop a sort of homeroom for Hawaiian students. I didn't want to do what is now being done very widely on American campuses, the ethnic groups

practicing separatism. And the [United States] Supreme Court finally ratified the sentiment, to say that "separate but equal" is bad. But it was already developing the opposite idea, that "Let's be equal but separate." And you see this on campuses now. Stanford [University] had a big commencement, and then they had five or six ethnic commencements, several years ago. Which I thought was sort of a travesty of the kind of integration that the [United States] Constitution was trying to create.

But the way we compromised on that was to develop a homeroom right in the middle of the campus, the Mānoa campus. We just cleaned out the lower floor of one of the buildings, and made a living room out of it. Had magazines and stuff in there. And so the young Hawaiian students could come in there and, in a sense, be refreshed and energized and then go out into the community where they were a minority—and felt very much as a minority—and survive all right, psychologically, socially.

WN: Was there any kind of active recruiting drive to get more Hawaiians onto campus?

HC: Yeah, that was part of the same discussion, actually. Because so many of the Hawaiian students felt kind of discriminated against and unloved, and maybe pulled down by the crabs-in-the-bucket syndrome in their own communities, too, the word had obviously spread that it was pretty tough for a Hawaiian to survive on the Mānoa campus, so we had to overcome that by proactive measures. We didn't want a situation to develop in which the Mānoa campus consisted mostly of Oriental students and, at least, half *Haole* graduate population, and hardly any Hawaiians. And all the Hawaiians were in the community colleges. That didn't seem like it would be serving the future of the state of Hawai'i very well if we were sort of leaning against that wind all the time.

You speak of the town-gown relationship. A part of that had to do with the ethnic mix. That is, if you went down to meet with a bank board, or a group of businessmen, or even the Rotary, there were a lot of White male business leaders. But in some ways, the most difficult relationship wasn't that. It was the difference between those communities and a university campus. I mean, I don't know how many times it happened that I'd get my tie and coat on and go down for lunch with a group of businesspeople that we were trying to. . . . We were always trying to get them to support what we were doing. And the first question would be, "Why do you let that ridiculous professor say those silly things?" which they'd read in the newspapers. And I would spend most of the rest of the lunch explaining that neither the professor nor I felt that he was working for me. That just isn't the way a university works. And to businessmen who were living in a culture of pyramids, of administrative pyramids, the idea of the horizontal-ness of an administration of a university was kind of a sacrilege. It was shockingly different.

As you know, I tried to explain what I thought was happening in our society as a whole in my book, *The Future Executive*, that came out while I was in Hawai'i, and explain all the different kinds of organizations from a marine platoon, to an urban hospital or a big university. The marine platoon was the most vertical. Along that spectrum, the business community was much more toward the marine platoon. And to try to explain to them about what the rest of the spectrum looked like was always a hard sale. But, of course, the experience of trying to explain that was helpful in getting my own thinking straight, since my field of writing at that time was primarily executive leadership.

WN: Did the business community look at horizontal-type leadership as sort of a weakness?

HC: Yeah. And the idea that I couldn't tell that professor to shut up just didn't enter into the categories in their heads, at all. And . . .

LC: And you couldn't fire him, either.

HC: And that if he had tenure, I couldn't fire him. Yeah. Indeed, the whole issue [i.e., Oliver Lee case] that blew my predecessor, Tom Hamilton, out of the water was just such an issue.

So it was partly that cultural difference between business and the military, too, and a university and research community. There wasn't nearly as much cultural gap between the university and an organization like the [Hawai'i] Sugar Planters [Association], which was a research shop, which Bob [Robert L.] Cushing was the head of. So we didn't have to explain this horizontal-vertical business to Bob Cushing, when he was chairman of the [University of Hawai'i] Board [of Regents, 1968–69]. I mean, he had a feel for the university.

WN: What about other regents? You know, many of the regents come from—are local, but from the business community, or they're from wherever. Was it a hard sell, your style of governance?

HC: Well, yes, but sort of in a different way. Their concern was usually how we looked outside. How we looked to the outside community. So they were picking up criticism based on what they'd read in the newspapers or heard on television. And then they'd try out their criticism on us, inside. So we had some of the same kinds of dialogues with them. But most of the regents had a better sense, just because they were involved with the university, they had a little better sense of what a university was, and that it was something different and special.

WN: Most of the regents felt that way.

HC: Most of the regents.

WN: But there were obviously some who didn't feel that way.

HC: Well, or were more impressed with the criticisms they were getting from the outside, and less tolerant of the explanations they were getting on the inside. I think that, in the relationship with the regents, the *Haole*-local gap was more pronounced, and was more of what was in play psychologically in their relationship than was true with the community at large, or even with the business community or the military.

On the whole, setting aside the special problem that I had with Admiral McCain after that speech, our relations with the military were very good. For one thing, they were rather distant. I mean, they were geographically quite a ways away from the campus. And a lot of their children were at the university, or were hoping to go to the university. So what we did didn't really affect them very much. They also realized that we were technologically and intellectually kind of in the vanguard of the community that they had to live with. We had the biggest computer center in the Hawaiian Islands, not counting Pearl Harbor. And obviously we had a lot of experts on engineering and physics and mathematics, and so on. That was impressive to them as well.

Whereas, in terms of general community relations, the fact that we had some top-notch social psychologists or engineers or whatever was not as important a factor. And in terms of the general community relationship, our graduate program wasn't a big asset. Whereas in our minds, and the minds of the military leaders, and the minds of some of the business leaders, and the minds of people like George Chaplin, it was creating a very important part of Hawai'i's future.

WN: Graduate slash professional schools . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . you're talking about.

HC: But for the general population, being able to create a truly open admissions policy from the outlying precincts to the central campus was what they really had their eye on. "What are you doing for our kids?" you know.

I should have said this back when we were talking, yesterday, about the decision to enable community college graduates who had sixty credits, giving them a preferential shot at a slot on the Mānoa campus for the junior and senior years. My last faculty senate meeting, I had a special pleasure in being able to announce some figures that we had just developed on the graduating group that was graduating that spring, in 1974 shortly before I left. Namely, that the grade point average of the students who had come from the community colleges who were graduating that year, was slightly higher than the grade point average of the students who had started on the Mānoa campus. And that was a revealing . . .

WN: Yeah. (Chuckles)

HC: . . . thing, in a sort of almost shocking—almost shockingly good news for the Mānoa faculty.

WN: For the Mānoa faculty, or the community college faculty?

HC: Well, especially for the Mānoa faculty. Because it upset their assumption that people who started on the Mānoa campus must be better, you know. And I think it was also very pleasing to the community college faculties, obviously. But it was interesting. I remember making that announcement. There was a momentary hush (WN chuckles) in which nobody exactly knew what to say next.

WN: Wytze Gorter was someone whom you named as your—as Mānoa's first permanent chancellor.

HC: Yes.

WN: And I think you touched on it earlier, about why the decision was made to have a Mānoa chancellor. But could you tell me, what was in your mind in terms of restructuring the campus? What needed to be done?

HC: He wasn't---I don't think permanent chancellor is really the right term, because every academic administration job is from year to year, in effect. You don't get tenure in administration. But what was in my mind was the importance of taking advantage of our

unique structure—almost unique in the United States. I think Georgia also had, for a while at least, an integrated structure where everything was part of University of Georgia, including community colleges even. But ours was the most integrated. But that meant that we should integrate them. We should make the community college experience a bridge to the rest of higher education, which was mostly on the Mānoa campus. And it also meant that we had to be seen to be paying enough attention to the other (campuses, the other kinds of education). Because politically, in the legislature particularly, people's view of the university was primarily one of the smaller units in Maui or Kaua'i or the Big Island or the windward side of O'ahu, and so on, or even the specialized community colleges that we had, such as Kapi'olani [Community College]. (For many of) the legislators, their dedication to the University of Hawai'i was really dedication to one of the "neighbor units," you might say, 'cause we try to be as careful in our language about the other campuses as (the state) government was about referring to what used to be the "outer islands," and came to be called the "neighbor islands," which is a much nicer, politer way of putting it.

WN: Sort of getting away from a Mānoa-centric . . .

HC: Yeah. (WN chuckles.) Well, it's a similar kind of thing you see in some other states, where the word to describe everything but the central city is at least mildly prejudicial—downstate Illinois, upstate New York, phrases like that. That's why, in Minnesota, here for example, they've developed, quite a long time ago, the term "greater Minnesota" to refer to Duluth and . . .

WN: Suburbs and all . . .

HC: . . . Waseca. No, I mean the places that really were far away but were part of the system. So I had a strong feeling that it would never be credible to the legislators from other islands and from outside the city itself, even though O'ahu is the City and County of Honolulu in terms of government, there's a difference between downtown Honolulu and the predominantly Mormon areas in the north, and even some of the more distant suburbs out in the 'Ewa direction.

WN: So your goal really, then, was to actually try to decentralize the university administration, a little bit more by at least giving the impression that the community colleges were a little more, a little better represented.

HC: Yeah, and to avoid the sense that because of the structure, I was bound to pay most of my attention to what was going on on the Mānoa campus. Of course, that was what I paid most attention to always, because it was the biggest part of the university in terms of number of students, in terms of dollars, in terms of investment, and in terms of outside renown. But I had to look as if I was, if anything, leaning over backwards in. . . .

WN: Right.

HC: And I thought it would be helpful to set it up in the way that many states had set things up, with . . .

WN: With decentralization also comes, in essence, more administrators. Is that correct? Because . . .

HC: Because you have another layer.

WN: You have another layer, right.

HC: Yeah.

WN: And I was reading where, under your tenure, the central administration of the university grew from—well I guess the payroll grew from [\$]1.1 million to [\$]2.6 million. And so, you just look at the numbers, that looks like a negative way of looking at things. You know, “Why did Cleveland allow the central administration to grow into such a monstrous bureaucracy?” And, in essence, what you were doing is decentralizing, in essence. And with decentralization comes a greater payroll. Is that correct?

HC: Yeah, because if I’m acting as the Mānoa chancellor, as well as the UH system president, which I was, for the first two or three years—then you don’t need a chancellor. But if you have a chancellor, then he’s going to have an academic vice-chancellor and the rest of it. So on the other hand, when people add up the figures about the central administration, they’ll find central administration smaller, because central administration won’t include what’s going on in Mānoa and what’s going on in Hilo. So . . .

WN: So it’s a definition of what central administration is.

HC: So it’s a definition. That’s partly *shibai*, I guess, but it was partly real. In a way, for me personally, it [UH presidency] became a marginally less attractive job (after we set it up as a state “system”), because I wasn’t seeing quite as much of the best people on the Mānoa campus. They had to go to the chancellor for their problems. And it was harder to start things, to initiate things. (In the earlier setup, for example), PEACESAT was initiated right out of my office, with a quite direct relationship with the professor who was masterminding it. But with a more decentralized administration, all those dynamics would be between the Mānoa chancellor and him, except it might not happen because I had the flexibility to move resources around from my level, more effectively than a campus chancellor would have.

And I suppose that that really is why, in the later periods of [Al] Simone and [Kenneth] Mortimer, that tended to shift back to a situation where the university president was also the Mānoa chancellor.

WN: Would you say by decentralizing and making you become the head of the entire system over the chancellors of Mānoa and the community colleges, that that created more of a vertical-type administration, away from the horizontal administration that you had espoused?

HC: I think a little bit, yeah. And so it was done, as far as I was concerned, primarily for external reasons, reasons of how it looked and how it would work, and how the legislature would react to it, and so on. It wasn’t done for—as far as I was concerned—primarily for internal reasons. Other people may have had a different view.

But I had great admiration for Wytze Gorter. I thought he was not only a first-rate economist, [but] a very wise practitioner of academic politics and administration. He served, for example, on the board of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research in Boulder. We were one of the fifty-some universities that were part of that consortium. I later, when I was in

Minnesota, also served on the board of UCAR. Wytze had a national reach. And so I thought that he'd be an appropriate person—and he had good judgment. If we were going to do it by having chancellors, we'd better get somebody as good as he was as the Mānoa chancellor. Sort of establish the fact that that was not just a subordinate official but was a person who could have been president of the whole university.

And it was interesting that the dynamics of some of the internal political issues within the university changed in that he became the gladiator who dealt with the regents and dealt with the outside community on athletics, for example. So that when the famous issue about Larry Price came up, it was really the Mānoa chancellor who was handling it, and I was backing him, but I was sort of one step removed. Yet I was the executive officer of the board of regents, so as soon as it became a regent issue, as many Mānoa things did, I had to be involved.

WN: I see.

HC: But the Larry Price issue, you may recall, was not a question of whether he should be—he'd been the defensive [football] coach—whether he should be appointed full [i.e., head] coach. The question was whether he would be given a five-year contract or more of a sort of probationary contract to see how he would do. He had never been a head coach before. And he was a very well-known person, and a very engaging personality, whom I liked very much, I must say.

And when the board of regents got sufficiently tired of Wytze Gorter's insistence and my insistence that we should do only a short-term contract, and presumed to make the decision that the board of regents could make a contract directly with the football coach, I thought that was an issue to resign over. And if I hadn't already announced that I was leaving at the end of that year [1974], I think I would have resigned over that issue. Wytze Gorter did resign over that issue, as chancellor. So, he was not only bright and well able to handle himself, but he had the courage of his convictions.

WN: Was that a matter of loss of control? Or was it just a matter of one or two very strong-willed regents who really, in my opinion, didn't have the proper idea of what a board of regents should be doing?

HC: Well, I think it . . .

WN: Or of both?

HC: Those are the same thing, really. Because the regents who felt strongly about the athletic program, and particularly Wally Fujiyama, were—I mean, he was a very strong, rough, tough bargainer. And most of the other regents weren't prepared to stand up to him. So if he wanted something, that was the way it was going to be. But my feeling about it was that it was itself a constitutional problem. You simply couldn't have the board of regents managing the university. They had hired managers to manage the university. And making a contract with the football coach was part of managing the university. [In May 1974, the board of regents voted to extend Price's contract to 1979, leading to the resignation of UH-Mānoa chancellor Wytze Gorter.] And a manager whose supervisory board bypasses him, if he stays under those conditions, he's fatally weakened. And so that's how both Wytze and I thought about it. And I

still think that was right. And actually, on the substance of the matter, I think we probably turned out to be right, too, because he didn't stay for very long as a head coach. [Price resigned as head coach prior to the 1977 football season.]

WN: But did you see it as a *Haole*-local thing? With Wytze Gorter versus Wally [Fujiyama] and Larry Price?

HC: Well, it was, certainly in their minds. I'm sure Wally thought that we were discriminating against Larry because he didn't look like the kind of football coaches we were used to at Notre Dame or Syracuse or Michigan or Minnesota or wherever.

LC: Wally set out to dominate the law school. He was going to run that and dictate about it. So it wasn't just athletics. He interfered with faculty appointments. He wanted to dictate even what the law school was going to teach, the way I heard it. Is that correct?

WN: Right.

HC: Yeah.

WN: I think he said that, yeah.

HC: Yeah.

LC: So it was more than an athletic and local thing.

HC: But it came up most dramatically, and most clearly, in the Larry Price case. And it was a very good, clear, simple illustration of the limits of regental authority, and the troubles if you don't put limits to that.

WN: Well, you know, athletics, I think of all issues concerning the university, that's the one issue where you're really talking about community and the university as being . . .

HC: Right.

WN: . . . one. You know, unlike many other universities, an athletic team representing that university represents that university. Whereas, in Hawai'i, maybe in a few other places, the athletic teams represent the entire state.

HC: That's right.

WN: Under the guise of the University of Hawai'i. There's no pro team.

HC: Right.

WN: Here, you have the University of Minnesota football team, and then you have the Minnesota Vikings. So you could have these different allegiances and so forth. But in Hawai'i, you know, we talked earlier about the only game in town. You know, University of Hawai'i football, basketball, where . . .

HC: We're the only game in town.

WN: Someone who has nothing to do with the university, who has no desire to even care about what's going and what's being taught at the university, "This is my team . . ."

HC: Yeah. Right.

WN: . . . because they represent the state of Hawai'i. And that probably posed a very difficult situation for you.

HC: I think that states it extremely well, Warren. You can turn that around and put that in my mouth if you want to.

(Laughter)

HC: Because that's exactly the way it works. And that's why the regents and the governor and the legislators and other people had a sort of a special angle on the athletic teams. I felt a little badly because I said to Wally Fujiyama several times, "Look, if you want a professional team here, you shouldn't look to the university. You should develop a pro team."

But, let me tell you one other incident that illustrated to me what a major gap there was between the administration and the regents. We had—what was the name of the doctor on the board of regents?

LC: Was he the one that was spotted at the airplane?

HC: That was the incident. The basketball team was on its way to play some games on the Mainland, and he was spotted at the ramp, going up into the airplane, handing out money to the members of the team—spending money for them. Because he didn't think they were being compensated enough. Well, that was enough to get us thrown out of the NCAA [National Collegiate Athletic Association]. And it would certainly have queered our pitch for joining the WAC [Western Athletic Conference]. And yet I didn't want to make a big public scandal about it.

WN: Who actually saw it?

HC: I don't remember . . .

WN: A reporter? Or . . .

LC: I hope not.

HC: . . . who it was, but it never got in the newspapers, as I recall.

WN: So it was an internal thing.

HC: So it was an internal thing. But if it had gotten in the newspapers, it would have been just a major black eye.

WN: So how did you handle that situation?

HC: Well, by talking to him and to the other regents. And explain . . .

WN: Were they aware that they were violating a NCAA rule?

HC: Well, I don't think the doctor really cared that much.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 25-12-7-96; SIDE ONE

WN: Okay.

HC: So they kind of pressured him and tried to make sure that that didn't happen again. And fortunately, it never became a big, public scandal. And didn't set off an NCAA site investigation of the University of Hawai'i, which it could well have. So in a way, we were lucky to escape from the consequences of that act, because the act was so blatant.

WN: The issue of athletics, also. When you were president, during those five years, the university went from, I would say in my opinion, still a small-time regional sports program, and literally overnight, particularly in basketball . . .

HC: Particularly in basketball.

WN: . . . went to national prominence, with the Fabulous Five.

HC: We went to the NCAA [tournament] one year [1972]. We went to the NIT [National Invitational Tournament, 1971].

WN: Right.

HC: And also, we had the Rainbow Classic which turned out to be a tremendous success. I mean, absolutely filled the hall. Where was it? Blaisdell [Center], I guess, that they were playing in [then known as Honolulu International Center]. And basketball, you can do that by recruitment because you only need seven or eight people who are first-rate, and then a few others. We were in a particularly unfavorable position to do that in basketball, because the average height of people who were born in Hawai'i was not really tall enough to play basketball in a collegiate league. But once you imported a few [John] Penebackers and others, you could fill in with guards locally, and it could still more or less look like a Hawai'i team.

WN: That prompted your question to regent [Charlie] Ota.

HC: Yeah. But one of the more dramatic things that I remember from that program was the [1970] Rainbow Classic. One year [1970-71], we had a very good team, and we were pretty sure we'd wind up in the finals. And the one thing that we didn't want to happen was that we would play BYU [Brigham Young University]. Not the local BYU, but BYU in Utah. So they

[BYU] were put---so we didn't want to have to meet the BYU team, which was all White. And they'd brought their band, and so forth.

LC: All White, girl cheerleaders in blue and white. (Laughs)

HC: All White.

LC: All blond.

(Laughter)

HC: And so they were quite deliberately put in the other bracket, so we wouldn't have to meet them in the early rounds. [Because of the Mormon church's controversial racial policies, student leaders protested Brigham Young University's participation in the 1970 Rainbow Classic basketball tournament.] We didn't think they'd survive the early rounds. But somehow they did survive. And they got in the finals, too. The evening (of the finals), I thought the roof was going to blow off that hall. It was the most exciting athletic event I think I've ever witnessed.

LC: Absolutely. (Laughs)

HC: The audience was just screaming for a victory. It was a very close game. [Hawai'i won, 94-90.]

LC: And their band (laughs) was trying to drown them out. (Laughs)

HC: Every time there was an intermission, their band would start in, and our band would try to compete with them. (Laughs) And it became a sort of public racial quarrel, almost. And I don't know what would have happened if we hadn't won that game. (WN laughs.) But fortunately, the Fabulous Five did win that game.

LC: They played way over their heads the whole evening. (Chuckles) It was just wonderful.

HC: Well, both teams did.

LC: Yeah.

HC: So it was a terrific contest.

LC: Who was the little guy that was on the Fabulous Five?

WN: Jerome Freeman.

LC: Jerome . . .

HC: Jerome Freeman.

LC: Right. He leaped clear up and hung from the basket (laughs) at the end.

(Laughter)

HC: Jerome Freeman, that's right.

LC: He practically ran between their legs (laughs), he was so little and so quick. (Laughs) He was amazing.

HC: It was great fun.

WN: Well, you know, the national prominence that they brought to the university, and. . . . You know, when you took office, that was one of your goals. To achieve national prominence for the University of Hawai'i.

HC: Yeah.

WN: And athletics was one field, but of course there were consequences to that, and growing pains, or whatever. And I think that led to some problems.

HC: Yeah, because it had developed that [head basketball coach Ephriam] "Red" Rocha was kind of playing at the ethical margin of college athletics. And we were worried about that, and eventually, we did fire him as the coach. I made a mistake, I think, in having that announced at the last game [of the season], I think it was. Because that gave it much more prominence and produced a huge reaction in his favor.

LC: And his wife and daughter were at the game, and he hadn't told them this was going to happen. Harlan had been conferring with him for twenty-four hours about another job, and he'd never told his family. So they got it right in the face at the game.

HC: We did, in fact, reassign him. We didn't fire him.

WN: Right. Right. [The March 5, 1973 editions of the *Honolulu Advertiser* and *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* reported that Red Rocha was "stepping aside" as basketball coach and would accept a position as coordinator of the statewide university athletic commission.] It was unclear, even in the media, you know. It wasn't clear, what really happened.

HC: But that was the kind of thing that. . . . I didn't want to have to fight that argument in public, of course. So the fact that the reasons for firing were somewhat fuzzy was essentially deliberate. Because we didn't want to prefer charges or anything, or . . .

LC: But the trouble was that nobody knew that he'd spent twenty-four hours working out an alternative job for him, and that he'd agreed to it.

HC: But it was a tactical mistake to announce it at the game. I can't be right all the time. (Laughs)

WN: That was your decision?

HC: Yeah.

LC: But putting the athletics in perspective makes me understand better why the reaction was so

strong.

WN: Right.

LC: When it was a local. . . .

HC: But it wasn't just a university issue, it was a . . .

LC: That's right.

HC: It was part of the pride of being a state.

WN: It's how people define themselves, really. How well your athletic team. . . .

HC: Right.

WN: And, I think in Hawai'i, it's more pronounced, because we're in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, and there's always this need to say that you're better . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . than people on the Mainland. I mean, people wouldn't think of that before, but suddenly, we have this powerhouse basketball team, and we can beat anybody over there.

HC: Yeah.

WN: It's just this feeling that just took over the entire community.

HC: Yeah.

WN: And, you know, here you are, in essence head of the university . . .

LC: Who's an East Coast *Haole*.

WN: . . . you know, and a decision that you make—for example firing the basketball coach like that—is in essence saying, it's like saying you're the head of Hawai'i.

(Laughter)

HC: Yeah.

WN: You're the head of the state, rather than just a university. Everything was magnified, is what I'm . . .

HC: Yeah.

LC: Yeah.

WN: . . . what I'm saying. My reading of it was it magnified into something beyond the university

theme.

HC: But it was interesting. I don't recall Governor Burns ever trying to micromanage the athletic program, tell me what I ought to do about it. Except, he wanted to get into the Western Athletic Conference. And I thought that was a very good idea, so we had no disagreement about that.

LC: He never missed a game.

HC: He never missed a game. And I'm sure that he talked to some of his friends who were on the regents. And that may have been part of the problem. But he himself was very correct about the relationship. And that was true also academically. He didn't call me on the carpet for something that was generally unpopular in the community, or something like that. He. . .

WN: When you look at some of the major issues that faced the university, you know, going back to Oliver Lee, some of these other issues that you confronted, would you say that much of this involved mostly procedure problems rather than the actual issue itself? For example, with Oliver Lee, you're talking about opposition to the [Vietnam] War, academic freedom, and things like that. But then it became really more due process, tenure, procedure kinds of things. Would you agree that much of the problems, the confrontations, involving the university were largely procedural?

HC: I think at least they turned up in procedural guise. But in the Oliver Lee case, I think the procedure was the substance because nobody was really arguing that the war was a great thing. And it would have been obviously wholly inappropriate to fire somebody because of their views about a matter of substance like that. So that the question arose over whether he was going to be promoted and given tenure. And he made that more difficult by continually getting in the news.

WN: Okay, well, I don't want to get into that situation, because that's really out of . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . your. . . I think I sort of used that as an example. [The Oliver Lee situation was one dealt with by HC's predecessor, Thomas H. Hamilton.]

LC: You told him your two points about why the politics was so difficult?

HC: Well, there was a famous quote from a guy who used to teach public administration at Columbia University. And he was trying to explain one time—or I don't know, maybe he was asked—why is academic politics so vicious? And he was a political scientist, so he was being asked sort of a professional question. Why is academic politics so much more vicious than other forms of politics? And he came up with a wonderful answer. He said, "One of the reasons is that the stakes are so small." (Chuckles) "And the other reason is that the men of honor always seem to be outnumbered by the men of principle." In other words, the people who were—and that's the procedure issue, you see—people who will stand on principle, on a matter of procedure. And you can always get more faculty members around that argument than you can on the question of substance, which would be, I guess, what he meant by the "honor" side of that.

WN: Well, where would you put you in this spectrum?

HC: Well, I think I was---it was natural because of the position, and because of past experience too, that I was more focused on the substance, on what we were trying to do. And more willing to be flexible about procedural questions.

But on some kinds of procedural questions, such as the relationship between the governing board and its executive officer, I regarded that as really a question of substance.

WN: It gets to the very heart of governing a university.

HC: Yeah.

WN: Because if the regents, really, manage the university, then in essence, the state government is doing it.

HC: Yeah. Well, particularly in Hawai'i. That might not be true in some places where the governor changes more often, and so on. But in my case, every one of the people on the board of regents had been appointed by Burns. And they all felt that they were sort of part of the Burns administration.

WN: So you felt very often, or you felt often enough, that people were making—the regents were making an end run around you?

HC: Well, not---I wouldn't say often, no. Because sometimes, they were—on other issues—they were critical and parochial. I remember a meeting of the board of regents in which. . . . We always had a lot of statistical reports that we sent routinely to the board. And we were trying to recruit somebody in a sub-field of biology. I can't remember what the word was now. Do you remember that?

LC: I'm trying to remember it, but. . . .

HC: And it was the kind of sub-field where there were probably only half a dozen, or a dozen at most, first-rate people in the whole country. And one of the regents was critical of the fact that the chairman of that department was off gallivanting around the country on our budget, trying to recruit somebody for this slot. And asked the question, you know, "Can't we find somebody like that around here?" Well, in the context, for that particular slot, that was a ridiculously ignorant question. But you couldn't say to a regent, "That's ridiculously ignorant," you know. So we just had to explain how difficult it was, and how few people there were, and so on. And how if you didn't go after them, other people would get them 'cause there were a lot of good universities with good biology departments.

So, you've got that kind of regent trouble. But by far, the most serious issues with the board of regents as a whole, or at least with the majority of the board of regents, came over athletics. And that may be typical (elsewhere, too).

LC: Yeah, boy. You certainly hear a lot of stories about it. (Laughs)

WN: Well, you can look at athletics and look at, you know, in essence it is trivial, because you are

talking about a game, a kids' game, and so forth. But then on the other hand too, the revenue that they brought in.

HC: It was a big deal. And we were too early at that time, to have some of the issues that have come up, and been front and center in athletic administration in the last twenty-five years. Equal facilities for women's athletics, for example. Nobody was talking about that. We had some women's teams, some of which—the volleyball team, for example—were doing very well in national terms. But it hadn't become a major feminist issue at that time.

WN: It wasn't federally mandated either.

HC: Yeah. But on the whole, we did accomplish, I think, during my period a considerable upgrading of the athletic performance and reputation, of the teams. And football, eventually—I guess it was my last year—the WAC thing was able to happen. And I was pleased that it happened while it was still my pigeon.

The reason why it was best to play in a league of more or less similar quality was illustrated when one year—I guess probably about, maybe my second year or so—we had Nebraska on our [football] schedule. Nebraska that year was number one in the country. And I had a call from the president of the University of Nebraska, whom I knew. You get to know people in the university presidents circuit, and I had met him before anyway. And he said, "You know, the people of Nebraska are pretty enthusiastic about football and about following their team. I think it would be helpful if you could reserve about 20,000 seats," (WN laughs) "in your stadium." We were still playing in the Termite Palace [i.e., Honolulu Stadium].

WN: Which held about that.

HC: Which held about 20---I think if you put special chairs at the top and everything, you could get up to about 23[,000] or [2]4[,000] or something like that.

WN: Right.

HC: And I said, "If I made that deal, I'd have to send in my resignation that same day."

(Laughter)

HC: "I'd never survive here." So we finally bargained down to 5,000. But even that was something of a squeeze.

LC: Sure, everybody wanted to see Nebraska play.

HC: Everybody wanted to see Nebraska play. And when they came, we were down in Waikīkī the night before, at a restaurant with some friends, I think some of the visitors. Waikīkī was a sea of red. Everybody was wearing red.

LC: Every red aloha shirt and *mu'umu'u* in town was sold out.

(Laughter)

HC: And one of the---the reason why there were so many people there, even though they couldn't go to the stadium, was that an enterprising tour director advertised in Nebraska, "Come to Hawai'i." The game was not going to be on national television. "You can watch the game on television at the same time that you're looking out at the surf. As soon as the game's over, you can go swimming," and so forth. And was sort of . . .

LC: Oh, and they had a *lū'au*. They were going to have TV sets all around the *lū'au*, too. (Laughs)

HC: Yeah. (Laughs)

LC: (Laughs) They came in droves. (Laughs)

HC: Literally, 20,000 people did come.

WN: Really?

HC: And it was a tremendous bonanza for the tourist industry, I guess. And I'm sure that for the local TV, they got higher ratings, probably, for that game than almost anything. Because all the Nebraska people were watching, but all the people in Hawai'i were watching to see the best team in the country, which they wouldn't normally have the chance to. At least they have a chance to see them in Hawai'i.

LC: Hawai'i was the only team in the country to score against them first. And this touchdown was knocked on a (laughs) foul or technicality or something and didn't count. (Laughs)

WN: Was that the one forty-five to three or something?

HC: No, it was thirty-something. Because as it turned out, we did better than most of the teams in the country had done against them.

WN: Right. I remember that. Why don't we end today, for this morning's session?

HC: Okay.

END OF INTERVIEW

Tape Nos. 25-13-8-96 and 25-14-8-96

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Harlan Cleveland (HC)

April 10, 1996

Minneapolis, Minnesota

BY: Warren Nishimoto (WN)

[NOTE: Also present at the interview is Lois Cleveland (LC), HC's wife.]

WN: This is an interview with Harlan Cleveland, for the UH presidents oral history project, on April 10, 1996, and we're at his home in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The interviewer is Warren Nishimoto.

Okay. Let's begin our last interview for this series. And before I get into the latter part of your tenure as president, '73 and '74, I'd like to ask you about a couple of issues that might have reached your desk. One is the issue of collective bargaining for faculty. Was that a major issue?

HC: Well, it was a major development, but it was beginning to happen all over the country. So it wasn't just a Hawai'i thing. I always thought that it was a bad idea for faculty members to form a union. I thought it would be better for them to have a strong professional association and work things out that way.

Because, unionization would have a levelling effect. Since, you know, if you were an associate professor, you would tend to get paid so much whether you were topflight or just average in whatever the field was. It didn't seem to me to serve either the university's purpose or the individual's purpose, for the best of the people in a particular category to be kind of held to an average salary. For fields in which our Mainland competition was—which once was much livelier—it would be harder to get the best people unless we paid top price. It would be harder under collective bargaining, I thought, to make those distinctions, either between excellence and average, and between, say, physics and English. Because for a very good price for an English teacher, you couldn't get a first-rate physicist in the marketplace. And we needed to be able to make those distinctions. Those were distinctions I thought would tend to be rubbed out by the collective bargaining process.

The other part of it that I wondered about from the beginning was whether a union would think that standards of excellence were subject to bargaining; I couldn't figure out how (to bargain about) intellectual activity. I can imagine (such bargaining about) piecework, where you're able to measure how many gadgets (the worker is) able to turn out in an hour, and so on. Where productivity was measured that way, you might be able to bargain about the numbers. But I didn't know how you'd do that with medieval history, or ancient Korean traditions, or. . . .

WN: Were there other subjective ways to measure productivity? Student evaluations, publications?

HC: Yeah, but that's not the kind of thing that I thought, if you had a union-type leadership . . .

WN: Hmm. I see.

HC: I didn't think the American teacher's union. . . . What was it called?

WN: UHPA [University of Hawaii Professional Assembly]?

HC: No. The one that . . .

WN: Oh, prior to that.

HC: The one that got it at first.

WN: I think American Association of University Professors?

HC: No, that was in the second round. The first round, it was the more militant union for grade school and high school teachers.

WN: HEA? Hawai'i Education Association?

HC: No, that was more of a, really more of a professional association at first. It was the American Association of Teachers, or something like that.

WN: American Federation of Teachers?

HC: AFT. Yeah, that's it. I haven't been involved in that kind of business (for more than two decades), so it gets a little fuzzy in the mind. Some universities had considered the option, and some of their faculties had voted on whether to have a union, and had decided not to. That was true of most of the Ivy League institutions; and some public universities, like University of Michigan, had also voted it down.

But the politics of our situation was fundamentally different. In the first place, unions were politically popular. Some of them—Harry Bridges and the longshoremen and so on—had played a big part in the history of the West Coast and of Hawai'i. So it was hard to make the kind of points that I'm making now without being seen to be anti-labor, you know. But by the same token, the labor mystique in Hawai'i was very hard to apply to this kind of intellectual activity.

So I had talks with Werner Levi and others—the faculty leaders. I advised them against going for a union. But some of the best of the faculty leaders thought that it would be both good for them, but also, that it was inevitable in Hawai'i that it would happen, and they'd better try to keep control of it themselves.

The other factor that was different from other institutions was this: in the nature of things, if you once had state legislation that said there will be collective bargaining at the University of Hawai'i, that would mean everybody—community college faculties and (the instructors in)

various part-time (programs). And they would have interests (that conflicted with those of) the Mānoa faculty. And I thought that the probability was that the people who regard themselves essentially as teachers on the Mānoa campus, and most of the community college faculties, would outweigh in voting the oceanographers and astronomers and other people who had (major advanced research interests—and) where (both the university and the state) had a big stake in their research programs. There'd be no way to sift those out of the mix. I didn't make a huge public fuss about it, but I was quite frank in telling (faculty members) that I thought that it was bad news from their point of view to (vote for collective bargaining).

So then they had a hearing. It wasn't the legislature that had the hearing, it was the Hawai'i Labor Relations Board, I guess. They had a hearing about whether this kind of union collective bargaining could be applied to the university. And also—very important—where you would draw the line between "labor" and "management" in a university. I was clearly management. And a professor with no administrative duties was clearly a peon (in the traditional hierarchy of labor relations). But what about a department chairman? The department chairman is partly representing the faculty in collective units—in effect, disciplines—but at the same time, the department chairman has responsibilities to the administration to stay within budget and stuff like that. So they had me come and testify about where you would draw the line. And I read up on some labor history, and prepared quite a substantial brief on the subject, which was, I think, quite baffling to them because their experience hadn't prepared them for my argument, which was that a department chairman is both "management" and is also part of the "labor" group.

WN: Especially when department chairs teach also.

HC: Well, exactly. And most department chairs do teach and do research. So I thought that if they were going to do collective bargaining, that there ought to be some way of adding a third party of people who were not entirely labor and not entirely management, but who had certain responsibilities of their own and ought to be heard in the dialogue, or "multi-logue." I think I may have called it a "multi-logue." It was a word that they hadn't ever heard, because I had made it up.

WN: "Multi-logue?"

HC: It was a word that I had made up, so they hadn't ever heard it.

(Laughter)

HC: It meant, you know, a dialogue between more than two people (WN laughs) or two groups. It was kind of an interesting seminar. And after all, I'd been teaching public administration and worked on government union issues, and known a lot of labor leaders in my life, so I made it too complicated an issue for them. The result was they went ahead and simplified it anyway; they threw the department chair into the [bargaining] unit. I told them if the department chairmen were thrown into the unit, that would require the appointment of a whole collection of assistant deans to do some of the things that the department chairman was supposed to do for the administration. And that would inflate the administrative costs of the university, and be generally unpopular with people who thought that there oughtn't to be so many administrators anyway. That was a sort of curve ball from the point of view of the labor relations panel, because I was speaking to their prejudices—that there were already too many administrators,

you know. I was saying, "If you do this, there'll be more administrators." They were sort of (chuckles) taken aback by that, I think.

Anyway, all my efforts along that line were not very successful. And it came out the way it was almost bound to come out, I suppose, in Hawai'i because of its labor history. And so we had the vote. And a substantial majority of the whole community, including all the other (eight) campuses, as well as Mānoa. . . . The neighbor campuses were very largely—in the case of Hawai'i Community College, for example, probably unanimously—in favor of collective bargaining. The vote was more split on the Mānoa campus. As I remember, it was a slight majority against collective bargaining on the Mānoa campus, but that was swamped in the bigger numbers of (funiversity) faculty (as a whole).

Then there came questions about collective bargaining for other categories of people. Graduate assistants, for example. The graduate assistants wanted very badly to be (in on the act), "If everybody else is going to have a union, we ought to have a union," you see. And again, I was allergic to that because I thought that it would have the effect of levelling wage scales, and not reflecting the different markets for different kinds of people in different fields.

The line I took was partly based on the fact that I knew a lot of people in other universities, and knew what had been happening in other universities, and could guess all too clearly what would likely happen in Hawai'i if you had collective bargaining. So the AFT, first of all, they had the vote that there would be collective bargaining. Then there was the election. And the faculty senate leadership sort of organized as a union and put themselves forward as a bargaining unit. And the AFT went out and beat the bushes and got the vote. The leadership of the AFT was quite predominantly people whose thinking about the university and about power issues was inherited from the [19]60s. So they saw this as a matter of who's really going to have power in the university. But the trouble was that they were so preoccupied with these power issues that they neglected to do the main thing that the union was supposed to do, which was to bargain collectively about terms and conditions of employment, especially salaries. So we went through at least two full years without a raise for people in the faculty, because the union couldn't get itself organized and didn't get itself professionally engaged on the question of salary levels, which is a very complicated and rather boring subject, you know, to become an expert on. Your own salary is not boring, (WN laughs) but everybody else's salary is sort of a bore.

So I went down to the legislature and said, "Look, these fellows haven't yet learned how to do collective bargaining. You mandated collective bargaining, but the result of your mandating, and their not knowing what to do with it, is having a very bad effect on our competitive position in the academic marketplace." Our levels of professors and associate professors were falling behind their colleagues in the same fields on the Mainland. And that was going to be very bad for Hawai'i. And I thought we ought to get the faculty a raise, even if they hadn't bargained for it. It was sort of an unusual position to take.

But you see, I was in an interesting position. Because early in the game, it was decided—politically decided in the legislature—that the bargaining unit for the employees would be whatever unit was elected. But the bargaining unit for management would be the board of regents, not the management of the university. Because people in the legislature, I think, who were in favor of collective bargaining thought that the regents were more political appointees and would yield more easily to what the unions would want.

Well, the staff work for the board of regents was, of course, done by our staff, especially by Ken [Kenneth K.] Lau, a main person. If you wanted to get a good rehearsal of just how the negotiations would go, he'd be the best source. And maybe it was done that way because it was pretty widely known that I was opposed to the general idea of collective bargaining—so they didn't want me to be one of the collective bargainers.

Anyway, I was going down to the legislature and saying, "Look, you've told the board of regents and the unions to negotiate, but they're not getting on with it. And I'm telling you, as president of the university, that we're going to fall behind in the academic competition if we don't keep up. So why don't you put some money in the pot?" So there was quite a big issue about that, and the legislative leaders finally decided that, no, they don't want to contaminate collective bargaining. Collective bargaining was such a pure thing, you see. They didn't want to contaminate it by reaching in and saying, "Well, here's a raise," you know.

So, I was unable to accomplish that, and I thought it was really a very peculiar turn of events. Because here I was advocating a raise for faculty members who were defending the collective bargaining process so vigorously that they were preventing themselves from getting a raise.

(Laughter)

WN: So you were looking more in terms of merit pay? Or were you looking at an across-the-board raise?

HC: Well, at that point I was really looking at some across-the-board money to get our general level up, because we were falling behind in everything.

WN: So this is not a merit increase kind of thing, based on subjective . . .

HC: No.

WN: . . . criteria of excellence or anything like that, which is probably what you would be more in favor of.

HC: And which is the way a university normally works. Because the best professors get more money, and more tolerant practices about outside consulting and (outside activities), to compensate for the fact that they are being creative.

Then, finally, the faculty leadership—the real leaders of the faculty, not the leftover protesters from the [19]60s—got very restive about all this. They weren't getting a raise, and none of their colleagues were getting raises, and it was because the union leadership thought of this somehow as a power game, and didn't think of the bargaining about conditions of employment as the centerpiece. (Chuckles) And I was kind of advocating getting on with the bargaining—but meanwhile, trying to get enough money so that we didn't have to wait another year for the raises.

The faculty leadership, including Werner Levi and others, got sufficiently restive about that, that they started campaigning for decertifying AFT. And the NEA [National Education Association] group and the faculty professional association, which was basically the leadership of the faculty itself, combined into a new (kind of union)—which I think they called the

University of Hawai'i Faculty Association, or something like that, UHFA. There was a big process, a vote on the decertification and then, having decertified AFT, then this other group was voted in. And they started bargaining right away about the terms and conditions of employment, and so on. And collective bargaining then got going in the way it was supposed to have.

That was happening (just about as) I left (in 1974). I think it was during my last year that the decertification came. So I had considerable difficulty in curbing my tongue and not saying, "I told you so, this was going to be a mess." Because I had really thought that it would be a mess and it turned out to be a mess. And I just don't think that the steel worker's union, the 1937 kind of (model can) very well (be applied) to information workers. But the people who were supporting unionization outside the university were people who had that image in their minds. And the majority of the faculty of the university as a whole was willing to see an apparently militant group carry the ball. The problem is that they didn't (know how to) carry the ball down the field. They were raising issues about who would make what kinds of decisions in the university that were marginal to the terms and conditions of employment. And they were unlikely to be successful in getting them through, in getting the regents to agree to them. 'Cause it [would have] removed power from the regents and the regents' immediate staff, which was me and my staff. So I'm afraid that that was not a happy set of circumstances from my point of view. And it was one of the things that persuaded me that being president of the university for another long period, say another five years, would probably not be the best way to use my talents. But that was only one factor.

WN: Well, let's get into that. In December of 1973, you announced your resignation from the university effective, I think, September of '74.

HC: Yeah.

WN: Well, reading the media accounts, they give some factors. Why don't you tell me what were the major factors in leading to this decision.

HC: I don't remember what the media said. Maybe you can tell me . . .

WN: Well . . .

HC: But I'll tell you first, if you like.

WN: Yeah. (HC chuckles.) It doesn't matter what the media said, really.

HC: When I was negotiating about the question of being president with the board of regents in the spring of 1969, I was asked in one of the meetings with the regents whether I would sign on for five full years. And I said, "Well, it has to be a two-way street, doesn't it?" I mean, the reason they wanted me to sign on was that they had the—historically ridiculous, as you look back on it—idea that the Democrats might beat Nixon in 1972, and that, therefore, I'd be invited back into the government, you see.

WN: You mean in '72.

HC: In '72, yes.

WN: Oh, okay, okay. So you're talking about Nixon just coming into power but they—the Democrats—thinking that he's going to be a one-term president.

HC: Well . . .

WN: Is that what . . .

HC: Some people seemed to think that.

WN: Oh, okay.

HC: I wasn't that confident myself. And so what I told them was that I didn't think that it was a fair bargain for me to sign on for five years, but to be told that I was serving at the pleasure of the board of regents. If the pleasure of the board of regents was for me to serve for five years, then that should be part of the deal.

WN: So they're saying that you can stay for five, but they're saying, "We're not sure we want you to stay for five."

HC: No. They were saying that they wanted me to stay for five, but they weren't willing to change the constitution, which is that the executive officer serves at the pleasure of the board of regents.

WN: Ah.

HC: And that would have required an explicit contract on their part to change that deal. So I didn't have any term of office. But as I came up to the fourth and fifth year, I had a feeling that it would require kind of a new decision—almost as if it had been a five-year term—a new decision on my part. I had to think about that. And I also had the impression that the people most interested in the subject, the regents, and other political folks in the legislature and the governor's staff, and so on, were sort regarding it as a five-year term, too, and thinking that maybe they had a decision to make as to whether I should stay. And because of what I thought was a sort of depressing effect of unionization on the potentials that I had been pushing for at the university, and because the regents were showing more and more signs of local-itis—not only Wally Fujiyama, although he was the most dramatic case—and it seemed clear to me that Hawai'i as a community was going to insist pretty soon on there being a locally-born president of the university, I decided that I didn't really want to stay around to go through that argument and fight about it. It was when I first realized that, that I worked hard to persuade Fudge [Fujio Matsuda] to come to the university [in 1973] as vice president for business [affairs]. He seemed to have the skills of large-scale management that he'd demonstrated in developing the airport and developing the transportation system, when he was [head] of [the Department of] Transportation for the governor. And he was an engineer by original [academic] training. So having built in the person I thought would be a qualified successor, and who had the essential characteristic of being a local, then I started thinking that I would rather decide when to leave, rather than get into a situation where I'd be more and more being pushed out by what was, I think, clearly a deteriorating [relationship with the] board of regents, you know.

WN: Well, what factors led to this so-called deterioration? We've touched on a few of them, the

athletics issue . . .

HC: I think one---they were all appointed by the governor, of course. I think one very important factor was that the governor was sick. He had what he died of, and that was slowing him down, making him less willing to take advice from everybody the way he used to. And that he was putting on the board people that he felt he had some political obligation to, to advance or to give some plum to. And being on the board of regents was regarded as quite a plum, even though it was an unpaid job, of course. And so that deterioration of quality might be symbolized by the change from having [Robert] Cushing as chairman, to having Wally Fujiyama as chairman.

WN: I'm looking at a *Honolulu Advertiser*, December 22, 1973. New regents coming on board were Roger Evans, Sandra Ebesu, Wally Fujiyama, Ruth Oshiro, John Holt. And they would have been replacing Brian Sakamaki, Patsy Young, Robert Cushing, Clarence Chang, and John Farias. And then the ones already on board were [Harold] Eichelberger, Stuart Ho, Monte Richards, Harriet Mizuguchi, Kiyoshi Sasaki, and Charles Ota.

HC: Um hmm [yes].

WN: So according to this, it seems like Wally came on board after, well, right about that time that you announced your resignation. But was he active before that? Is that what you're saying?

HC: He wasn't very active before that in the university. He was active about the law school. I think he was the president of the Hawai'i Bar [Association]. And so he felt that he had a special obligation to supervise the law school, as it were.

WN: I see.

HC: But . . .

WN: Because, according to this, he was coming on-board after you announced your resignation.

HC: Yeah. I didn't remember whether it was before or after. But the resignation was not directly a reaction to the composition of the board of regents. It was a general judgment about the politics of the university, and how it stood in the community, and whether we were looking at the probability of a levelling off of budgets for education in Hawai'i—for the first time (since statehood).

WN: Okay, let me just turn the tape over.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

WN: So, one reason being Governor Burns being ill, and you know, the state not progressing that well. Another was the, maybe the composition . . .

- HC: The state being not as ambitious about education, about higher education, as it had been when I came.
- WN: And one reason was Burns being ill.
- HC: That's my guess, afterwards. That the change in the kind of people that he put on the board . . .
- WN: I see.
- HC: . . . for example, he had [previously] put the Cushings and the Eichelbergers and the Monte Richards and the . . .
- LC: [Monsignor Charles] Kekumano.
- WN: Kekumano.
- HC: . . . Kekumano. And . . .
- LC: Richardson?
- HC: [William S.] Richardson was never on the board.
- WN: No.
- LC: We just knew him.
- HC: He was chief justice. And here the same governor was [now] putting on different kinds of people. So, looking back on it, I'm guessing that the reason for the change in his sense of quality control probably had a good deal to do with the change in his physical energy. Because he had so many of the strings in his own hands, you see. And no real deputy or even chief of staff. So that was one factor, but the other factor was that the economic recession was catching up with Hawai'i. The recession was—to a considerable extent, I think—caused, or occasioned by the huge, long shipping strike. So that everything---the cost of everything went up, and all budgets started being squeezed, and so on. And it looked to me as if it was going to be a maintenance job and not an institution-building job. And I thought that that wasn't my cup of tea.
- WN: Now did you bring Fudge in before this realization?
- HC: I'm sure I brought him in before the beginning of the last year, yeah. [Fujio Matsuda became UH vice president for business affairs in January 1973.]
- WN: So you knew there was a budget [crunch] situation.
- HC: Yeah.
- WN: And you were instrumental in bringing him in as vice president for business affairs, I guess, with that idea that he may be named president?

HC: That was my idea, yeah.

WN: Your idea. Was it anybody else's?

HC: I didn't communicate that idea, I don't think—overtly, at least—to him or to anybody else.

WN: And how did you know Fudge?

HC: Well, I'd gotten to know him. He was in the [governor's] cabinet [as director of the State Department of Transportation], and I was sort of in the cabinet. And I got to know him, you know, in that way. And the university played some part in some of the controversies that came about: how big the airport ought to be, and what the tourism projections were likely to be, and all those issues. I knew him professionally, he wasn't a personal friend at that time. He became that later when he became part of the university. I got to know him, and we got to know Fudge and Amy quite well. They were more than good friends. So, I think it was probably sometime in the fourth year that that happened [1973], but I can't remember exactly when. And the reason there was a vacancy was that the man that I'd brought in earlier, who was a *Haole* from California, was not in very good shape physically, and had to—and finally decided to go back to California.

WN: And who was this?

HC: Bill Parsons.

WN: Bill Parsons. Right. Okay.

HC: He was a very distinguished figure in the field of public administration. He was one of the creators of the National Academy of Public Administration, and had been an assistant secretary of the treasury for administration. He, in effect, established the tradition in Washington, which still persists to some extent, that a career person will be the assistant secretary of administration in each department which is the highest level, usually, that a career civil servant can aspire to.

WN: Yeah. [WN refers to document.] Bill Parsons, here, resigned on 12/1/72. And Fujio Matsuda came on board in January of '73.

HC: Yeah, that checks out. So it was the middle of my fourth year.

WN: Okay. And . . .

HC: January of '73.

WN: . . . Fudge seemed to fit a couple of categories. One, of course, he was local. Born and raised . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . in Hawai'i which, sort of, you were sensitive to at that time. Secondly—tell me if I'm right or wrong—you know, he was a business money-type person, management-type person,

because of his experience in the governor's cabinet. Were you looking at this could be the person who could lead the university in lean times? More of a maintenance-type leader?

HC: Well, I wouldn't have---I don't think I would have formulated it that way at the time. But he had the skills that were going to be needed as managing priorities, that we talked about earlier, became more central. But I thought he also had a good sense of what a university is—was—and what a university could be. But another factor was that he was a member of the local group. He had grown up as a part of the state system. And there was an assumption, which I think he shared, that he could deal effectively with the governor's staff and the administrative agencies and the legislature, because he'd been doing that, and he knew everybody, and so on. So that seemed like a good collection of skills to bring in as the business manager [i.e., vice president for business affairs] of the university. But it also seemed to me that he had the imagination and ambition to make the university the kind of university that I was trying to make it. So it was not as sharp a change as your question implies. And it didn't then seem to be as sharp a change as probably it was in practice, later on.

WN: Now there was another local candidate who wanted the job, and in essence became another candidate for the position when Fudge got in. That was Dick [Richard H.] Kosaki. Was there any thought on your part to support Dick or put him in a position where he would be in a more advantageous position to become the next president?

HC: Dick was not a possibility for the business manager of the university. I mean, I don't think I ever considered him for that slot, for Parsons' slot. 'Cause he was more of an academic, and more of a faculty leader, and that's what he'd been doing as vice president for academic affairs. So that gave at least two options for my succession, and both of them seemed to me to be very good options. And I didn't really think that I should—or that if I tried, I would be successful—completely mastermind my own succession.

(Laughter)

WN: When the---you have the advantage of hindsight right now. Maybe you . . .

HC: Yeah.

WN: . . . could probably say that. But you're being honest. (Laughs) Okay, so you have the budget cutbacks, and . . .

HC: It's unfortunately normal with strong leaders in every—in corporations or in countries—that they don't think very hard about their succession. I mean, you know, [Benito] Mussolini and [Adolf] Hitler and all those people never thought about it. The Chinese obviously hadn't thought about it very hard, (WN chuckles) and the Japanese haven't thought about it at all, they just juggle prime ministers.

WN: You didn't have a really strong feeling, maybe, of who was going to succeed you. But you probably had an idea as to what type of person needs to succeed you.

HC: Yeah.

WN: Or what that new president is going to be facing.

HC: And I thought that it needed to be somebody who was a part of the Hawaiian community on a sort of permanent basis.

WN: You knew they wouldn't do a national search like they did with you, or bring somebody in from . . .

HC: I knew they would do a national search and wind up with a local candidate. So I wanted to build the local candidate in for that contingency. It would've been unthinkable for them to just appoint Fudge, which I think Wally [Fujiyama] probably wanted to do. There had to be a big *shibai* about it. But I think---my guess was that it would be a *shibai*, and that the actual candidates would be local, and probably only one or two. Probably only those two you mentioned: Kosaki and Matsuda.

WN: I think Wytze Gorter's name came up, too.

HC: Well, because he had been on the list before, so he was. . . . But I don't think by that time he was—I don't think he was very ambitious for the job at that point. He was not far from retiring himself.

But then I had the—I don't know what your next question was going to be, but . . .

WN: Go ahead.

HC: I had this problem: how do I make sure that this doesn't become a mess or a big fight? And for that, I sought out the advice—he wouldn't take any money, so I didn't really hire him as a counsel. But I sort of morally hired a counselor for that function to help me decide what was the best way to extricate myself from the situation, without damage to the university and without damage to my own reputation and future. And that's when I asked [J.] Russell Cades for help. And I don't know if I've ever known anybody that I thought had a more balanced and imaginative sense of how to maneuver in a complex situation. I hadn't really known him well, though I'd liked him very much. And we'd been in their home, and so on. And of course he'd been at College Hill; everybody had been to College Hill. But he seemed the kind of person that ought to—he would know everybody. He would know the history, for a long time, of the university and of the state. And he would be able to talk to anybody. And I asked him first to take soundings to determine whether my hunch was right, that things were developing in such a way that there would be an increasing number of voices, including on the board of regents, that would be looking forward to a local to be president. When he came back from those soundings, I never knew who-all he talked to about it. My guess is he talked to everybody. He may well have talked to the governor. And he came back and said, in effect, that you're about right about that.

And his advice was not to let it run on so long that it became a controversy as a consequence of which I left, and so the record would show that I was kicked out, you see. But to preempt the situation. And I had to consider the timing. I went back to this five-year idea, 'cause a lot of people thought that it was a five-year deal even though it hadn't worked out that way. But that was because there was some publicity at the time about a five-year deal. So I kind of glommed onto the five-year term. That was partly self-serving. I wanted to serve out five years, because my retirement would vest then, whereas it wouldn't if I didn't stay for five years. I wanted to give adequate notice so that the process of looking for my successor didn't

start when I left, but started well before I left. There could be a reasonable transition. And all of that I talked through with Russell Cades. That led to my December [1973] announcement. But it was because of the five-year thing that I said I would leave in September [1974], you know, because I could have left in June [1974], at the end of the academic year. But it would have been so silly, because I was then fifty-six [years old]. And so the retirement wouldn't have kicked in until sixty-five or seventy. But since I had it coming, I thought I might as well get it to kick in right away. So my decision, which was not based on having another offer somewhere else yet, changed the dynamics of the situation. It cooled off relations with the board of regents quite a lot because they didn't have to wonder whether they were going to support me or fire me or what, you see. And I think it made the last year a much more constructive year on my part, and on the part of other players in the system, than it might have been otherwise.

Then after that, when I was, in a sense, on the labor market, I ran into Joe Slater, whom I had known somewhat, who was president of the Aspen Institute [for Humanistic Studies], and who had been president of the Salk Institute before that. He used to work for the Ford Foundation. And on one trip to the Ford Foundation looking for money for something, I just ran into him in an elevator and we stopped and talked for a little while. And I told him what my situation was and said that I was looking around. If he had any ideas, I'd appreciate it, 'cause he's the kind of person who had a big circle of acquaintances, particularly in the foundation field.

And before too long, he was back to me, saying that they wanted to internationalize the Aspen Institute [for Humanistic Studies]. And would I consider coming aboard as director of a new international affairs program, and also helping them internationalize their board? And that, in effect, I could write my own ticket as to what the international affairs program would be. It would be a sort of a think tank built around my own (intellectual interests)—what I wanted to think about. At that point, I was kind of hankering after a (period during which) I could get back to doing more writing 'cause most of my writing had been writing speeches and memos and (chuckles) things like that, rather than . . .

WN: Let me ask you . . .

HC: . . . publications.

WN: . . . this question. I guess now is the time when I can ask you some hypothetical questions. One would be, what if Burns were still healthy? What if the budget situation continued to be good? And what if you were getting support from the board of regents? Would you have considered staying?

HC: I probably would have stayed for longer, yeah. But those are pretty big "what ifs."

WN: Now, Lois, given all that, would you have wanted him to continue? Or was it---I'm sure both of you talked about the situation and where you want to go with your lives and so forth. Was it more than just these "what ifs"? Were there other things that would say, "Well, maybe we should try something else."

LC: Well, I think . . .

WN: Maybe you can get a little closer, Lois.

LC: I think the "what ifs" might have meant it would be a little longer before the question came up. I don't know. But the thing I know that he said to me was that given these circumstances, "I'm an innovator. I'm an institution builder. And I'm going to have to turn into a maintenance man, and I don't like that. I want to go and initiate something. Get something moving. That's what I like to do." So how much longer he would have wanted to go on. . . . If he had a lot of new projects coming up, and support funds, it would have been different.

WN: So the "what ifs" that I gave . . .

LC: But when the money dropped, that aspect of the job dropped with it. And that had been going on for a couple years, by then. When he was first there, they put in the university budget, and then the legislature would add a lot more money and things to it. Suddenly, uh oh, no more. Everybody's hurting. You've got to take your share of the cut.

WN: From your perspective, living in Hawai'i for five years, could you have done this for another five years?

LC: I think so. Yeah. But I tend to be pretty happy wherever I am. It doesn't break my heart to pull up stakes and move somewhere else. So I think I could have gone very happily. It would have been nice to be near my children again. [Living in Hawai'i] it wasn't as easy to see them as often as I would have liked to. I had a lot of friends on the Mainland I hadn't seen for a long time. On the other hand, I had never got "island fever." Talked about it. Heard other people talk about it. But I didn't have it. I just loved it there.

WN: Okay. That's interesting.

LC: But if he wanted to move, and I had a feeling he was getting restless, it would have been less pleasant.

WN: So there was nothing like, "Well, Harlan, well, come on. Why don't we just stick it out for a little while more?" or anything like that?

LC: No. No.

HC: Also, I don't think either of us thought seriously about the Tom Hamilton option, of staying in Hawai'i and doing something else.

WN: Why not?

HC: Well, partly because the something else that I most wanted to do was to get back into the general international affairs policy business. And Hawai'i was kind of on the fringe of that as far as America was concerned. And if you had enough money, you could probably develop a big think tank and policy organization in Hawai'i for the whole Pacific. And I'd even tried to do that through this Laurence Rockefeller-Noburo Gotoh deal, but that had fallen through. So my feeling about my future didn't have to do with being in a particular place. It had to do with dealing with a certain kind of subject matter. A certain kind of thinking. And . . .

LC: In the back of my mind, too, I equated it [staying in Hawai'i] with staying in Washington when your party went out of power. From being among the movers and shakers, you had to

come back to being a spectator and watch other people do what you enjoyed doing.

HC: And we never wanted to be . . .

LC: Staying there and not in that job would have been a totally different thing.

WN: I see.

HC: I remember somebody said, maybe it was Lois, that we shouldn't ever get in the position where we were the little child with his nose against the window of the bakery, you know, from the outside, watching the goodies but not being part of it. And the Aspen Institute offered very much the kind of future that I was thinking for myself that I wanted to do. More writing and stirring around in the general foreign policy field. In fact, I stayed in that for six years, which is the longest I'd ever stayed in anything until I came here [Minnesota]. I had no particular idea of going to another university.

WN: Yeah, that's another question I meant to ask you. Did that ever come up? The opportunity to be president of another university?

LC: I think it did.

WN: Like Al [Albert J.] Simone [former University of Hawai'i president who subsequently became president of Rochester Institute of Technology]?

HC: No, not really.

LC: It didn't get to the realistic point, that it. . . . Never offered.

HC: Which?

LC: No other university ever came to you.

HC: I'd had one opportunity to go to the University of Texas as dean of the LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] School [of Public Affairs]. But I was deeply enmeshed in getting the University of Hawai'i going, and I had just. . . . So I didn't really think seriously about that.

If I had sort of put myself on the market for some university presidency, somewhere, my guess is I would have turned up on a number of lists of the kinds of institutions that Simone and Mortimer have made a career out of. But I didn't really want to do that. And there was a limited number of institutions that I knew I would say yes to if somebody asked me. I mean, if somebody wanted me to be president of Princeton, or to be president of the University of Michigan, I would have said yes without a moment's hesitation. But I didn't want to---I mean, I'd been a university president in an extremely interesting and very lively and very expanding and optimistic mode. And it was a little like my feeling about going (as ambassador to) Rome after being at NATO as ambassador. "Well, I've done that. Let's try something else," you know.

WN: Well, that sort of sums up your life, really.

HC: Yeah, it does.

WN: Let's try something else, and do whatever you can to make it better, and then, when the job's done or it looks like you won't be able to do some of those things, then it's time to move on.

HC: Right.

WN: What would you . . .

HC: There's one little thing about the Aspen Institute. When the deal for a big think tank on the Big Island fell through, which was going to be a joint venture of Laurence Rockefeller and the Tōkyū railroad group that owned a lot of hotels and was about to build what is now the Mauna Lani Hotel. A whole group of us, including Laurence Rockefeller and [Noboru] Gotoh, had gotten together in a conference room in one of Gotoh's hotels, which was down on Waikīkī.

LC: The restaurant was on the—was called The Third Floor.

WN: Third Floor? Yeah, I've heard of that.

LC: Yeah. Isn't it the Regent?

WN: Yeah. Hawaiian Regent [Hotel].

HC: Hawaiian Regent.

LC: Hawaiian Regent.

HC: And these two tycoons had been talking about this think tank with some other people sitting around. 'Cause it wasn't going to happen unless they wanted it to happen. And at one point, Laurence Rockefeller leaned over and said, "Do you realize that this might cost us \$5 million each to get this off the ground?" Gotoh grunted that that seemed to be all right with him. So then they jointly asked me to be the entrepreneur to put it together. I first went to Tokyo for a week, and wound up with a cast-iron promise—a challenge grant, really—by Gotoh—that's spelled G-O-T-O-H—that he'd put up \$4 million dollars if the Americans would put up \$4 million, then we could collect another couple of million dollars from Canada, Australia, and so on. Did we go over this before? On the tape? I can't remember.

WN: We might've. We might've.

HC: Anyway . . .

WN: But if you can sum it up.

HC: It did fall through. Because when I went to see Laurence Rockefeller, the stock market had been going down. And he was feeling poor, in relative terms. And so he said he wasn't going to be able to do that.

Well, this was one of the biggest sort of challenge things that had been started from the

Japanese side. There were always Americans going to Japan and saying, "We'll put up this if you'll put up that," and so on. But for the Japanese to start it was kind of an innovation. And so when it crashed, it crashed very publicly.

And the next day, the head of the C. Brewer Company—it was a Canadian at that time—called me up and said, "I see that that thing you were trying to work out has not worked. We're just starting a resort community down on the other side of the [Big] Island, Punalu'u. And we'll build some kind of a conference or retreat center into that, if you want." And since it had been announced that I was going to the Aspen Institute by that time, that was in effect an offer to the Aspen Institute.

So I called up [Joe] Slater to say here's this opportunity for a base in Hawai'i. And how about sending somebody out to work it out with C. Brewer? And he said, "Well, you're shortly going to be one of us. Why don't you work it out with him?" So I did, and they put \$300,000 in escrow, and eventually a very fine conference center was built into that [Sea Mountain Resort] project.

WN: In Punalu'u.

HC: In Punalu'u. And we liked the place so much when we went to visit to see what this was all about, you see, that we eventually, after leaving Hawai'i—the project was just being finished the next year, and we were the second people to buy a condominium in that project. We've had it ever since.

WN: And you still go back every year.

HC: Still go back every year.

LC: We figured he'd be going [back] three, four times a year for different Aspen meetings. That didn't work out. But our cottage (laughs) was there, wonderful, and it's rented when we're not there, so.

HC: And it's been a wonderful place to think and write. Several of my books in the last twenty years have been mostly written there. So, in that respect, it's been a fine investment, especially since it doesn't really cost us anything much to go there for a few weeks, or even a couple of months. Because we go on frequent flier points, and it doesn't cost any more to eat there than it does to eat here (in Minnesota).

LC: And we bought a used car, which is now about old enough to vote. (WN laughs.) An old Ford LTD that (laughs) still zooms up over the volcano and down the other side (laughs) without missing a beat.

HC: Yeah.

LC: So we don't have to rent a car to be there.

HC: Nineteen eighty-four or something like that. No, 1978.

LC: [Nineteen] seventy-eight.

WN: You still have that car?

HC: We still have that car.

WN: You still drive that car to Hilo?

HC: Yeah.

LC: All the time.

WN: Gee.

(Laughter)

LC: And a friend keeps it when we're not there, and he can use it for a second car.

WN: Let me change tapes. We have about twenty minutes before McNeil-Lehrer [News Hour] starts. So, lets---we'll sum it up.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 25-14-8-96; SIDE ONE

WN: Okay, just a few more questions, and we'll be finished. What would you like best to be remembered as a contributor to the University of Hawai'i? If someone were to say, "Harlan Cleveland was president from '69 to '74. He's remembered as being the one who. . . ."

HC: Well, I guess for two kinds of things. One of which would break down into subheads. One would be that he saw the potential for universal higher education, and talked about that twenty years before most people were speaking about it. And had the vision to develop an open admissions, not only to the university, but to the Mānoa campus from the other campuses. And saw that as a way of overcoming the disadvantage of Hawai'i as an ex-colony.

And the other was that he was willing to bet a lot of energy, and in the end, a lot of money, state money and federal money, on certain specialties that were natural to Hawai'i. Astronomy is an outstanding example because without Mauna Kea, there wouldn't be an Institute for Astronomy, probably. At least not a famous one. But during his time, the France-Canada-Hawai'i telescope was developed. The University of Hawai'i, to everybody's surprise, won the competition for the first new NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] telescope, and generally, Mauna Kea was established as the best terrestrial site for astronomy in the world. That was something that started before he got there, but pushing that and defending it was a major piece of business.

He also reorganized and highlighted and helped raise a lot of money for the ocean sciences, which was a natural for an island ex-kingdom, ex-colony, and state.

And maybe the third item that—the kind of attitudes he expressed about the diversity of

Hawai'i, the mixture of people, the "everybody's a minority" kind of politics and economics. That he helped us develop a philosophy about how to think of ourselves. And has since done quite a lot of writing about cultural diversity, which really comes out of the experience he had there. Something like that. Did I show you the piece called "The Limits to Cultural Diversity"?

WN: I read that.

HC: Yeah.

WN: Okay, what about disappointments? "President Cleveland could have done a lot more if it weren't for. . . ."

HC: Well, I guess the main disappointment was that most people didn't really share the sense of destiny about Hawai'i that I think I shared with the governor. That Hawai'i could play a major role in the Pacific basin, that Hawai'i, a microcosm of interethnic mixing, could be a kind of model for what most parts of the world are going to have to do eventually, which is to figure out how people can be different, yet together. I just made a speech this last year in Croatia, at a meeting of a whole collection of academies; I was speaking for the World Academy of Art and Science. The title of my keynote speech was "Different Yet Together," which was so obviously not what the folks in ex-Yugoslavia were demonstrating in the last few years.

So I guess I thought that Hawai'i had more to learn and more to teach than most of my fellow residents of Hawai'i thought. And one aspect of that disappointment—or two aspects that particularly are interesting: one is that the growth of local-itis during the time that I was there seemed to me to be really contrary to Hawai'i's destiny. The kind of imagination that produced an East-West Center, and produced many of the aspects of the University of Hawai'i that I pushed and liked and advertised, were interfered with by the feeling which every community has to some extent—that "We've got everything we need in this community. We don't need to bring in all these strange-looking people from elsewhere to help." And I think that's one disappointment.

And the other is the great difficulty that so many people in Hawai'i had in looking far enough ahead to do the things now that would affect at least the middle distance of the future. For example, it was obvious when I was in Hawai'i that the dependence of many parts of the islands and many people on sugar production was going to go by the board eventually. It was being propped up—even in the [19]70s, it was still being propped up primarily by preferences legislated by Congress, and by protecting domestic sugar production against Cuba and other producers. But now we've come to the point where the Hāmākua [Sugar Company] is closed and now Ka'ū [Agribusiness Company] is closed, and yet no plans have been laid long since, as they should have been, for how to handle that transition. In a way, it's ironic that that's the case, because the university contains in it one of the great futurists in the world, Jim [James A.] Dator. An outstanding thinker, and has been very influential with thinking in many other parts of the world. There was a project that George Chaplin and others had going before I got there. It was called Hawai'i 2000.

WN: Right.

HC: And that was a very constructive and interesting attempt to take time by the forelock. But I don't think it had nearly as much—it didn't resonate as much with the people who held

political power and economic power as I think it should have.

So you speak of disappointments, not so much a personal disappointment, because my personal future didn't depend on Hawai'i doing the things that I thought it ought to do. But I think there were some important opportunities missed there that didn't need to be missed, and that some people, including myself, were calling attention to, for a long time ahead of time.

I don't know, have you collected the texts of the speeches I made during the five years that I was there?

WN: But not systematically. I've collected the ones that you got published in the [*Honolulu Advertiser*, [*Honolulu Star-Bulletin*], but not the ones that you didn't publish. I'm sure it's available.

HC: Well . . .

WN: Would it be available?

HC: I don't know. They'd be available in the archives of the president's office, I suppose. I have quite a collection, and at one point, I thought of writing a book about my period in Hawai'i. And I collected quite a lot of stuff for that. And I found that much of the stuff that I collected was present in speeches that I'd made. I'd already experimented with the rhetoric of writing and talking about those potentials. So it may be that I still should try to do something with that, although it may be also that the conditions under which those things were written are so different now.

WN: They're applicable, still. Okay, well, we're going to have to end the interviews. We've done [eight] sessions. It's not to imply that your career—professional, productive career—ended when you left the University of Hawai'i, of course. You left in '74, and since then you've done so many other things. The Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. You know, you were the Distinguished Visiting Tom Slick Professor of World Peace at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, [University of Texas]. In 1980 you became dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. You also were a professor of public affairs and planning, University of Minnesota. You're currently president of the World Academy of Art and Science. One last question. What's in Harlan Cleveland's future? Or is that too difficult a question, given the fact that you've gone to so many places. (Laughs)

HC: I've always been a sort of compulsive writer, so I suppose that more writing is one of the things that's in my future. We're moving to the outskirts of Washington [D.C.], partly because the focus of my thinking and contacts still has to do with national and international affairs more than with local affairs in Minnesota or Hawai'i or anywhere. So I have a general sense of direction still, about trying to be a philosopher about leadership and about international affairs. And I'll probably continue to improvise on that theme.

WN: (Clock tolls.) A good way to end.

(Laughter)

WN: Thank you, Harlan.

HC: Well, thank you.

WN: I appreciate it very much.

HC: Thank you very much. It's been a very stirring thing to do. It's stirred me up.

(Laughter)

WN: Thank you, Lois.

LC: Thank you, too.

END OF INTERVIEW

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